Tanner James Management Consultants Pty Ltd

ABN 91 063 977 284

4th July 2018
Tanner James submission to the APS Review

This submission advocates that the APS should skilfully adopt global best practice programme and

project management to establish the professional competencies and capabilities it needs to manage

policy in implementation in an agile, innovative and efficient manner.

Sadly, we’ve been here several times before. So many times in fact, that I am actually going to

provide most of my submission in the form of previous submissions. It provides a sorry history of

the APS’s inability to reform itself. I note that the review is to provide recommendations for

implementation and change management strategies, so I’ll address that also – simply by providing a

copy of my implementation recommendations to the Gershon Review.

Here is what I want to convey to the review panel:

1. Global best practice for portfolio (of change) management, (transformation) programme
   management and project management has been around for years. It originated out of the
   then Office of Government Commerce (OGC), established by Sir Peter Gershon, and is now
   run by AXELOS. These are proven de facto global standards used in 150 countries by
   literally millions of people.
   Attachment: The AXELOS Portfolio: Enabling Organisational Change.
2. Tanner James introduced PRINCE2® project management to Australia and the APS in 1996.
   Likewise with other frameworks, including Managing Successful Programmes (MSP®).
   Over 150,000 Australians have been trained in these frameworks, about 10% of them by
   Tanner James, the majority of who are APS. We are an Accredited Training Organisation
   (ATO) and a Registered Training Organisation (RTO). The attached brochure provides a
   sense of our services.
   Attachment: Tanner James corporate brochure.
3. The Gershon Review was conducted in 10 years ago. Tanner James made a submission to
   that review also – attached. Sadly, you can change “OGC” to “AXELOS” and the
   submission is still pretty much a reflection of the situation today. One of the results of the
   Gershon Review was that agencies were required to conduct Portfolio, Programme and
   Project Management Maturity Model (P3M3) Assessments and Capability Improvement
   Planning. Tanner James is accredited to conduct P3M3 assessments and has conducted over
   50 such assessments on APS department’s and agencies.
   Attachment: Tanner James submission to the Gershon Review.
   Attachment: Gershon Review – Implementation Recommendations
4. One department stood out above all others – DHS. We conducted P3M3 assessments of the
   entities that merged to form the department in 2010, and helped the department increase its
   maturity dramatically. The Shergold Report actually specifically highlighted this
   achievement:

Enhancing Your Programme and Project Management Capability
“Some agencies, like the Department of Human Services, have already established a
centralised model of program management to build internal capability, provide an
independent level of assurance for programs with enterprise-level risks and oversee
effective program delivery.166 Such initiatives are to be warmly welcomed. They should be
shared.
166
Tanner James Management Consultants 2014, ‘P3M3 Assessment Report—Department of Human
Services”
Attachment: Tanner James Management Consultants 2014, P3M3 Assessment Report—
Department of Human Services

5. Tanner James has made several other submissions and approaches to the APS advocating
   skilful application of global best practice programme and project management to better
   manage policy in implementation. One example was in 2009 when we approached the then
   FaHCSIA about the Closing the Gap Agenda, following an ANAO report.
   Attachment: Establishing a robust management framework for FaHCSIA’s management
   of the Closing the Gap agenda.
6. Professor Peter Shergold highlighted the inadequacy of programme and project management
   very eloquently in his 2015 Learning From Failure Report. Tanner James created a tagged
   and flagged version of the report and ran a marketing campaign to draw the issues to SES
   attention. Among several other things we offered an e-Book Enhancing Policy
   Implementation Capabilities in the Public Sector highlighting what needs to be done.
   Attachment: How to improve your chances of policy implementation success
   Attachment: Enhancing Policy Implementation Capabilities in the Public Sector
7. For 24 years I have run a small business that is trying to help the APS skilfully adopt global
   best practice programme and project management. We haven’t achieved that – yet. But
   we’ll keep trying. Pockets of the APS have success, but then the SES change and all the
   good work is lost. At least I’m in good company - Sir Peter Gershon and Professor Peter
   Shergold were also ignored. Doing business with the APS is tough for a small business, not
   least due to bureaucratic procurement processes and massive spending fluctuations during
   the course of the financial year.

I hope this input is useful. I would welcome the chance to speak to the panel about implementation.

Yours Sincerely

John Howarth
Founder and Executive Chairman
Tanner James Management Consultants Pty Ltd

MSP®, PRINCE2®, PRINCE2 Agile®, MoP®, and P3O® are registered trade marks of AXELOS Limited. All rights reserved.
The Swirl logo™, AXELOS Certified Partner Logo, MSP, PRINCE2, and PRINCE2 Agile Approved Examination Organization logos are trade marks of AXELOS

Limited, used under permission of AXELOS Limited. All rights reserved.

Enhancing Your Programme and Project Management Capability
The AXELOS Portfolio:
Enabling organizational change
WHY DO ORGANIZATIONS

NEED BEST PRACTICE

APPROACHES?
To achieve long term and consistent success,
organizations must embrace change and
understand how to make it part of their
‘business as usual’ operations.
Business leaders need effective change to make their organizations more competitive,
efficient, resilient and able to deliver value; this requires people with the right knowledge and

skills to make those ambitions a reality.
That is why using proven, industry-leading best practices that work alongside each other can

build the necessary skills to help organizations manage and deliver change while obtaining

real, measurable business value. Employing a best practice method or framework increases

the odds of success and boosts the credibility of an organization.
Ultimately, best practice methods can provide value by addressing key organizational

questions and challenges. Embedding them in an organization will support the delivery of

strategic business objectives in the most cost-effective way possible.
AXELOS’ GLOBAL BEST

PRACTICE APPROACHES

As all organizations seek continual improvement – doing

more, better and for less – this means implementing the

right changes to support business strategy.
AXELOS’ best practice guidance and certifications, developed over 30 years in partnership with

government, industry and academia, will help this process; whether the desired goal is – for example
– risk management, strategic alignment, project delivery or continuous service improvement.
This guide will outline a number of challenges for organizational change and explain how AXELOS

Global Best Practice addresses these challenges: what the best practices are, how they can help

organizations deliver value and how they complement each other in the process of organizational

change. They include:
• PRINCE2®
• PRINCE2 Agile®
• MSP®
• P3O®
THE AXELOS PORTFOLIO:
ESSENTIAL TOOLS FOR

ESSENTIAL GROWTH

Customers who use the AXELOS portfolio

include a large number of the world’s most

recognized brands. Why? They all want to

achieve competitive advantage by ensuring

their business resources, processes and their

biggest asset of all, their employees, are

aligned to fulfilling this goal.
The world’s most practiced project management methodology

The world’s most complete agile project management solution,
combining the flexibility and responsiveness of agile with the

AGILE clearly defined framework of PRINCE2

Principles and processes for use when managing
successful programmes

Business support structures through portfolio, programme
and project offices
BUSINESS CHALLENGE: AXELOS BEST PRACTICE:
Having an effective method for a

business to deliver well-defined
PRINCE2
Organizations need to embrace and execute change:
outputs, products or deliverables this is unavoidable because of increasing pressures
from customer demand, technology, shareholder
expectations and legislation.
Projects provide the vehicle for organization-wide change. However, projects handled by different
parts of an organization tend to be managed differently, resulting in a range of projects ‘marching to
their own tune’ without a cohesive structure. And as technology is now embedded in virtually every
organization and is critical to business success, it is necessary to integrate project management and
IT service management (ITSM).
Other demands of projects include;

• Management between tasks: ensuring outputs are fit for purpose

• Delivering a quality output, product or deliverable

• Dividing projects into manageable chunks and persuading an
organization that it needs to happen that way

• Planning in stages while keeping the
“Organizations
end goal in sight
don’t have time to
• Having a staged process to help
reinvent the wheel but need
decide whether a project
continues or ceases an existing structure to facilitate
integration between project management
• Many project managers can be good
and ITSM. In my opinion, PRINCE2 is the
at gathering requirements, but the
real difference is getting people solution. By adopting it, organizations can then
on board to make things happen; tailor it to the enterprise rather than choosing
acting as an advisor and translator of other methods and practices that don’t fit
stakeholder needs and what should be well together.”
accomplished. The effective project
manager is a trusted authority to run Lisa Hodges – Owner/Principal
the project on a day-to-day basis Consultant, Cornerstone Service
appointed by the project executive and Management
sensitive to the specific needs outlined
within a project’s objectives.
AXELOS BEST PRACTICE:
PRINCE2

PRINCE2 is a structured project management method – based on the collective experience of numerous

project managers, teams, academics, consultants and trainers – which provides a secure framework to

manage projects. PRINCE2 provides guidance that gives individuals and organizations the essentials of

running a project, is easy to learn and a flexible method that can adapt to all types of project.

PRINCE2 is effective because it:
• Is a process-based, step-by-step method which is business, product and value focused

• Enables project managers to get up and running quickly and manage a whole project
from start to finish

• Uses an integrated approach, with standard templates and principles

• Is based on a set of project management principles which, provided they are adhered to, makes
PRINCE2 inherently tailorable for projects of any size and in any environment

• Provides a common language for people working across multiple projects

• Saves the business time and money.
PRINCE2 supports portfolio, programme and project management and integrates readily into

associated AXELOS frameworks MoP and MSP. It helps create the controlled project environment

that programmes rely on to deliver major change. PRINCE2 is also enabled to work in an agile

delivery environment.
PRINCE2 integrates with ITIL, or other ITIL-like frameworks, already in use for ITSM in many

organizations globally.
BUSINESS CHALLENGE: AXELOS BEST PRACTICE:
Responding more quickly

to customer demand and
PRINCE2 AGILE
The needs of business in the 21st century have

remaining competitive in shifted dramatically. Now, speed is of the essence

the market with companies and technologies creating a new
level of response to the ‘I want it now’
world of customer demand.
Therefore, new products and services need to deliver benefits much sooner than ever and should
be a more accurate reflection of what customers want – delivered on time, to the required level
of quality, with the necessary functionality and all within budget. Organizations want to see new
product development at an early stage to understand whether it’s right or wrong, to adapt it for the
next stage of development or to stop the project altogether.
Agile delivery methods within projects are now deployed beyond the IT environment and offer the
ability to realize benefits earlier. However, using agile methods within projects requires a degree of
governance. This is because:

• It will be consuming a large amount of the organization’s capital

• A project is often delivering something complex

• It needs to be aligned with strategic objectives and be
reviewed continually for business justification

“Implementing the PRINCE2 Agile • Someone needs the authority to make ‘go’ or ‘no go’ decisions
approach in the real world [will] apply • It may be delivering several products aligned to corporate
well in companies that have a strong need objectives so needs co-ordinated delivery.
for accountability. Organizations…want to feel
secure and avoid bad or unmanaged surprises
which is perfectly addressed by PRINCE2
concepts like a project manager role, project
stages and meaningful standard reports.”
Jeurgen Halstenberg – PRINCE2
and Agile/Scrum Consultant
and Trainer, Maxpert
AXELOS BEST PRACTICE: AGILE

PRINCE2 AGILE

PRINCE2 Agile builds on the principles of PRINCE2 to help practitioners govern projects using agile

delivery methods. PRINCE2 and agile are complementary, giving project managers a more well-
rounded view of product development in today’s world.

PRINCE2 Agile is effective because it offers:
• Up-to-date guidance, including agile approaches like Scrum, Lean start-up and Kanban

• A ‘one-stop-shop’ for anyone considering agile in a project management domain

• An approach that can be tailored and adapted to different contexts, where agile use is either
at an early stage or mature

• A challenging exam, giving the certification real credibility in the market.
Built collaboratively involving 40 experts, one of the main strengths of PRINCE2 Agile comes from

combining the focus on products and continual business justification in PRINCE2 with the responsive

delivery approach of agile. Together they ensure what is delivered is of value to both

the business and users.
The concepts of PRINCE2 within PRINCE2 Agile allow people involved in projects to speak a

common language and underpin agile delivery methods with an ability to scale and help agile become

more readily adopted across a corporate culture.
PRINCE2 Agile integrates with portfolio, programme and project management, enabling

faster and better decision-making, accelerating the business-planning cycle, enabling

earlier delivery of benefits at programme level, providing a controlled project “PRINCE2 Agile is the

environment and resulting in a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
vital next step in project
management; not because
PRINCE2 wasn’t already agile,
but more because the agile
movement has grown rapidly.”
Steve Boronski – PRINCE2
Lead Trainer at ILX Group plc
BUSINESS CHALLENGE: AXELOS BEST PRACTICE: MSP

Delivering transformational

change in an organization
(MANAGING SUCCESSFUL
PROGRAMMES)
Transformational change in an organization needs to
be based on a corporate business plan and a delivery
mechanism. To minimize risk, manage dependencies
and prioritize the benefits required from change,
organizations need programmes to turn a major
objective into a reality.
A programme is about defining an organization’s future and how its transformed state will look.
However, major change introduces complexity, risk, numerous interdependencies and competing
priorities that need managing. Some of the challenges when introducing programmes are:

• Not recognizing or accepting the size of change created by programmes

• Getting an organization’s employees to buy into transformational change

• How mature the organization is and the competence of people to deliver programmes

• Gaining senior stakeholder involvement

• Lack of clarity about what a programme needs to achieve and not following the right steps

• Senior executives dealing with the outcomes, i.e. making difficult,
organization-wide decisions while being busy with the day job
“MSP is a proven best
practice framework that provides
• Adding value without added bureaucracy.

the right steps to get organizations
moving with major change. It focuses
on managing organizational change
and stakeholders, delivering strategic
objectives rather than co-ordinating a
group of projects.”
Rod Sowden – Managing Director,
Aspire Europe
AXELOS BEST PRACTICE: MSP
(MANAGING SUCCESSFUL

PROGRAMMES)
MSP provides programmes with an agenda and sequence of events to follow, helping executives,
the sponsoring group, the programme board and the senior responsible owner (SRO) through the

process. It also helps programmes get started properly: bringing together the sponsoring group,
agreeing a programme brief which outlines where the organization wants to go, enabling wider

stakeholder engagement and working on the endgame.

The MSP Best Practice guidance is effective because it:
• Focuses on strategic, business change

• Builds stakeholder engagement

• Provides an adaptable route map for a programme

• Ensures consistent communication about the aim of the programme and overall transformation

• Helps people understand the benefits to be delivered by the programme

• Delivers the right products and outputs in the right order to achieve
the benefits and deliver transformational change.
MSP complements other AXELOS Best Practice guidance, for example helping PRINCE2 project

managers remain aligned to corporate strategy and deliver what’s required. It works closely with

AXELOS’ Management of Portfolios (MoP®) Best Practice to ensure related projects are grouped and

managed effectively to achieve business goals.
It can also be used effectively with project management frameworks outside

AXELOS’ Best Practice guidance.
BUSINESS CHALLENGE: AXELOS BEST PRACTICE: P3O

Creating an internal

structure for supporting
(PORTFOLIO, PROGRAMME

change in an organization & PROJECT OFFICES)
Organizations need to know how well their methods for
change and improvement – portfolios, programmes and
projects – are performing: are they meeting objectives and
supporting the business in making the right decisions? Are
they the right investments? Are they delivering value and
change most effectively?
The problem comes when project or programme managers are tasked with both supporting change
and managing change. If they are responsible for collecting data, analyzing information and planning,
it becomes difficult to see the big picture and make the right decisions in line with organizational
objectives. As a consequence:

• There is less or no consistency in calculations and reporting for business
cases, plans, resources allocated and funds accounted for

• Project and programme managers might have inadequate data and focus on
the wrong tasks, causing programmes or projects to drift off course

• It becomes difficult to prioritize initiatives for approval or not.

“P3O provides guidance
to ensure that the services
delivered by your Portfolio,
Programme and Project Offices provide
ongoing real value, adding services
that drive and support delivery of your
organization’s strategy.”
Eileen J Roden, PMO and PPM
Consultant and Trainer.
Chalk House Training
and Consultancy
AXELOS BEST PRACTICE: P30

P3O provides guidance on establishing appropriate support structures for portfolio, programme and

project management disciplines. This function is more commonly known as a Project Management

Office or ‘PMO’.
The integrated offices operate to collect data in a compliant way to help decision-making in line with

the three levels of change: portfolios, programmes and projects. P3O helps achieve this by providing

the one reliable version of the truth about the status of the portfolio, programme or project. It does

this by:

• Providing a set of consistent standards of working, processes and templates

• Ensuring a consistent approach across all initiatives

• Providing accurate and timely data

• Check that all initiatives are complying with the organizations policies

• Establishes a centre of excellence and specialist services to give practical support and guidance.

AXELOS’ P3O Best Practice guidance and certification is effective as it:
• Provides guidance on how to define and integrate a structure to provide
support at all three levels of change and enable business decisions

• Shows how to justify the structure within the organization

• Explains how to set it up and the techniques needed to operate it. For example, using benefits
realization management to identify and prioritize activities for Portfolio and Programme offices
and developing standardized business processes that can be continuously improved.
“Change can be the foundation
• Provides information to senior executives and programme/project managers to make
of competitive advantage but, to
decisions. Ultimately, having a pre-defined approach supports the work of programme
and project managers be effective, a change management
programme must identify areas of potential
• Complements AXELOS’ ITIL service management best practice approach
for translating business change into business as usual benefits. conflict…and bridge the gap between the
aspirations of executives, technical project teams
and the people affected by the change. Few
organizations do this well.”
Paul Arnold, Business Transformation
and Change Director at Able and How,
organizational change management
consultancy
1300 774 623
info@tannerjames.com.au
www.tannerjames.com.au

@AXELOS_GBP
AXELOS - Google+
Ask@AXELOS.com
AXELOS Global Best Practice

ITIL, PRINCE2, MSP, M_o_R, P3M3, P3O, MoP and MoV are

registered trade marks of AXELOS Limited. AXELOS, the AXELOS

logo and the AXELOS swirl logo are trade marks of AXELOS Limited.

AXELOS.com
CP0001/07/16
Enhancing your programme and project management capability
Enhancing Your

Programme and Project

Management Capability

Our company is founded upon the following core values:

• Integrity
• Care
• Making a Difference
• Having Fun
• Courage
• Responsibility
ABOUT

TANNER JAMES
Founded in 1994, we have an unequalled
track record having helped over 50
Government agencies build their capability to
manage benefits-led change and deliver new
policy initiatives. We have trained thousands
of people and have assisted hundreds of
programmes and projects.

Our services include consulting, classroom
training and workplace training. We hold
international and national accreditations and
also conduct examinations and competency
assessments. While some companies
focus on delivering textbook theory with
the aim of getting people through exams
as quickly as possible, Tanner James has
remained committed to practical learning and
development relevant to the workplace.

We use case studies based on clients actual
projects and programmes, and as an RTO
we offer a Diploma of Project Management
based upon PRINCE2® that is achieved
through assessing the competency of
participants in applying the method to a real
project in their agency. We have helped
many agencies develop and implement
Capability Improvement Plans that connect
individual learning with project/programme
team learning and overall agency capability.

PRINCE2®, MSP® and P3M3®
are registered trade mark’s of
AXELOS Limited.
The Swirl logo™ is a trade mark
of AXELOS Limited.
Tanner James is an Accredited
Consulting Organisation (ACO)
and an Accredited Training
Organisation (ATO)
Training

We offer training in several management frameworks,
including PRINCE2® and MSP®, with a range of course

types suited to different participant needs.
All courses are focused on pragmatic application within

your workplace and are run by appropriately qualified

programme and project management professionals,
who continue to build on their experiences as Tanner We advocate the 70:20:10 adult learning model and de-
James consultants. Training courses are run publicly liver on-the-job face-to-face learning that supports and

or can be delivered in-house within your organisation, complements initial classroom learning. This is why

with flexible timetables which can be varied to suit your as well as being an internationally Accredited Training

availability. We can incorporate exams into courses, but Organisation we are also an internationally Accredited

we also offer practical training that allows those who Consulting Organisation in P3M3®, PRINCE2® and

wish to do so to take exams at a later date. MSP®.

s
er
rs

e
ag

ng
tm /
se

ec me
an

les
s

les ha
on

er ss/
COURSE TYPE DESCRIPTION
ive

pr ram

Ro

ff
ro s/c
p

us ine
ut

sta
/S

O

M
og
ec

O

s
oj

PM

Bu
BC
Ex

SR

Pr
• •
A briefing specifically aimed at
Executive Briefings
senior executives and looks at their
(0.5 days)
project and programme board
In-House Only
controls.
Our Overview courses are a in-

• • • • • •
troductory course on the method.
Overviews
Useful for those new to a project
(1 Day)
or programme. The courses
Public & In-House
outline the key elements of the
specific method.

Provides a more in-depth
understanding of the
methodology, leading to a

• • • •
In Practice Courses Foundation Certificate. In contrast
(4 days) to the Foundation Course, this
In-House Only course allows more time to focus
on the application of the method
and boasts a strong practical and
case study focus.

Diploma of This course prepares you to gain a

• •
Project Management nationally recognised qualification
using PRINCE2® while focusing on principles and
(BSB51504) skills of project management
(4 Days) based upon recognised best
Public & In-House practice (PRINCE2®).

This course is based on the In

• • • • •
Practical Foundation Practice course, however there is
Courses no exam. This allows more time
(3 Days) for practical learning rather than
Public & In-House focusing on passing an exam. (The
exam can be taken at a later date)

Provides individuals with a solid

• •
grounding in the methodology,
Foundation Courses
leading to a Foundation
(3 days)
Certificate. This is well suited for
Public & In-House
those with experience looking to
gain a qualification.

This course covers the preparation

• •
and sitting of the Practitioner
Practitioner Courses
Exam. It is for those who have
(2 days)
passed the Foundation Exam and
Public & In-House
wish to achieve a higher level of
formal qualification.
Consulting

Tanner James is an Accredited Consulting Organisation (ACO), and our Registered Consultants are expert in

programme and project management and well positioned to provide you with independent assessment and

advice. Whatever the assignment, we will offer an honest professional opinion together with pragmatic advice

on how best to move forward, supported by a clearly documented record of our activities

and recommendations.

Whether we are assisting you with programme or project management implementation, the Tanner James

approach is to work alongside your staff to mentor and coach them in achieving your desired outcomes,
which we will clearly agree with you at the commencement of each assignment. Our aim is to transfer skills

and knowledge to your staff to enable them to effectively and pragmatically use programme and/or project

management frameworks such as PRINCE2® and MSP® within your organisation.

We are flexible in our delivery - ranging from provision of full-time assistance for several months to just

doing a few days work on an as-required basis.

P3M3® Assessments

The Secretaries’ ICT Governance Board (SIGB) selected the Portfolio, Programme and Project Management

Maturity Model (P3M3®) as the APS’s standard for measuring agency capability. P3M3® scores agency

portfolio, programme and project management capability at one of five maturity levels, across multiple

process perspectives. Tanner James has more experience than any other Accredited Consulting Organisation
(ACO) in conducting P3M3® assessments (and capability improvement planning) for Commonwealth

Agencies.

Since 2010, Tanner James has refined its approach to P3M3® assessments to offer alternative approaches to

clients which are not offered by other suppliers. These options provide a range of benefits including reduced

cost and better value, and include working in partnership with you to transfer our knowledge and skills to

your staff. This means that you will have a much deeper understanding of the assessment process, and if

desired you will be equipped to conduct your own assessments in future with minimal need for

external assistance.

Capability Improvement

The purpose of capability improvement planning is to use current P3M3® maturity levels and our expert

observations and insights to inform agency choices about how best to improve internal management

processes.

Tanner James believes that fundamentally a Capability Improvement Plan is not simply about setting target

maturity levels. These are secondary. In our opinion capability improvement planning must be about agencies

considering what benefits can be gained from improving specific aspects of portfolio, programme and project

management, and then selecting a practical approach to do so.

Tanner James does not provide “off the shelf ” Capability Improvement Plans, because it has been our

experience that without internal executive ownership capability improvement initiatives fail to realise their

full potential. So we work closely with stakeholders to identify what we believe are the areas to concentrate

upon, and how best to approach improvement.
Tanner James Client List

ACT Government Deregulation Planning NSW

ActewAGL Department of Families, Housing, PwC Australia
Community Services and QLD Department of Communities

Attorney-General’s Department
Indigenous Affairs

Australian Agency for QLD Department of Community
Department of Foreign Affairs and

International Development Safety
Trade

Australian Bureau of Statistics QLD Department of Disability
Department of Health

Australian Communications and QLD Department of Education
Department of Human Services

Media Authority and Training
Department of Immigration

Australian Competition and QLD Department of Emergency
Department of Infrastructure and Services

Consumer Commission
Transport

Australian Customs Service QLD Department of Environment
Department of the Prime Minister and Resource Management

Australian Electoral Commission and Cabinet QLD Department of Health

Australian Federal Police Department of Treasury QLD Department of Justice and

Australian Institute of Health and Department of Veterans Affairs Attorney Generals

Welfare
EY Australia QLD Department of Premier &
Australian National Audit Office
Foxtel Cabinet

Australian Taxation Office
Geoscience Australia QLD Department of Public Works

City of Melbourne
Gold Coast City Council QLD Government Chief

Civil Aviation Safety Authority Information Office
ING

Climate Change QLD Police Service
Insurance Australia Group

Commonwealth Bank Rabobank
IP Australia

Corporate Solutions Queensland Rio Tinto
KPMG

Country Energy Sensis
LinFox

CrimTrac Suncorp Metway
Microsoft

CSIRO Sydney Ferries Corporation
Murray Darling Basin

Deakin University Commission Telstra

Defence Materiel Organisation National Archives of Australia Therapeutic Goods

Department of Administrative and National Congress of Australia’s Administration

Information Services First Peoples Thiess

Department of Agriculture, National Foods TransACT

Fisheries and Forestry
News Ltd Transurban

Department of Broadband,
NSW Department of Ageing, VIC Department of Human

Communications and the Digital
Disability and Home Care Services

Economy
NSW Department of Education VIC Department of Justice

Department of Defence
NSW Department of Lands VIC Department of Treasury and

Department of Education,
Finance

Employment and Work Relations NSW State Rail
VIC Police

Department of Environment NSW Sydney Water
VICRoads

Department of Finance and P&O Ports
Enhancing Your
Programme and Project
Management Capability

www.tannerjames.com.au
Ph:1300 774 623
Fax: 02 6162 0462
info@tannerjames.com.au
REVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN

GOVERNMENT’S USE OF INFORMATION

AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

The Gershon Review

• an Industry Perspective on OGC Methods

Submission

May 2008
Tanner James Submission to Gershon Review May 2008

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This submission recommends that the Federal Government builds on its promising but basic use

of Office of Government Commerce (OGC) management methods, to make them key tools for

the delivery of change and implementation of policy.

This submission has been prepared by John Howarth, Managing Director of Tanner James

Management Consultants, the longest established and largest dedicated provider of accredited

OGC services in Australia.

Since the first PRINCE2 course was run by Tanner James in 1997, over 100,000 Australians have

been trained in OGC methods. Today, there is a field of competitive suppliers and APMG

Australasia, the accreditation body in Australasia for qualifications in MSP and PRINCE2, has

established permanent staff to regulate the methods on behalf of the OGC.

There is a reasonable awareness of OGC management methods in Federal, and some State,
Government Agencies, however, there are dramatic variations in the way the methods are

applied. The application of OGC methods vary from quite effective to inappropriate, with most

application falling somewhere in between. The points of application are summarised as,

• Quite effective use is evident where Agencies understand the OGC accreditation and
qualification system, have trained SES officers, have employees who are qualified
Practitioners and have made good progress in embedding key paradigms such as role-
based management, benefits realisation management and product-based planning.
• Typical use is where Agencies have trained most project staff to Foundation level, had
some success, but also had some problems – often related to “death by template” where
junior staff have misinterpreted the methods as being about form-filling without thinking
and communicating. Additionally, some SES staff believe that project management is just
something project managers do, and is not something requiring their involvement.
• Inappropriate use is where Agencies have little or no understanding of the OGC
accreditation and qualification system, have very few trained staff, and openly challenge
the validity of the OGC management methods. Such Agencies typically talk about “using
the principles of PRINCE2”, and happily use parts of the OGC copyright and intellectual
property with no acknowledgement (this is contrary to OGC intent, and possibly illegal).
Unfortunately it is fairly common to see the practice of using OGC copyright and
intellectual property in “home-grown” project management frameworks within these
Agencies.

While OGC management methods are visible in Federal Government Agencies, usage is

immature and the Government is a long way from realizing the true value these methods offer.
Central agencies have been lukewarm towards the methods and this is hampering the

Government’s ability to deliver change and implementation of policy.

Tanner James recommends that the Federal Government endorses the OGC management

methods key tools for the delivery of change and implementation of policy, and implements them

in a way that ensures the methods are skillfully and appropriately applied.

APMG Australasia regulates the methods in Australia on behalf of the OGC, and the review

team may wish to contact them to seek statistics or other information related to this submission.
2/7
Tanner James Submission to Gershon Review May 2008

Introduction

To be able to evaluate the perspective offered by this submission it is strongly recommended that

the reader is fully conversant with the OGC accreditation and qualification system for

management methods. The following links are recommended for this purpose:
• Best Practice Management Home Page
http://www.best-management-practice.com/
• An explanation of MSP
http://www.best-management-practice.com/Programme-Management-MSP/
• An explanation of PRINCE2
http://www.best-management-practice.com/Project-Management-PRINCE2/
• An explanation of MSP Training Accreditation
http://www.msp-officialsite.com/Accreditation/AccreditationScheme.asp
• An explanation of PRINCE2 Training Accreditation
http://www.prince-officialsite.com/Accreditation/AccreditationScheme.asp
• APMG Australasia
http://www.apmg-australasia.com/home/home.asp

About the Author

The submission has been prepared by John Howarth, Managing Director of Tanner James

Management Consultants , who is uniquely qualified to comment on the use of OGC methods in

Australia. John used early versions of the methods when he worked for the UK Civil Service and

UK public sector in the 1980s, then was personally responsible for introducing both PRINCE2

and MSP to the Australian market. John is a qualified PRINCE2 and MSP trainer and consultant

and has personally trained and provided services to hundreds of Federal Government public

servants. Tanner James is now the longest established and largest dedicated provider of

accredited OGC services in Australia.

Background

PRINCE2 was launched in 1996 and Tanner James ran the first PRINCE2 course in 1997 with

initial use of the method beginning in the Department of Defence. A competitive training

market naturally developed as individuals and companies decided to become accredited suppliers

themselves.

Since then, over 100,000 Australians have been trained in OGC methods and a market of

competitive (and accredited) suppliers has been developed and APMG Australasia has

established permanent staff to regulate the methods on behalf of the OGC. The market is still

very focused on training, with little recognition by buyers of accredited consulting organisations.
Federal Government Agencies still readily take advice on the use of OGC management methods

from contractors and consultants who are only qualified to Foundation level (and even those

who are unqualified).
3/7
Tanner James Submission to Gershon Review May 2008

Current Status of OGC Management Methods in Federal Government

There is a reasonable awareness of OGC management methods in Federal, and some State,
Government Agencies, however, there are dramatic variations in the way the methods are

applied. The application of OGC methods vary from quite effective to inappropriate, with most

application falling somewhere in between. The points of application are discussed in detail below

and provide some examples of how Agencies use the methods and some of the challenges faced.

Quite Effective Use

Quite effective use is evident where Agencies understand the OGC accreditation and

qualification system, and have made concerted efforts focused on appropriate application of the

methods. These Agencies are characterised by:
• SES officers who understand the methods and in many cases have received executive
training and/or coaching from an accredited organisation;
• Employees who are qualified Practitioners (as opposed to only being qualified to
Foundation level);
• They have made good progress in embedding key paradigms such as,
o role-based management - for cross-agency and Whole-of-Government
working,
o benefits realisation management - for translating strategic intent and outcomes
into tangible, measurable targets, and
o product-based planning - for clarifying exactly what is to be delivered.

Typical Use

Typical use is often evident where Agencies have made some attempt to improve their project

management capability yet have not had a clear strategy for doing so. Sometimes the focus is a

single project, or group of projects, but more commonly the attempt is a more general initiative.
Unfortunately, often the initiative is “owned” at EL2 or EL1 level, centered around ICT projects,
and driven by a Project Management Office (PMO) with an unclear mandate within the Agency.
These Agencies are characterised by:
• The majority of project staff only trained to PRINCE2 Foundation level.
• Projects have had some success with PRINCE2 and the method has supporters.
• Problem are still evident and are often related to “death by template” where junior staff
have misinterpreted the methods as being about form-filling and not thinking and
communicating.
• Some SES staff believing that project management is just something project managers do
and is not something requiring their involvement.

4/7
Tanner James Submission to Gershon Review May 2008

Inappropriate Use

Inappropriate use is found in Agencies that claim they use the OGC management methods,
however, this claim is actually very misleading. Such Agencies happily use large parts of the

OGC copyright and intellectual property with no acknowledgement (this is contrary to OGC

intent, and possibly illegal). Unfortunately it is fairly common to see the practice of using OGC

copyright and intellectual property in “home-grown” project management frameworks within

Agencies. These Agencies are characterised by:
• Staff and contractors who typically talk about “using the principles of PRINCE2”, “using
PRINCE2 lite” [sic] and “cutting down PRINCE2”. Commonly, such individuals have
no PRINCE2 training or qualification and have mistakenly interpreted the fact that
PRINCE2 is comprehensively defined as an indication it is to be applied bureaucratically.
• Little or no understanding of the OGC accreditation and qualification system. This
situation is often exacerbated by contractors, some of whom actually understand the
system, yet deliberately play it down due to their own lack of OGC qualifications.
• Having few trained staff.
• Self-appointed “experts” who openly challenge the validity of the OGC management
methods and instead put forward their own personal experience and models of the world
as being a more proven basis for managing change. While some agency staff are guilty of
this, of more concern is that there is a whole industry of contractors and consultants
busily re-inventing the wheels instead of contributing to the Government’s commitment
to deliver change and implementation of policy

As such, while OGC management methods are visible in Federal Government Agencies, usage is

immature and the Government is a long way from realizing the true value these methods offer.
Central agencies have been lukewarm towards the methods, and much of the debate is still about

the validity of the methods, rather than about skilful application of the methods. Specific

challenges include:
• The international OGC-APMG regulation system is geared towards regulation of
suppliers and individuals who understand and respect the system including OGC
copyright and IP. The system is not geared towards immature markets, such as Australia,
where there is a need to educate buyers and suppliers about the existence of the system
and permissible use of OGC copyright and IP.
• Some major consultancies and independent contractors – who are unaccredited and
unqualified - are mischievous in the way they represent their own expertise in OGC
management methods. Unfortunately uneducated agencies buy their services and accept
their advice at face value, often resulting in poor implementation of the methods.
• There is a propensity for agencies to build their own frameworks for project and
programme management. This results in considerable “re-invention of the wheel” and
inappropriate guidance on use of the OGC management methods.
• Many SES officers do not recognise the pedigree of the OGC management methods, and
are therefore unwilling to spend time to increase their awareness of, or skill in using, the
methods. Tanner James acknowledges that there a number of SES officers who have
taken time to attend formal training and/or briefings to inform themselves about the
methods.
5/7
Tanner James Submission to Gershon Review May 2008

• OGC management methods are intended to ensure ICT programmes and projects are
business-driven, however, several agencies see the methods as being ICT focused rather
than enablers of strategic change.
• Most agencies still tend to manage programmes and projects within their line-
management structures rather than embracing the role-based management approaches
which offer huge potential benefits for true Whole-of-Government (Federal and State)
management of strategic change and policy delivery.
• There is still a strong grants-based mentality in many areas of the Federal public service
when it comes to implementation of Government programs. This often results in too
much focus on inputs, insufficient focus on benefits and outcomes, and ineffective
management approaches being used for program management. Many program managers
approach the delivery of transformational change (eg. implementation of a new
Government policy) the same way as they approach “business-as-usual” (BAU) (eg.
payment of a routine subsidy). This lack of awareness of structured programme
management (MSP) was evident at the recent National Program Managers Conference in
Canberra.
• Agencies often approach the implementation of OGC management methods the wrong
way round: First, they write a framework; then they tell people they have to use it; finally,
they find they have to train people who have misunderstood the intent of the framework.
Tanner James has proven that implementation is more successful to approach it the other
was around: educate people as to why methods are required and train them in the
methods; programmes/projects then apply the methods; and then the agency can
standardise how it applies the methods based on lessons learned.
• The Federal Government has introduced the Gateway Review process, but has not made
it clear how it relates to other OGC management methods (MSP, PRINCE2, P3M3).
This manifests itself as confusion among SROs when the OGC methods are offered as
appropriate ways to address weaknesses identified by a Gateway Review.
• The Federal Government has not expressed its policy in relation to OGC management
methods and the central agencies have not put in place mechanisms to support their
usage. Indeed, the central agencies appear to have little awareness of the OGC regulation
system. For example, there are no common panels which offer accredited training
services in MSP or PRINCE2, and most agencies have no appropriate mechanism for the
purchase of such accredited services. This has seriously hampered the development of
the competitive market of OGC accredited suppliers in Australia.

6/7
Tanner James Submission to Gershon Review May 2008

Recommendations

Tanner James recommends that the Federal Government:
• Express its policy in relation to OGC management methods, and in doing so endorse the
OGC management methods key tools for the delivery of change and implementation of
policy (and not as ICT focused);
• Build closer executive and working relationships with the OGC and APMG Australasia in
relation to the OGC-APMG regulation system and OGC management methods;
• Educates its buyers about the existence of the OGC-APMG regulation system, and
permissible use of OGC copyright and IP;
• Discourage agencies that wish to build, or have built, their own frameworks for project
and programme management from the ground-up;
• Educate SES officers about the pedigree of the OGC management methods;
• Encourage SES officers to spend time to increase their awareness of, and skill in using,
the methods, through attendance at formal training and/or briefings;
• Embrace the role-based management approaches which offer huge potential benefit for
true Whole-of-Government (Federal and State) management of strategic change and
policy delivery;
• Approach the implementation of OGC management methods in the correct order:
educate, train, implement, standardise;
• Clearly communicate how the Gateway Review process relates to other OGC
management methods (MSP, PRINCE2, P3M3);
• Establish common panels which offer accredited training services in MSP and PRINCE2.

Conclusion

APMG Australasia regulates the methods in Australia on behalf of the OGC, and the review

team may wish to contact them to seek statistics or other information related to this submission.

If requested additional evidence by way of expanded written submission or interview can be

provided, including provision of SES contacts that have had exposure to OGC management

methods.

John Howarth

Managing Director

Tanner James Management Consultants Pty Ltd

7/7
Gershon Review – Implementation Recommendations

Use Managing Successful Programmes (MSP) to manage implementation
• MSP is the OGC non-proprietary approach to programme management.
• Sir Peter refers to implementation as a “major program of administrative reform and
cultural change” requiring leadership and skills of the right calibre.
• MSP represents best-practice on how to implement a benefit-driven programme.
• Using MSP will demonstrate visible leadership through “practicing what is preached”.
• Rationale is "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them."
Albert Einstein.
• Sir Peter recommends establishment of a Program Board, a specific MSP construct.

Ensure the “Gershon Review Implementation Programme” (GRIP?!)
Program Board is properly briefed on its role in the context of MSP
• APMG Australasia can identify an accredited trainer and/or consultant to brief the Program
Board.
• Using MSP is not about reading a manual or filling in templates.
• The implementation program should be managed by a qualified MSP Advanced Practitioner
(recognising it may take a few months for the individual to attain this qualification).

Undertake Programme Identification in November 2008 then Programme

Definition in December 2008 - January 2009
• Assumes Cabinet acceptance of the Gershon recommendations no later than 30 November.

Use PRINCE2 to manage central elements of the program as projects.
• i.e. elements that will be done in one or more of the central agencies.

Encourage individual agencies to manage enhancement of their capability

as an MSP programme (larger agencies) or a PRINCE2 or PMBOK project
(smaller agencies).
• Again, using these methods to implement these methods will demonstrate visible leadership
through “practicing what is preached”.
• Again, rationale is "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created
them." Albert Einstein.
• This concept is proven and indeed referenced in the new OGC P3O (Portfolio, Programme
and Project Offices) method, a sibling to MSP, PRINCE2 and P3M3.

Author background:

These recommendations have been prepared by John Howarth, Managing Director of Tanner James Management

Consultants , who is uniquely qualified to comment on the use of OGC methods in Australia. John used early

versions of the methods when he worked for the UK Civil Service and UK public sector in the 1980s, then was

personally responsible for introducing both PRINCE2 and MSP to the Australian market. John is a qualified

PRINCE2 and MSP trainer and consultant and has personally trained and provided services to hundreds of Federal

Government public servants. Tanner James is now the longest established and largest dedicated provider of

accredited OGC services in Australia. Tanner James made a detailed submission to the Gershon Review.

Tanner James Management Consultants Pty Ltd. Page - 1 - 6 November 2008
P3M3® Assessment Report

P3M3 Assessment Report Department of Human
Services (DHS)

Version
1.4
Date Created
8 August 2014
Date Updated
Friday, 26 September 2014
®

© Tanner James Management Consultants.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the
written permission of Tanner James Management Consultants.

Classification Unclassified
Document Control

Distribution List

Name Position Organisation

Soraya Weber National Manager, Portfolio Program Office DHS

{All members} CIP Working Group DHS

®
John Howarth Registered P3M3 Consultant & Chairman Tanner James

Ray Ahern Principal Consultant Tanner James

Revision History

Date Version Modified By Changes Made, Review History

8 Aug 14 0.a Ray Ahern Preliminary Draft (prior to completion of
workshops)

18-19 Aug14 0.b John Howarth Further drafting following steps 1 and 2.

19-20 Aug14 0.c Ray Ahern Level 4 statements of maturity

21-22 Aug14 0.d Ray Ahern Integration of findings and recommendations,
incorporation of DHS-provided consultation
tables.

22 Aug 14 1.0 John Howarth TJ approved first draft to DHS

10 Sep 14 1.1 Ray Ahern Typos and formatting errors.

12 Sep 14 1.1 John Howarth Final Draft Report.

16 Sep 14 1.2 Skye Finlay Updates after discussion with Soraya

17 Sep 14 1.2 John Howarth Final Report

24 Sep 14 1.3 Ray Ahern Response to comments by Malissa Golightly

26 Sep 14 1.4 Ray Ahern FINAL incorporating DHS comments

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 2 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 5

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Background.............................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Report Purpose........................................................................................................ 6
1.3 Scope ....................................................................................................................... 6
1.4 Assessment Approach ............................................................................................. 7
1.5 Key Definitions ....................................................................................................... 10

2 ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW ............................................................................................ 11
2.1 Portfolio Management (assessed as Level 4) ....................................................... 11
2.2 Programme Management (assessed as Level 4) .................................................. 11
2.3 Project Management (assessed as Level 4) ......................................................... 11
2.4 Key Outcomes ....................................................................................................... 12
2.5 Implications for Capability Improvement ............................................................... 13

3 ASSESSMENT DETAILS ................................................................................................ 15
3.1 Portfolio Management Maturity Description........................................................... 15
3.1.1 Key Summarised Observations for Portfolio Management ....................... 15
3.1.2 PfM Organisational Governance ............................................................... 16
3.1.3 PfM Management Control ......................................................................... 16
3.1.4 PfM Stakeholder Management ................................................................. 17
3.1.5 PfM Benefits Management ....................................................................... 18
3.1.6 PfM Finance Management........................................................................ 19
3.1.7 PfM Resource Management ..................................................................... 21
3.1.8 PfM Risk Management ............................................................................. 21
3.2 Programme Management Maturity Description ..................................................... 23
3.2.1 Key summarised observations for Programme Management .................. 23
3.2.2 PgM Organisational Governance .............................................................. 23
3.2.3 PgM Management Control ........................................................................ 24
3.2.4 PgM Stakeholder Management ................................................................ 24
3.2.5 PgM Benefits Management ...................................................................... 25
3.2.6 PgM Finance Management....................................................................... 26
3.2.7 PgM Resource Management .................................................................... 27
3.2.8 PgM Risk Management ............................................................................ 28
3.3 Project Management Maturity Description ............................................................ 29
3.3.1 Key summarised observations for Project Management .......................... 29
3.3.2 PjM Organisational Governance ............................................................... 30
3.3.3 PjM Management Control ......................................................................... 30
3.3.4 PjM Stakeholder Management ................................................................. 31
3.3.5 PjM Benefits Management........................................................................ 32
3.3.6 PjM Finance Management ........................................................................ 32
3.3.7 PjM Resource Management ..................................................................... 34
3.3.8 PjM Risk Management.............................................................................. 35

4 APPENDIX A – Assessment Participants ........................................................................ 37

5 APPENDIX B – Information provided to assessors ......................................................... 40
®
6 APPENDIX C – P3M3 Overview .................................................................................... 45

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 3 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
Ms Emily Canning

Chief Financial Officer

Department of Human Services

ACT 2600
th

17 September 2014

Dear Emily,
®
P3M3 Independent validation
®
I am writing in relation to the P3M3 capability assessment undertaken for the Department of

Human Services (DHS) which was completed in August 2014.

Tanner James was engaged by DHS to assist the department in understanding the

assessment process and in undertaking the assessment. This involved a partnership

approach designed to ensure full understanding and ownership of the outcomes by DHS while

still ensuring the assessment was conducted with full rigour and independence.
®
I was personally the Registered P3M3 Consultant who led this assessment, and hereby

confirm that I can provide an unqualified assurance (i.e. independent validation) of the

accuracy, reliability and completeness of the assessment as follows:

Process perspectives
Sub-model score

Organisational

Management

Management

Management

Management

Management
Governance

Engagemen
Stakeholder

Resource
Financial
Benefits
Control

Risk
t

Portfolio

Management 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Programme

Management 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Project

Management 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

I would like to congratulate the department on achieving and maintaining such high levels of

maturity.

Please pass on our thanks to all DHS staff involved, especially to members of the Portfolio

Program Office for their time and support. Every person we met was pleasant, helpful, and

showed a real commitment to the assessment process.

Yours sincerely,

John Howarth

Chairman

Tanner James Management Consultants Pty Ltd
P3M3® Assessment Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
®
A P3M3 (Portfolio, Programme and Project Management Maturity Model) assessment of the

Department of Human Services (DHS) ICT-enabled portfolio, programmes and projects was

conducted during August 2014. This assessment was an Assisted Self-Assessment, which

means that DHS took the lead in verifying usage of existing and new processes and structures.
Tanner James has helped to guide and verify the overall assessment through a number of

workshops and follow-up interviews, based to some degree on the DHS self-assessment of

compliance. Tanner James, as the Accredited Consulting Organisation (ACO), has provided

the independent assurance as required by the Department of Finance.
DHS has been assessed as having the following maturity levels:
 Portfolio Management sub-model Level 4
 Programme Management sub-model Level 4
 Project Management sub-model Level 4.

Assessment Team Observations

DHS has continued a remarkable job of professionalising and embedding management

disciplines for ICT enabled change. The Department has built on previous achievements and

appears to be making logical progressions towards optimal performance in those areas where

higher levels of maturity are sought. An important distinction here is that the Department is

not merely addressing weaknesses identified in previous reports but is implementing a

cohesive and coherent improvement programme to reinforce existing strengths as well as

addressing areas for improvement.
DHS has very strong leadership in this area with a clear focus and accountability upon

effective delivery of initiatives and the realisation of benefits.
In particular, the benefits management and realisation process is well established across all

DHS change initiatives. High-level accountabilities ensure that benefits are owned and

actively measured, managed and realised. Programmes appear to be consistently applying

a rigorous approach incorporating lessons learnt in previous implementations.
Future target ratings for DHS in Portfolio, Programme and Project Management Maturity,
including strategies for organisational capability improvement, will be developed separately

from this report.
DHS is progressing well in achieving the maturity targets it set out for itself at the end of 2013

in its Capability Improvement Plan. DHS has targeted a number of Level 5 maturity levels

within the CIP (for specific process perspectives, not at a sub-model level).

The “key observations and recommendations” sections in this report contain broad

recommendations as to what DHS would need to address in order to attain Level 5 maturity.
Tanner James notes that DHS has set some ambitious targets for P3M3 maturity at the end

of 2015. Tanner James recommends that in pursuing these targets DHS considers, in

response to the report, what benefits are sought from organisational P3M capabilities.

Where assessments are provided against these targets it should be noted that comments

identifying gaps are not to be taken as criticism. Indeed few, if any, organisations in the world

have reached this level of maturity consistently.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 5 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
®
In September 2009, P3M3 was selected by the Secretaries ICT Governance Board (SIGB) as

the capability measurement methodology for the Australian Government. In December 2009,
the Secretary of Finance instructed all FMA Agencies (now known as non-corporate entities)
®
to undertake a P3M3 Capability Maturity Assessment by December 2010.
®
The P3M3 model allows organisations to identify the key practices that need to be fully
®
embedded to achieve the next maturity level in organisational capability. P3M3 is an

overarching capability maturity model containing three sub-models, Portfolio Management

Maturity Model (PfM3), Programme Management Maturity Model (PgM3) and Project

Management Maturity Model (PjM3). The Model and its component sub models are defined

in Section 2.7 Key Definitions.

1.2 Report Purpose

The purpose of this report is to:
 Support a DHS self-assessment of ICT-enabled initiatives covering Portfolio,
Programme and Project Management maturity; and

®
Provide external validation of DHS current P3M3 Ratings by an Accredited
Consulting Organisation in accordance with Department of Finance requirements.

1.3 Scope

Scope Inclusions
®
The P3M3 assessment covered the portfolio, programme and project activities across DHS.
This included sufficient programmes and projects to create a representative sample of DHS

ICT-enabled change initiatives. The assessment covered both internally and externally funded
®
projects and programmes within DHS. In accordance with the P3M3 model:
a portfolio is the total set of ICT-enabled change governed by the DHS Executive
Committee;
a programme is a strategic change to DHS that is ICT-enabled and is comprised of a
set of related projects;
a project is a project that:
 is managed by DHS (not externally); and
 has an ICT component.
DHS is currently running 6 major programmes:
 Service Delivery Reform,
 Household Assistance Package Payments (HAPP).
 Child Support System Reform
 Aged Care Reform
 Optimising Online Healthcare Services for Healthcare Providers
 Shared Services.
DHS also manages a number of minor ICT-enabled programmes and around 100 active ICT-
enabled projects.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 6 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

Scope Exclusions

DHS Portfolio Agencies and Authorities have been excluded from this assessment.

1.4 Assessment Approach

Assisted Self Assessment – partnership and transparency
®
The overall intent of the approach chosen for the DHS 2014 P3M3 assessment was for the

assessors to work in partnership with DHS and be as transparent as possible, so that

ownership and understanding of the assessment results resides within the department not with

an external assessor.
®
DHS has developed a strong understanding of the P3M3 Model and has exceptionally strong

process compliance and assurance functions. It was therefore appropriate that DHS chose an

assisted self-assessment for the 2014 review. This means that Tanner James facilitated a

number of workshops, conducted interviews, guided the scoring process and provides a level

of assurance. For the 2014 assessment version 3 of P3M3 was used, which is designed to be

backward compatible with version 2.
Assisted self-assessment does however mean that there is a degree of reliance on DHS

assessment, particularly of compliance with stated processes. In Tanner James’ opinion, DHS

has strong regimes of self assessment and independent assurance which minimise any risks

associated with the method of assessment.
There were four main steps to the P3M3 assessment:

1. Initial Assessment – identify processes, responsibilities and likely performance
   against P3M3.
2. Desktop Assessment – evaluate actual practices against P3M3.
3. Validation and Clarification – establish levels of compliance.
4. Report – document and communicate ratings, observations and recommendations.
   These four main steps are described below in further detail.

Initial Assessment – identify processes, responsibilities and likely performance

against P3M3

The main purpose of the initial assessment was to make an initial judgement as to the likely

level of DHS maturity, and to identify areas for further evaluation. It checked DHS has defined

management processes that adequately address all seven process perspectives for each sub-
model, and considered both likely organisational compliance and the arrangements for

management of the processes.
To undertake the assessment the external assessors engaged with the process owners for

each sub-model. This was predominantly the offices (PPO, PMOs) with relevant corporate staff

involved. A few hours were spent with each of the three groups to assess whether DHS

frameworks and processes adequately address the requirements set out in P3M3.
During these sessions the groups walked through the seven perspectives, to do an initial rating

of maturity based on the P3M3 v3 descriptors. In setting the rating for each perspective within

a sub-model the group:
 Was informed by the attribute questions related to processes, responsibilities and
performance in the AXELOS enhanced online self-assessment tool;

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 7 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Considered the associated observations and recommendations in the 2013 P3M3
Assessment Report, identifying any things that have changed, and also noting cases
where the P3M3 v3 descriptor varies from the P3M3 v2 descriptor; and
 Identified areas for follow-up in the desktop assessment (e.g. questions, areas to
probe, evidence sought).

Desktop Assessment – evaluate actual practices against P3M3

The purpose of the desktop assessment was to make two judgements:

1. Is DHS managing its portfolio of ICT-enabled investment and constituent programmes
   and projects in accordance with defined management processes?
2. Are the defined management processes themselves being managed (i.e. controlled
   using metrics and quantitative techniques), and in areas where DHS aspires to Level
   5 maturity, is there evidence of Optimisation?
   DHS assessors (the PPO) had primary responsibility for item 1, and Tanner James had primary

responsibility for item 2. The assessments focussed on items identified during the initial

assessment, and were conducted as follows for each sub-model:
 The desktop assessment of whether portfolio management processes are being
applied and whether the processes are being managed was undertaken by Tanner
James working directly with the PPO and any other offices with portfolio management
responsibilities.
 The desktop assessment of whether programme management processes are being
applied was undertaken by the PPO conducting spot-checks on 2 of the 6
programmes. Tanner James reviewed the results of these spot checks, and worked
with the PPO and Programme Offices to assess whether the processes are being
managed.
 The desktop assessment of whether project management processes are being applied
was undertaken by the PPO conducting spot-checks on 10 of the 96 projects. Tanner
James reviewed the results of these spot checks, and worked with the PPO and Project
Offices to assess whether the processes are being managed.
The desktop assessment included review of key documents as listed at Appendix B.

Validation and Clarification – establish levels of compliance

The final step in the actual assessment process was to meet with key DHS people to:

1. Validate the findings of the desktop assessment and
2. Clarify levels of compliance in areas which impact the final assessment ratings.
   Tanner James also met with the following independent assurers and advisers to validate and

clarify practices in relation to some or all of the three sub-models.
 KPMG as independent assurers; and
 John Craven of Craven Innovation.

Report – document and communicate ratings, observations and

recommendations

The external assessors (Tanner James) created this first draft of the actual assessment report

and provide it to DHS for comment. The approach taken to assessment, validation and

clarification is designed to ensure that there were no surprises in the report. Where it is

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 8 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

deemed appropriate to include similar observations and recommendations to the 2013 P3M3

Assessment Report, DHS will be responsible for providing a soft copy of that content.
Feedback was received and incorporated into the report. None of the scores were changed

as a result of the feedback.
Time has been allowed for DHS to promulgate the report to assessment participants, and to

progress it through the appropriate Departmental committees.
Tanner James will remain available to meet with executives to answer questions and provide

expertise on particular aspects of the assessment.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 9 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

1.5 Key Definitions
®
P3M3 is an overarching capability maturity model containing three sub-models, Portfolio

Management Maturity Model (PfM3), Programme Management Maturity Model (PgM3) and

Project Management Maturity Model (PjM3).

Portfolio Management

A portfolio is defined as the totality of an organisation’s investment (or a segment thereof) in

the changes required for it to achieve its strategic objectives.

Portfolio Management describes the management of an organisation’s portfolio of business

change initiatives.

Programme Management

A programme is defined as a temporary, flexible organisation created to coordinate, direct

and oversee the implementation of a set of related projects and activities in order to deliver

outcomes and benefits related to the organisation’s strategic objectives. Programmes exist to

manage the complexities involved in delivering beneficial change.

Programme Management is focussed on the areas of tension between strategic direction,
project delivery and operational effectiveness.

Project Management

A project is defined as a unique set of coordinated activities, with definite starting and

finishing points, undertaken by an individual or team to meet specific objectives within defined

time, cost and performance parameters as specified in the business case.

Project Management guides a project through a visible set of activities, from controlled start-
up, through delivery, to controlled closure, and review.

Process Perspectives
®
The Process Perspectives are the seven areas of management which P3M3 focuses on in

all three models as the basis for assessing Maturity Levels. For the purposes of assessment

the model provides specific attributes for each process perspective which are indicative of

each maturity Level. Specific Attributes relate only to a particular Process Perspective.

Further Information

Further definition of the model, process perspectives and maturity levels are provided at

Appendix C of this report.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 10 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

2 ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

2.1 Portfolio Management (assessed as Level 4)
Level 4 maturity definition:
DHS obtains and retains specific metrics on its 5

whole portfolio of programmes and projects as a 4

means of predicting future performance. DHS

assesses its capacity to manage programmes 3

and projects and prioritises them accordingly.
2

Assessment Headlines:
DHS Portfolio Management was strong across 1
®
all seven P3M3 perspectives, highlighted
0

pbyarticularly impressive risk, benefits and

Management

Management

Management

Management

Management

Management
Organisational

Stakeholder
Governance

stakeholder management processes. This

Resource
Financial
Benefits
Control

Risk

supports prediction of future performance and

effective prioritisation of change.

2.2 Programme Management (assessed as Level 4)
Level 4 maturity definition:
5

DHS obtains and retain specific measurements

on its programme management performance 4

and runs a quality management organisation to

better predict future programme outcomes. 3

Assessment Headlines: 2

DHS Programme Management was assessed at 1

Level 4 across all seven P3M3® perspectives.
Particular strengths are apparent in the 0

Management Control, Benefits Management
Management

Management

Management

Management

Management

Management
Organisational

Stakeholder
Governance

Resource
Financial
Benefits
Control

and Finance Management perspectives. This

Risk

provides a solid basis for ensuring value for

money delivery of DHS programmes.

2.3 Project Management (assessed as Level 4)
Level 4 maturity definition:
DHS obtains and retains specific measurements

on its project management performance and

runs a quality management organisation to

better predict future performance.
Assessment Headlines:
DHS Project Management was assessed at

Level 4 maturity across all seven P3M3

perspectives. Particular strengths appear in the

Stakeholder Management, Benefits
Management

Management

Management

Management

Management

Management
Organisational

Stakeholder

Management and Risk Management
Governance

Resource
Financial
Benefits
Control

Risk

perspectives. There is a very strong platform in

these perspectives for further maturity

improvement.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 11 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

2.4 Key Outcomes

In 2012, Tanner James remarked that DHS has done a remarkable job of professionalising

and embedding management disciplines for ICT enabled change given the need to

amalgamate three large agencies. In 2013, KPMG noted significant improvements in Portfolio

and Programme Management that placed DHS in the top few Commonwealth agencies to

have reached that maturity rating. This 2014 assessment makes it clear that

professionalisation has continued and strengthened the Department’s position.

DHS has been assessed as having the following maturity levels:
 Portfolio Management sub-model Level 4
 Programme Management sub-model Level 4
 Project Management sub-model Level 4.
Whilst these overall ratings are the same as the ratings achieved in 2013, Tanner James

notes there appears to be consistent improvement and the Department is well placed to

achieve targets outlined in its Capability Improvement Plan.
®
In summary the characteristics of P3M3 Level 4 maturity (managed process) which DHS has

achieved are:

 Top management are proactively seeking out innovative ways to achieve goals.
 The organisation has defined processes that are quantitatively managed, i.e.
controlled using metrics. There are quantitative objectives for quality and process
performance, and these are being used in managing processes.
 Using metrics, management can effectively control processes and identify ways to
adjust and adapt them to particular initiatives without loss of quality.
®
By way of comparison, in summary the characteristics of P3M3 Level 3 maturity (defined

process) which is the highest level most other Federal agencies have achieved are:

 Management and technical processes are documented, standardised and integrated
to some extent with business processes. There is some process ownership and a
group responsible for maintaining consistency and delivering process improvements.
 Senior management are engaged consistently, providing active and informed support.
 There is an established training programme to develop individual skills and
knowledge.
®
P3M3 maturity level scores are determined from a number of elements. The primary
®
determinant for award of P3M3 maturity level is making a professional judgement against the
®
relevant maturity description P3M3 , taking account of individual attributes that are specific to a

process perspective. While not every single attribute was evidenced for every process

perspective at the level achieved, the assessors are fully satisfied that DHS clearly meets the

relevant maturity description for every process perspective at each level.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 12 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

2.5 Implications for Capability Improvement

DHS is progressing well in achieving the maturity targets it set out for itself at the end of 2013

in its Capability Improvement Plan. DHS has targeted a number of Level 5 maturity levels within

the CIP (for specific process perspectives, not at a sub-model level).

Tanner James cannot provide definitive advice on Capability Improvement at this time for the

following reasons:

1. Tanner James was engaged to provide support for a P3M3 self-assessment. A P3M3
   assessment focuses on the ‘here and now’ and deliberately excludes potential future
   states. Capability Improvement Planning requires a thorough understanding of the
   organisation’s desire, capacity and capability to improve. Tanner James’ understanding
   of such desire, capacity and capability to improve is not current or complete.
2. P3M3 is not a methodology for managing Projects, Programmes and Portfolios but, rather,
   it is an assessment tool. There is an underpinning reality that if an organisation
   mandates, and uses, solid P3 methodologies such as PRINCE2®, MSP® and MoP® then
   it will most likely achieve maturity levels 2 and 3 in each sub model respectively. At maturity
   level 4 the requirement is for adaptation and integration of those models with the
   organisation’s functions and regular review. As such it is more difficult to be precise about
   what mechanisms would be needed as the overall model will vary distinctly from one
   organisation to the next. Maturity Level 5 introduces far more abstract concepts such as
   continual improvement and ‘optimisation’ that will vary widely from one organisation to the
   next in their implementation.
3. Given that Maturity Level 5 has greater scope for interpretation than lower maturity levels,
   Tanner James can advise on paths that might lead to a Level 5 assessment but ultimately
   a P3M3 assessor will need to make a professional judgment in the future about the extent
   of maturity underpinning the implementation of such paths in the context of wider business
   operations.
4. Capability Improvement Planning should look first at the level of operating capability that is
   sought and then at all of the characteristics of a desired maturity level to determine if
   changes can and should be made.

However, Tanner James provides the suggestions throughout this report as to how the

organisation might improve towards Level 5 Maturity subject to those points stated above.

®
The characteristics of P3M3 Level 5 maturity (optimised process) are:
 The Organisation will focus on Optimisation of its quantitatively managed processes
to take into account predicted business needs and external factors. It will anticipate
future capacity demands and capability requirements to meet delivery challenges
(e.g. through portfolio analysis).
 Top managers are seen as exemplars, reinforcing the need and potential for
capability and performance improvement.
 It will be a learning Organisation, propagating into other programmes and projects the
lessons learned from past reviews. The Organisation’s ability to rapidly respond to
changes and opportunities will be enhanced by identifying ways to accelerate and
share learning.
 The Organisation will be able to show that continuous process improvement is being
enabled by quantitative feedback from its embedded processes and from validating
innovative ideas and technologies.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 13 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 There will be a robust framework addressing issues of performance management.
The Organisation will be able to demonstrate strong alignment of Organisational
objectives with business plans, and this will be cascaded down through scoping,
sponsorship, commitment, planning, resource allocation, risk management and
benefits realization.
Although DHS has not set (overall) Level 5 targets at the sub-model level, Tanner James

would expect the characteristics described by P3M3 at the sub-model level to be in place in

order to achieve Level 5 maturity for individual process perspectives. The Level 5 maturity

definition is:

Does the Organisation run continuous process improvement with proactive problem and

technology management for {the portfolio / programmes / projects} in order to improve

its ability to predict performance over time and optimise processes?

The “key observations and recommendations” sections in this report contain broad

recommendations as to what DHS would need to address in order to attain Level 5 maturity.
Such recommendations have been provided where:
a) The associated CIP target is set at Level 5, or
b) In the opinion of the assessors DHS is already significantly progressed towards
Level 5 and attaining Level 5 would potentially be of value to DHS.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 14 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

3 ASSESSMENT DETAILS

Legend

This part of the assessment report contains for each sub-model then within it the seven

individual process perspectives:
 Definitions from P3M3® (in italics) of DHS’s maturity level; and
 Key observations and recommendations made by the assessment team (in plain text).
The following symbols are used in the report:

Observation Description
symbol

Key Observation

Recommendation to maintain existing maturity

Recommendation for future maturity improvement where level
 5 maturity is a CIP target or recommended as a CIP target.

3.1 Portfolio Management Maturity Description

DHS’s Portfolio Management maturity level is assessed as Level 4. A Level 4

assessment indicates that:
DHS obtains and retains specific metrics on its whole portfolio of programmes and projects as

a means of predicting future performance. DHS assesses its capacity to manage

programmes and projects and prioritises them accordingly.

3.1.1 Key Summarised Observations for Portfolio Management

The leadership and governance provided by the DHS Portfolio Board - comprising of the

Executive Committee (EC), Finance & Investment Committee (FIC) and ICT Governance

Committee - continues to ensure that the ICT enabled change portfolio is effectively directed

and prioritised accounting for the nature of requirements, strategic alignment, risk and

capacity.
®
These decisions are supported by strong processes across all seven P3M3 perspectives of

Portfolio management.
Stand-out features of Portfolio Management include Benefits Management and Risk

Management which provide a strong basis on which the Portfolio Board can make decisions to

balance ‘risk and reward’ across the change portfolio.
Portfolio-level financial controls include Benefits Realisation controls and are headlined by initial

costing analysis, fully-costed and centralised business case approval and rigorous benefits

control.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 15 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

Strong stakeholder management processes and controls for internal and external

stakeholders including central agencies support negotiation of priorities and promulgation of

key messages about change.

3.1.2 PfM Organisational Governance

DHS’s maturity level for Organisational Governance of its portfolio is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The initiatives within the portfolio are prioritized in terms of their contribution to the

Organisation’s strategic objectives and overall level of risk.

3.1.2.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 DHS shows continued commitment to the value of portfolio management and appears to
effectively prioritise initiatives through a model that uses the Executive Committee (EC),
Finance & Investment Committee and the ICT Governance Committee. These three
committees effectively operate as the Portfolio Board, with clearly defined touch-points
with the Customer Committee and People & Leadership Committee. Initiatives are clearly
prioritised according to risk and contribution to overall objectives.
 Modelling of the impact of potential new changes is managed through top-down and
bottom up analysis and the dashboards provided to the Committees provide a sound
basis on which Portfolio level decisions are made. There is strong evidence that
supportability/ sustainability of business decisions is considered using this analysis.
 The ICT pipeline process and associated capacity planning provides an impressive
overview of impacts of new initiatives on a large and complex organisation. Additionally
there is clear alignment of the portfolio initiatives to the organisation goals.

3.1.3 PfM Management Control

DHS’s maturity level for Management Control of its portfolio is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
Portfolio management processes exist and are proven. Portfolio management has established

metrics against which success can be measured

3.1.3.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 The portfolio management processes are very clear, providing visible and agreed metrics
across the spectrum of initiatives and processes. A range of regular review processes
capture lessons learned, use independent assurance and/or react to evidence of potential
problems to determine opportunities to improve processes.
 Authorities for Portfolio Management appear to be very clearly stated and work well.
Executive accountability for the change portfolio appears to be embedded clearly into the
business structures.
 The terms of reference for the Portfolio Program Office (PPO) have been reviewed and
improved twice in the past which provides an example of review and adjustment of
processes.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 16 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 The reporting cycle is supported by strong data and sophisticated reports showing trends
and highlighting potential issues.
 There is a strong flavour of internal and external review of both processes and outcomes
with structured take-on of new ideas and adaptation to suit circumstances. It is particularly
impressive that on identifying an increased potential workload arising from the 2013 change
of Government, DHS implemented greater, and not reduced, governance and
management control of its potential ICT projects to cope with that workload.

3.1.4 PfM Stakeholder Management

DHS’s maturity level for Stakeholder Management of its portfolio is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
Sophisticated techniques are used to analyse and engage the stakeholder community

effectively, and quantitative information is used to underpin the assessment of effectiveness.

3.1.4.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 Evidence was provided of a wide range of Stakeholder Engagement approaches and
techniques employed to support the change portfolio and that these processes and the
underpinning processes are regularly assessed for effectiveness and refined where
appropriate
 Stakeholder Engagement and Communications Plans encourage consolidation of
messages, analysis of stakeholders, co-ordination across projects and application of a
transparent change management model. There is strong evidence of these plans being
both created and implemented.
 There is strong utilisation of centralised communications to deliver the corporate
messages and to consolidate messages being delivered to corporate stakeholders. The
use of Region-based Change Managers in this context is stated as being highly effective.
 The organisation structure includes a range of touch points (such as the Region-based
Change Managers and Senior Executive appointments) for ensuring that the needs of the
portfolio’s customers are met. This supports a Level 5 assessment against the
Organisation attribute of Stakeholder Management. A full assessment (in 2015) should
investigate the differentiation between business as usual and change portfolio
stakeholders.

3.1.4.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to the Change Portfolio):
The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Forward looking stakeholder management effectiveness reviews (focusing on process
effectiveness and efficiency).
 Proactive identification of potential barriers/problems to effective stakeholder
relationships.
 Creation, sharing and transfer of stakeholder related knowledge.
 Embedded Change Management culture, processes and behaviours.
 Performance based supply forecasts with both cost and resource loading predictions.
 Knowledge bank to help optimise stakeholder approaches.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 17 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Real time analysis of stakeholder management effectiveness such as clustering and
trending.
Items not specifically observed:
Observed behaviours and reported comments support that there is significant retrospective

analysis and adjustments to processes are made. However, no knowledge bank was presented

and therefore forecasting, pro-active identification and planning is unlikely to satisfy level 5

requirements at this time.
Possible Improvements:
To achieve Level 5 DHS should consider establishing a knowledge tool that contains
information about portfolio stakeholder management experiences, to allow DHS to share
knowledge, regularly and systematically review trends, and learn from experience.
Any system DHS adopts must differentiate portfolio stakeholders from other stakeholders
BAU stakeholders or programme/project stakeholders). To achieve Level 5,
analysis of stakeholder reactions, and resultant proactive communications to further
influence stakeholders, must be evident:
o for portfolio stakeholders in their own right, and
o specifically in relation to the portfolio.
To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the portfolio stakeholder management process. This should cover
proposing, evaluating and implementing evidenced-based changes to the established
portfolio stakeholder management approach.

3.1.5 PfM Benefits Management

DHS’s maturity level for Benefits Management of its portfolio is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The benefits realization and management process is well established, measurable and is

integrated into how the Organisation manages itself.

3.1.5.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 The Benefits realisation processes appear to have been maintained and improved and
remain strong across the DHS change portfolio.
 There is good evidence of investigation of benefits management outcomes and the
ensuing changes to processes. There are also established routines for reviewing those
processes.
 A Portfolio Programme Office has clear responsibilities to maximise the contribution of the
change portfolio to operational performance and strategic objectives. Performance metrics
are consistently tracked across the business to measure improvements against baselines
and targets.

3.1.5.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to the Change Portfolio):
The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Trending analysis for assets cost performance and risk used to support benefits
identification

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 18 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Whole of life decision criteria to optimise benefits from asset investment
 Benefits related assurance reviews to assure Executive of effectiveness of benefits
management.
 Demonstrable relationship between portfolio plan and organisation strategies.
 Expected and whole of life cost/benefits analysed to inform future decisions.
 Benefits measurement informs future decisions.
 Knowledge bank enabling optimisation of benefits management approaches.
 Enterprise portfolio benefits management tools enabling trending and early warning
analysis.
 Benefits skills embedded throughout leadership and development programmes.
 Externally recognised portfolio benefits management expertise.
 Process improvement is proactive based on real time trend analysis.
 Standards are continually improved using feedback from reviews and other sources.

Items not specifically observed:
Many Level 5 behaviours were reported and exhibited. However, no tools were presented

showing predictive analysis. Comments and evidence surrounding non-financial benefits and

dis-benefits were mixed and did present a convincing Level 5 case.

Possible Improvements

Non-financial benefits and dis-benefits should be managed with the same rigour as
financial benefits.
To achieve Level 5 DHS should regularly and systematically review aggregated benefits
data for hotspots and trends.
To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the portfolio benefits management process, based on trend analysis,
lessons learned and process metrics.
At Level 5 the process is also likely to be updated based on analysis of predicted benefits
management performance, not only past performance.

3.1.6 PfM Finance Management

DHS’s maturity level for Finance Management of its portfolio is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The Organisation has effective and robust financial control of its investment decisions and the

approval and monitoring of initiatives. There is proactive, evidence-based management of the

portfolio.

3.1.6.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 The Business Case approval process includes strong costing and approval processes
and this approach appears fully embedded across the organisation’s change portfolio.
Review is by a number of mechanisms including gates and performance analysis. This
provides the basis of robust financial control which works hand in hand with benefits
management processes to support evidence based management.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 19 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 There is clear evidence of regular assessments of financial processes by the Portfolio
Programme Office as well as through independent assurance. There is also evidence of
the application of lessons learned and review outcomes to those processes.
 The change portfolio delivers within its forecasted spend profile consistently and
demonstrates a clear understanding of under and over-spends for initiatives and their
relationship to tolerances through a sophisticated reporting dashboard

3.1.6.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to the Change Portfolio):
The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Analysis of asset costs supports optimised processes for asset investment decision
making.
 Financial assurance that return on investments is optimal.
 Continual improvement of processes embedded through organisation.
 Optimised funding through understanding trends in supply chain costs.
 Cash flow is optimised through understanding trends in contracts and performance.
 Knowledge transfer (relating to finance processes) is an inherent behaviour.
 Enterprise wide portfolio management tool used for analysis such as trending and early
warning.
 Externally recognised finance management expertise.
 Finance skills embedded in organisation leadership and management development
programmes.
 Knowledge gained is managed, shared and used to optimise portfolio delivery plans.
 Adequate resources and funding for financial management improvement initiatives.
 Proactive process improvement based on trend analysis.
 Ability to flex appetite for financial risk to better align the change portfolio to meet
organisational objectives.
Items not specifically observed:
Many Level 5 behaviours and practices were reported and observed. No evidence was

provided of pro-active, forecast-based process improvement. Whilst there are enterprise

financial tools in use, the use of enterprise knowledge tools to support process optimisation

was not observed or supported. No evidence was presented of conscious and pro-active risk

appetite management.
Possible Improvements:
To achieve Level 5 DHS should regularly and systematically review aggregated financial
data for hotspots and trends and use that information to adapt processes
To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the portfolio financial management process, based on trend analysis,
lessons learned and process metrics.
At Level 5, DHS should demonstrate it is able to flex its appetite for financial risk to better
align the portfolio to meet organisational objectives - e.g. flex financial tolerances for
some initiatives as long as the portfolio of initiatives balances financial risk – for those
elements of the portfolio where spending is at the departments discretion.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 20 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

3.1.7 PfM Resource Management

DHS’s maturity level for Resource Management of its portfolio is assessed as Level 4.
A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The Organisation has established effective capacity and capability strategies and processes

for obtaining, allocating and adjusting resource levels in line with medium and long term

investment plans.

3.1.7.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 DHS has established impressive capacity and capability mechanisms to support resource
management including capacity and capability planning for both business and ICT.
 One threat to continued maintenance of a Level 4 assessment at the Programme and
Project level arises from the Commonwealth-wide APS recruitment restrictions. Whilst
this remains a threat at those levels, the DHS responses provide substantial evidence of
strategies for obtaining resources based on the calculated and evidenced needs of
change initiatives. Approaches such as being positioned at the front of the queue to
redeploy personnel made redundant from other agencies with programme and project
management experience and DHS’ ability to demonstrate impacts of reductions on benefits
give confidence that the organisation, at change portfolio level, is as well placed as
possible to cope with staff freezes.
 There is clear evidence that accountability for resource reporting, governance and
management is embedded within the organisation’s structures.
 Sophisticated approaches exist to match resource supply and demand as well as to
arrange additional resources when required.

3.1.8 PfM Risk Management

DHS’s maturity level for Risk Management of its portfolio is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The Organisation’s appetite for risk and the balance of risk and benefit across the portfolio are

continually reviewed and managed.

3.1.8.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 There is a clear understanding of portfolio risk appetite across the stakeholders
participating in the review and there is evidence that this is regularly and actively
assessed for effectiveness.
 Risk processes are regularly assessed and there are strong examples of these being
changed where areas for improvement have been identified. Examples appear to come
from regular review and proactive identification of potential problems.
 There is active analysis of risk trends but this is reported as somewhat limited due to the
lack of a central data source for risk. Those limitations aside, good evidence was
provided showing the organisation is well aware of risk profiles at portfolio level and
actively makes decisions, especially surrounding discretionary projects, based on risk.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 21 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

3.1.8.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to the Change Portfolio):
The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Asset management risk criteria enable optimised asset management decision making.
 Risk assurance is provided throughout the executive relating to process effectiveness and
efficiency.
 Desire for continuous improvement of risk management processes is embedded
throughout the organisation.
 Commercial-related risk reviews support successful and efficient procurement.
 Risk data is analysed for trends to inform commercial strategies.
 Knowledge bank allowing sharing of experiences used to optimise risk management
approaches.
 Knowledge transfer is an inherent behaviour (surrounding risk).
 A portfolio risk management tool is used enabling analysis such as trending and early
warning indicators.
 Organisational risk management framework interacts effectively with change portfolio risk
management.
 Organisational risk knowledge and processes enable portfolios to prepare optimised
plans based on past experience.
 Process improvement is pro-active based on trends and emerging evidence.
 Organisation actively seeks to improve risk processes based on trend analysis.
 Formal portfolio gate reviews proactively assess and manage investment risk and make
decisions based on their impact on the portfolio.
Items not specifically observed:
Portfolio risks appear well understood but the lack of a central tool limits the availability of

aggregated programme and project risk information to support that knowledge. No evidence

was presented of a central knowledge tool supporting optimisation of processes or of

underpinning knowledge transfer practices relating to risk processes. No claims were made

relating to formal gate reviews per se, although it is understood there are structured executive

reviews in place.
Possible Improvements:
To achieve Level 5 DHS should regularly and systematically review aggregated risk data
for hotspots and trends with a view to optimising risk processes.
To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the portfolio risk management process, based on trend analysis, lessons
learned and process metrics. This is likely to include comparison with other
organisations.
At Level 5, DHS should demonstrate consistent application of the portfolio risk
management process to both opportunities and non-financial risks.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 22 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

3.2 Programme Management Maturity Description

DHS’s Programme Management maturity level is assessed as Level 4. A Level 4

assessment indicates that:
DHS obtains and retain specific measurements on its programme management performance

and runs a quality management organisation to better predict future programme outcomes.

3.2.1 Key summarised observations for Programme Management
 DHS has developed and consistently used a sound set of program management
processes, principles and governance arrangements, including benefits management and
change management disciplines that allow it to obtain and retain measurements and predict
outcomes.
 Performance across all seven perspectives of Programme Management is strong (with
each assessed at Level 4) with particular strengths showing up in Benefits Management
and Finance Management perspectives.
 Risk Management processes are very strong but to build to Level 5 maturity some form of
centralised collection of risks, such as through a database, would be required. This could
support predictive analysis required to reach Level 5.
 The maturity of Programme Management in DHS is well supported by strong leadership
and a culture that integrates the disciplines into the business.

3.2.2 PgM Organisational Governance

DHS’s maturity level for Organisational Governance of its programmes is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
Programme and organisational governance are integrated with measurement and feedback

used to refine programme governance as appropriate to make it more effective.

3.2.2.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 The primary stakeholders with roles in Organisational Governance for programmes appear
to have significant, integrated roles in the range of Portfolio governance mechanisms.
There are clear measurements applied to programme success, problem areas and
process effectiveness that support evolutionary improvement in maturity improvement.
 As an example, the Executive Committee (EC) supported by the Finance & Investment
Committee and the ICT Governance Committee is accountable for the establishment of
programs to support budget funded initiatives. This is seamlessly integrated with the
Portfolio Board approach. However there are very clear distinctions between
Programmes and the Portfolio governance.
 Programme, and constituent project, approvals are accordingly made in the context of the
wider portfolio.
 Examples were provided of continual review of authorisation approaches based on
historical analysis of performance. This included changes to the SDR programme as a
result of evident risk exposure and provision of seed funding to mitigate risks associated
with approvals.
 The suite of programme controls, information and reporting provides a very clear view of
which programmes are running, how they relate to strategic objectives and the impact of

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 23 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
issues and risks on portfolio outcomes. There is substantial evidence of the use of
forecasts, such as those provided in the dashboard reports, to direct programme
realignment to corporate objectives.

3.2.3 PgM Management Control

DHS’s maturity level for Management Control of its programmes is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The programmes’ management control approach is integrated with the Organisation’s control

mechanisms, and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and refine the

programmes’ effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.2.3.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 The provision of Program Status Reports to Programme Boards as well as the PPO and
ICT PMO for maintaining portfolio level dashboards helps to integrate the programme’s
controls with the organisation’s control mechanisms. Program Status Reports remain
consistently used and are validated effectively, thus providing assurance to Programme
Boards that the program and the projects within it are on track or to provide guidance on
dealing with issues and risks. Metrics are used to monitor and control projects in
quantitative terms and the concepts of tolerance setting and exception management are
applied in a flexible and pragmatic manner.
 Performance Management approaches used include internal and external Health Checks
as well as the use of Independent Assurance for a range of purposes. The organisation
is proactive in establishing its review program based on emerging data trends.
 All programme management personnel have a range of measures built into job
descriptions and performance agreements specifically relating to their programme role
effectiveness. Programme Board effectiveness is internally and externally reviewed on a
regular basis.
 The dashboard reports shown support the stated evidence that all programmes are
delivering broadly within specified business case parameters. Where variances do occur
they are highlighted through effective Exception Reporting and these appear to be actively
managed.
 The creation and use of an Executive Command Centre to assist with complex transitions
is a strong example of optimisation of structures to integrate programme and operational
activities. This lends a strong argument in favour of Level 5 assessment for the
Organisation attribute of Management Control. Whilst this does not cause the overall
Management Control perspective to be assessed at Level 5, it is a logical first step wards
that goal should DHS choose to add that to its Capability Improvement Plan.

3.2.4 PgM Stakeholder Management

DHS’s maturity level for Stakeholder Management of its programmes is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The programmes’ stakeholder management is integrated with the Organisation’s stakeholder

management approach and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and

refine the programmes’ effectiveness across the Organisation.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 24 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

3.2.4.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 DHS demonstrates robust stakeholder management approaches and provided evidence
that these processes are regularly assessed for effectiveness. As well as reviewing the
communications, the outcomes of feedback exercises are actively fed into the programme
structures and activities where possible.
 DHS uses an extensive range of communications channels and techniques to deliver
messages tailored to the varied customer base and demographics. DHS have made a
noticeable shift towards business readiness and benefits delivery which is evident through
their engagement of both internal and external stakeholders. There is evidence of
consistency, purposeful selection and regular improvement in these approaches.
 There are several mechanisms by which communication is consolidated and aligned to
corporate messages. Consolidated media strategies are in place and these were reviewed
in 2012. Twelve monthly change forecasting, the 3 month pack of detailed information
on every change that is to be implemented and tools such as “Transformation Street” and
the Change Info Hub provide horizontal integration of communications. These
mechanisms could lend support to a Level 5 assessment of Stakeholder Management
in the future.
 The wide range of feedback mechanisms used include mechanisms that show
stakeholders consistently feel well engaged by programme teams.
To achieve a Level 5 assessment, DHS might consider further integration of external and
internal communications along with developing evidence of the use of knowledge
management to support continuous improvement of programme communications. Use of
such tools might help to provide evidence of optimisation of processes.

3.2.5 PgM Benefits Management

DHS’s maturity level for Benefits Management of its programmes is assessed as

level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The programmes’ benefits management approach is integrated with the Organisation’s

performance management and uses the measurement and analysis of performance to verify

and refine the programmes’ effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.2.5.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 Benefits identification and management at a program level is consistently undertaken and
it is being used by all programs. The approaches used are consistent with and integrated
in portfolio Benefits Management approaches. The central management of processes,
tools and templates used for benefits management activities ensures consistent
measurement and control as well as regular review of benefits processes.
 Convincing evidence was provided that there are defined and consistently used criteria
for benefits and that these are linked clearly to organisation objectives. This evidence
included a range of templates, dashboard reports and guidance.
Evidence was not as convincing regarding criteria and processes for identifying and
managing disbenefits. DHS may wish to review criteria for capturing and managing
disbenefits to reinforce the existing rating and as a step towards possible achievement of
Level 5 in the future.
 The organisational structure contains very clear responsibilities for achievement of
benefits as do benefit profiles/assessments. This attribute borders on Level 5 which
requires inclusion of specific responsibilities for pre-emptive interventions based on

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 25 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
forecasting benefits performance. To achieve this level further use of consolidated
knowledge management and centralised forecasting techniques could be beneficial.
 Evidence is provided in reports that programmes are delivering expected benefits
consistently and that variations are actively managed.
Whilst there will undoubtedly be associated costs and imposts, it would appear that a
Level 5 assessment for the Benefits Management perspective of the Programme
Management sub-model would be within reach of DHS if it chose to include this in the
CIP. As for Portfolio Management, this would most likely require investment in knowledge
management tools to support continuous and pro-active improvement of processes and
enhance performance (along with supporting evidence).

3.2.6 PgM Finance Management

DHS’s maturity level for Finance Management of its programmes is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The programmes’ finance management is integrated with the Organisation’s finance

management approach and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and

refine the programmes’ effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.2.6.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 DHS utilise a standard approach to program business case development that is
consistent and integrated with corporate finance approaches. A consistent set of metrics
and analysis of programme performance is applied across DHS programmes.
 The common finance management processes for programmes are regularly assessed
and validated for effectiveness. There is evidence of processes being refined when
required.
 The Organisation attribute of Financial Management is, prima facie, at Level 5 in that
there is a clear view of forecast cost and funding requirements for al programmes within
the portfolio.
 Evidence provided supports a Level 4 assessment of Finance performance for
programmes in that nearly all DHS programmes deliver within their expected costs.
Level 5 assessment for this attribute requires reliable prediction of cost profiles driving
optimisation of funding.

3.2.6.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to the all Programmes):
The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Analysis of asset cost trends in order to optimise processes for investment decision
making.
 Continually monitored programme assurance with a view to optimising programme finance
processes.
 Desire for continuous improvement of finance processes is embedded throughout the
organisation.
 Funding is optimised through understanding of supply chain costs.
 The mix of programme costs is optimised around factors such as funding arrangements
and taxation.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 26 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Cash flow is optimised through understanding trends in contract terms and performance.
 Organisational knowledge is shared enabling optimisation of financial approaches.
 Finance tools forecast programme costs and funding requirements (real time).
 Lessons learned are used to optimise approaches, standards and processes across
constituent projects.
 Finance skills are embedded in management and leadership development.
 Cost estimation techniques are continually reviewed (using actuals and forecasts) to
improve control.
 Organisational knowledge is used to optimise plans.
 Process improvement is proactive based on (forward looking) reviews, feedback and
analysis.
 Strategic business planning is embedded within programme business cases.
 Sophisticated techniques (e.g. discounted cash flow, NPV etc.) are common tools
enabling investment optimisation.
 The organisation uses maturity assessments to optimise financial management capability.
Items not specifically observed:
Many Level 5 behaviours and practices were reported and observed. No evidence was

provided of pro-active, forecast-based process improvement. Whilst there are enterprise

financial tools in use, the use of them or enterprise knowledge tools to support process

optimisation was not observed or supported. No specific evidence was proffered supporting

process ‘optimisation’.
Possible Improvements:
To achieve Level 5 DHS should regularly and systematically review aggregated financial
data for hotspots and trends.
To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the programme financial management process, based on trend analysis,
lessons learned and process metrics.

3.2.7 PgM Resource Management

DHS’s maturity level for Resource Management of its programmes is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The programmes’ resource management approach is integrated with the Organisation’s

capacity and capability management and uses measurement and analysis of performance to

verify and refine programme effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.2.7.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 There is a solid resource management approach for DHS programmes which is integrated
with the organisations capacity and capability management approach. There is clear
understanding of performance driven from a range of reports and metrics. There are
strong review mechanisms to support verification and refinement of this approach.
 Resource management processes are reviewed from a number of perspectives and
channels for identification of issues are open and well-used.
 DHS is able to provide a thorough picture of resource requirements and utilisation across
its programmes and is regularly reviewing that balance to assess organisational capacity
to deliver.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 27 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Clear evidence shows adjustments to delivery during the programme lifecycle to re- balance
supply and demand. DHS is pursuing a range of risk mitigation measures to deal with the
threatened impact of APS staff freezes and redundancies. These risks could impact
maturity assessments if they eventuate to the extent that Programmes no longer have
sufficient resources to deliver. However, it appears at this time that programmes
consistently have sufficient resources to meet their scheduled targets. The sophisticated
approach the Department is taking to meeting these risks helps to show the maturity of
processes.

3.2.8 PgM Risk Management

DHS’s maturity level for Risk Management of its programmes is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The programmes’ risk management is integrated with the Organisation’s risk management

approach and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and refine the

programmes’ effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.2.8.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 There is a consistent risk management approach applied across the portfolio, programme
and project levels that supports measurement and performance analysis to verify
programme effectiveness across the organisation.
 The processes and use thereof are assessed at least monthly. There is clear evidence of
processes, business rules and guidance being refined to respond to identified issues.
 Risk roles are clearly assigned across the programmes and these include the capability to
respond to identified risks. There is broad usage of these roles to leverage change within
programmes to avoid threats. There appears to be some identification of opportunities but
this does not appear as mature as the framework for threats.
 Programmes appear to be well able to handle unpredictable events through early warning
and risk response mechanisms.

3.2.8.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to the all Programmes):
The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Asset risk criteria support optimal asset management decisions.
 Continual monitoring of Programme assurance supports optimisation of risk assurance
functions and processes.
 The desire to continuously improve risk management processes is embedded throughout
the organisation.
 The creation, sharing and transfer of risk management knowledge is an inherent
behaviour.
 Risk data is analysed for trends to inform and optimise future contracting strategies.
 Commercial-related reviews assure the leaders of effective and successful delivery.
 Organisational knowledge and processes enable programmes to learn from each other to
optimise their risk management approaches.
 Risk status reports are centrally analysed for improvement to approaches.
 An enterprise risk management tool is used that enables analysis such as trends for
common risks.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 28 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Lessons learned are used to optimise risk approaches.
 Plans are optimised using past risk data.
 The organisation continually monitors the application of resources to risks.
 Risk policy is forward looking and seeks to anticipate (as opposed to reflecting past
experiences).
 The organisation actively seeks to improve risk management standards.

Items not specifically observed:
General use of risk management was strong and shows some maturity level 5 characteristics.
Lack of a central, enterprise risk management tool limits the organisations ability to roll up

project risks into programmes, to conduct analysis of effectiveness and thus predict future

outcomes. No central knowledge tool was observed and this limits the ability to meet the

continuous improvement aspects of Level 5.

Possible Improvements:
To achieve Level 5 DHS should regularly and systematically review aggregated risk data
for hotspots and trends with a view to improving processes.
To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the programme risk management process, based on trend analysis,
lessons learned and process metrics. This is likely to include comparison with other
organisations.
At Level 5 the process is also likely to be updated based on analysis of predicted risk
management performance, not only past performance.
At Level 5, DHS should demonstrate consistent application of the programme risk
management process to both opportunities and non-financial risks.

3.3 Project Management Maturity Description

DHS’s Project Management maturity level is assessed as Level 4. A Level 4 assessment

indicates that:
DHS obtains and retains specific measurements on its project management performance and

runs a quality management organisation to better predict future performance.

3.3.1 Key summarised observations for Project Management

There has been direct investment in project management learning and development and

practice management. We note that across all of the P3M3 participants there was an evident

uplift in project capability compared to prior years.
The DHS Portfolio Office continues to have a direct impact on project management practices,
consistent application of organisational standards and generally lifting the standard of project

management across DHS. For example:
 Centrally controlled project management processes and techniques are being used to
effectively manage the delivery of new or enhanced capability.
 Sound project governance arrangements are being applied consistently, often within the
boundaries of a larger change program.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 29 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 A resource pool of trained and experienced Project Managers is being developed by DHS
to support current and future projects. This is supported by a focus on ongoing
development for individuals in specific roles and the creation of forums to share
organisational experience, lessons learned and knowledge across projects.
Strong Portfolio Management also has a positive impact on project management practices as

the DHS senior executive begin to set higher Departmental expectations on projects and

Project Managers.

3.3.2 PjM Organisational Governance

DHS’s maturity level for Organisational Governance of its projects is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
Project and Organisational governance are integrated with measurement and feedback is

used to refine project governance as appropriate to make it more effective

3.3.2.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 Project governance roles and processes are fully integrated with those of the organisation
with approvals signed off at the Executive level, either through the Portfolio Board
(Executive Committee informed by Finance & Investment Committee and ICT Governance
Committee) or the ICT Governance Committee for internal ICT initiatives. This joint
decision making process across business and ICT ensures balance between
organisational performance and the change impact.
 The project approval processes clearly include criteria to assess the value in the context
of the wider portfolio. The integration of approvals with programme approvals supports
this type of assessment.
 The approach to authorisation has been assessed regularly and there is evidence of
changes
 DHS has a comprehensive list of live projects that shows clearly their linkages with
programmes and strategic objectives. A comprehensive dashboard reporting approach
allows re-direction of projects to maintain alignment with corporate goals and there is
evidence of this occurring.
Evidence was presented to support a claim that the organisation attribute of
Organisational Governance is at Level 5; that is “DHS actively tailors its approach to
authorisation to suit the needs of internal and external environments”. The overall
assessment of Organisational Governance perspective remains at Level 4 in this
assessment but this might be an area that DHS considers as a Target Level 5 for
incorporation in the CIP.

3.3.3 PjM Management Control

DHS’s maturity level for Management Control of its projects is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The projects’ management control approach is integrated with the Organisation’s controls and

uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and refine project effectiveness

across the Organisation.

3.3.3.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 30 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Project boards show high degrees of engagement with active decision making focused
around setting strategies to improve delivery when required. The Project Boards are
integrated with Programme and Portfolio management arrangements. Measurements and
associated analysis is used to support these arrangements.
 Performance management is conducted through a range of approaches including health
checks, independent review and the normal control routines. These highlight
effectiveness of project controls and there is evidence of changes to processes as a
result of such reviews.
 Performance appraisals of project personnel are integrated with the DHS Performance
Appraisal framework and project role effectiveness is central within such appraisals.
 The nature of many projects as budget measures increases the importance of delivery on
time, budget and to quality requirements. One manager put this as ‘we must deliver
budget measures to plan and we do’. This claim is supported by dashboard reports
consistently showing red light indicators for only a small proportion of projects (often less
than 5%) and these red lights are rarely persistent.

3.3.4 PjM Stakeholder Management

DHS’s maturity level for Stakeholder Management of its projects is assessed as

Level 4. A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The projects’ stakeholder management is integrated with DHS’ stakeholder management

approach, and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and refine project

effectiveness across the Organisation

3.3.4.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 The project, programme and portfolio stakeholder engagement approaches are vertically
integrated and there is solid examination of the effectiveness of projects’ stakeholder
management across the organisation.
 Regular review of the effectiveness of stakeholder management is evidenced by a recent
review of the Governance Framework which coincided with a stakeholder management
review with the same intent. Project closure reports also routinely consider stakeholder
management effectiveness and lessons are transferred to Lessons Learned where
appropriate.
 Stakeholder communications are effectively managed horizontally across multiple projects
to enable consolidation and this borders on a Level 5 assessment which requires that
communications across multiple projects optimise stakeholder engagement efficiency and
effectiveness. Further metrics and evidence that engagement effectiveness and
®
efficiency is optimised would support such an assessment for the 2015 P3M3 Review as
planned.
 Likewise the performance attribute of Stakeholder Management is also approaching Level
5 maturity in that there is a clear view of which projects are engaging which stakeholder
groups. Similar evidence about optimisation of effectiveness of internal and external
stakeholder management would support a Level 5 maturity assessment in 2015
Project Stakeholder Management would appear to be an area in which Level 5 maturity
would be achievable with the introduction of improved, centralised knowledge management
to drive continuous improvement along with additional evidence of optimisation of
effectiveness and efficiency of communications.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 31 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

3.3.5 PjM Benefits Management

DHS’s maturity level for Benefits Management of its projects is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The projects’ benefits management approach is integrated with the Organisation’s

performance management and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and

refine project effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.3.5.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 There is a common benefits management framework across the portfolio, programmes and
projects that allows measurement and analysis of benefits management performance
across the organisation. The PPO has verified the continued usage of this framework
across projects and provides ongoing support and review of the framework.
 There is a common range of criteria for benefits across DHS and these are clearly linked
to the organisation’s objectives, especially linkage to the delivery of budget measures.
Dis-benefits are also included in the framework but there is less evidence of common
usage.
 The organisation structure includes responsibility for pre-emptive interventions into
existing projects to re-direct them based on forecasting benefits performance. As such
the Organisation attribute of the Benefits Management perspective can be assessed at
Level 5 maturity. To ensure maintenance of this level in support of the planned 2015
®
P3M3 full assessment, DHS might wish to consolidate evidence of forecasts vs actual
benefit performance across the portfolio and records of intervention decisions.
 The PPO, via Project Specialists together with the Benefits Management Team in the
Change and Project Coordination Branch, provide specific support to business project
managers in defining, measuring, managing and reporting benefits. This assists in skills
transfer and operationalisation of benefits management.
 The Performance attribute of Benefits Management also approaches Level 5 maturity
which would require that DHS can reliably predict when projects will collectively deliver
benefits. To achieve that level DHS would need to provide evidence of prediction of
individual and collective delivery of benefits, assessment of those predictions for accuracy
and corrective actions where needed.
Overall the maturity of Benefits Management in the Project sub-model is assessed at
Level 4 ‘with a bullet’. The refinement and embedding of performance metrics along with
structured and evidenced continuous improvement (probably using some form of
knowledge management system) would make maturity Level 5 an achievable target for
the CIP. Refinement of the management of dis-benefits would also assist this
improvement.

3.3.6 PjM Finance Management

DHS’s maturity level for Finance Management of its projects is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The projects’ finance management is integrated with the Organisation’s finance management

approach, and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and refine project

effectiveness across the Organisation.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 32 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

3.3.6.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 PPO spot checks have confirmed the previous observation that Business Cases are
instrumental during the project assessment phase. They are generally used as a source
of truth and reference point during initial discussions for project decision making. Cost
management at the project level is fully integrated with the organisation’s financial
management functions
 This use of a standard approach to project business case development that is consistent
and integrated with corporate finance approaches and is integrated with programme
business Case approval provides a strong and integrated basis for Finance Management.
A consistent set of metrics and analysis of programme performance is applied across
DHS programmes.
 The common finance management processes for programmes are regularly assessed
and validated for effectiveness. There is evidence of processes being refined when
required. There is a valid argument for assessment of this attribute at Maturity Level 5
which would require pre-emptive interventions based on financial reporting forecasts to
redirect existing projects. Implicit in the deeper attributes of this is evidence of structured
trend analysis, audit trails and continuous improvement. Recommendations are provided
below for the continued improvement of this maturity level.
 The Organisation attribute of Finance Management is at Level 5 maturity as the Project
and Programme dashboards provide a clear view of forecast costs and funding
requirements for all projects in the change portfolio.
 The project dashboard reports show clearly that the vast majority (usually greater than
95%) of projects are delivering on track.

3.3.6.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to all Projects):
The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Analysis of asset cost trends in order to optimise processes for investment decision
making for projects
 Continually monitored programme assurance with a view to optimising programme finance
processes
 Desire for continuous improvement of finance processes is embedded throughout the
organisation
 Funding is optimised in projects through understanding of supply chain costs
 Cash flow is optimised through understanding trends in contract terms and performance
 Organisational knowledge is shared enabling optimisation of project financial approaches
 Finance status reports are analysed by a central group for opportunities to improve
approaches
 Finance tools forecast project costs and funding requirements across the organisation
(real time)
 Finance skills are embedded in management and leadership development
 Cost estimation techniques are continually reviewed (using actuals and forecasts) to
improve control
 Organisational knowledge is used to optimise plans

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 33 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 Process improvement is proactive based on (forward looking) reviews, feedback and
analysis
 Strategic business planning is embedded within project business cases
 The organisation actively seeks to improve central finance management standards based
on analysis of projects and markets.
 Projects use sophisticated techniques within business case to help optimise investment
decisions at the programme and portfolio levels.
Items not specifically observed:
Many Level 5 behaviours and practices were reported and observed. No evidence was

provided of proactive, forecast-based process improvement. Whilst there are enterprise

financial tools in use, the use of them or enterprise knowledge tools to support process

optimisation was not observed or supported. No specific evidence was proffered supporting

process ‘optimisation’.
Possible Improvements:
To achieve Level 5 DHS should regularly and systematically review aggregated financial
data for hotspots and trends with a view to process optimisation.
 To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the project financial management process, based on trend analysis,
lessons learned and process metrics.

3.3.7 PjM Resource Management

DHS’s maturity level for Resource Management of its projects is assessed as Level 4.
A Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The projects’ resource management approach is integrated with the Organisation’s capacity

and capability management and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and

refine project effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.3.7.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 PPO spot checks support the previous P3M3® finding that mature, robust and consistent
processes, supported by the ICT PMO, exist to track and measure resource utilisation
and efficiency within the ICT Portfolio. These processes leverage central resource
management tools such as Primavera, the ICT Work Plan and TM1.
 Substantial evidence was provided that common resource management processes are
regularly assessed and refined when appropriate.
 There is a central function to compile and aggregate resource requirements and to
balance these with organisational capacity and capability. There is continued recognition,
at various organisational levels, for the need to share critical and/or limited resources.
Examples include the Project Management Competency Centre, the Business Analyst
Competency Centre, PPO Project Specialists and the Project Risk Support Team.
 Resource supply and demand is re-balanced during the project life-cycle by both
adjustments to the project and utilisation of resources between projects. From a business
perspective the tracking and measurement of resource utilisation and efficiency is focused
at the branch level and is critical to allow the movement of resources across initiatives
as required.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 34 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
 As was evident for programmes, DHS is pursuing a range of risk mitigation measures to
deal with the threatened impact of APS staff freezes and redundancies. These risks
could impact maturity assessments if they eventuate to the extent that projects no longer
have sufficient resources to deliver. However, it appears at this time that projects
consistently have sufficient resources to meet their scheduled targets. The sophisticated
approach the Department is taking to meeting these risks helps to show the maturity of
processes.
 A training strategy remains in place to support capability development within Project
Management. This is facilitated by the provision of various mechanism to support
knowledge transfer and practical applications including:
 classroom and e-Learning training courses;
 project management forums;
 induction and refresh sessions; and
 ongoing coaching and mentoring provided by Project Specialists.

3.3.8 PjM Risk Management

DHS’s maturity level for Risk Management of its projects is assessed as Level 4. A

Level 4 assessment indicates that:
The projects’ risk management approach is integrated with the Organisation’s risk

management and uses measurement and analysis of performance to verify and refine project

effectiveness across the Organisation.

3.3.8.1 Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations from the assessment were:
 Risk management across the portfolio, programmes and projects is consistent and
effective. There is substantial evidence of measurement and analysis of performance
being used to refine project effectiveness across the organisation.
 Strong evidence exists to show regular assessment of the risk management processes
for past effectiveness. Oral evidence was presented that the introduction of the PGPA
Act has catalysed continuous improvement of Risk Management processes. This is
supported by changes to the project processes whereby, for example, new and emerging
issues and risks must be notified within 10 days. There is also evidence that use of Risk
Management workshops is driving continuous improvement of processes.
 The Organisational structure includes responsibility for pre-emptive interventions to
redirect existing projects based on identified risks. It is not as clear that opportunities are
managed with the same rigour, however this is seen as an ongoing improvement that is
underway and accordingly the Organisation attribute of Project Risk Management is
assessed at Level 5 maturity.
 PPO spot checks confirm that standard risk management templates and tools, including
risk registers, are used consistently and this shows that projects are generally able to
handle events that were unpredictable through early warning and risk response
mechanisms. The Performance attribute of Risk Management also approaches Level 5
maturity. However, evidence of optimisation of the project portfolio through understanding
the risk profile would likely be achieved through the recommendations provided below.

3.3.8.2 Target Level 5 Comments

Level 5 Requirements Summary (Relating to the all Projects):

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 35 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

The following points summarise the requirements of Level 5 Maturity for this perspective:
 Asset risk criteria support optimal asset management decisions.
 Continual monitoring of Programme assurance supports optimisation of risk assurance
functions and processes.
 The desire to continuously improve risk management processes is embedded throughout
the organisation.
 Risk data is analysed for trends to inform and optimise future contracting strategies.
 Commercial-related reviews assure the leaders of effective and successful delivery.
 Organisational knowledge and processes enable projects to learn from each other to
optimise their risk management approaches.
 Risk status reports are centrally analysed for improvement to approaches.
 An enterprise risk management tool is used that enables analysis such as trends for
common risks.
 Risk management skills are embedded in management and leadership development.
 Lessons learned are used to optimise risk approaches.
 Process improvement is proactive and based on analysis.
 Plans are optimised using past risk data.
 Centralised risk categories are continuously reviewed.
 The organisation continually monitors the application of resources to risks.
Risk policy is forward looking and seeks to anticipate (as opposed to reflecting past

experiences).
The organisation actively seeks to improve risk management standards.
Items not specifically observed:
Many Level 5-like attributes are demonstrated in evidence reviewed. However, projects

consistently maintain an Excel spreadsheet based Risk Register. Whilst these are subject to

central review and control and a degree of analysis, this appears to be a central limiting factor

in progression towards Level 5 maturity assessment. It was also noted that there were some

questions over currency of a few project risk registers when these were informally presented

to reviewers. At Level 5 that question would simply not arise.
Possible Improvements:
To achieve Level 5 DHS should regularly and systematically review aggregated risk data
for hotspots and trends with a view to process optimisation.
To achieve Level 5 DHS should establish a clear audit trail showing continual
improvement of the project risk management process, based on trend analysis, lessons
learned and process metrics.
At Level 5 the process is also likely to be updated based on analysis of predicted risk
management performance, not only past performance.
At Level 5, DHS should demonstrate consistent application of the project risk
management process to both opportunities and non-financial risks.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 36 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

4 APPENDIX A – Assessment Participants

Portfolio Management
P3M3® Role Name Title
Portfolio Director - Emily Canning Chief Financial Officer
CFO
Portfolio Director - Gary Sterrenberg Chief Information Officer
CIO
Head of Portfolio Soraya Weber National Manager, Portfolio Programme
Office (PPO) Office
Head of Portfolio Elaine Ninham National Manager, ICT Portfolio Management
Office (ICT) Office
Portfolio Rohan W ong National Manager, Internal Budgets and
Management Reporting
Process Owner
(Benefits &
Finance)
Portfolio David Norris Director, Risk Management (for John
Management Kalokerinos - National Manager,
Process Owner Governance)
(Governance &
Risk)
Portfolio Alex Dolan National Manager, Government Partnerships
Management and New Work
Process Owner
(Stakeholder
Management)
Portfolio Anna Ryan A/g National Manager, Workforce Planning
Management
Andrea Paschalis National Manager, Learning and
Process Owner
Development
(Resource
Management)
Portfolio Office Bianca Ruut A/g National Manager, Change and Project
Coordination
Portfolio Office Justin Keenan Director, Portfolio Design Support and
(PPO) Assurance
Rebecca Gordon
Director, Portfolio Reporting and Support
Melissa Barry
A/g Director, Portfolio Capability
Development and Frameworks
Paul Cain
Director, Portfolio Risk Management

Programme Management
P3M3® Role Name Title
Head of Programme Soraya Weber National Manager, Portfolio Programme
Office (PPO) Office
Head of Programme Michelle Wilson General Manager, Disability, Carers and

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 37 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
Office (ACR) Older Australians Division
Head of Programme Robyn Calder A/g General Manager, Business Systems
Office (CSSR) Design & Transformation Division
Programme Office Rebecca Gordon Director, Portfolio Reporting and Support
(PPO)
Melissa Barry A/g Director, Portfolio Capability
Development and Frameworks
Director, Portfolio Risk Management
Paul Cain
Assistant Director, Portfolio Design Support
Kathleen Garcia
and Assurance

Programme Office Bianca Ruut A/g National Manager, Change and Project
(Business Change) Coordination
Programme Office Rebecca Tyler Director, Departmental Benefits Management
Section
(Benefits, Finance,
Governance & Risk) Director, Internal Budgets and Reporting
Anthony Perry

Director, Risk Management
David Norris
Programme Office Susan Cartwright National Manager, Budget Implementation
Branch, Social Services

Programme SRO Michelle Wilson General Manager, Disability, Carers and
Older Australians Division
Programme SRO Robyn Calder A/g General Manager, Business Systems
Design & Transformation Division
Business Change Bianca Ruut A/g National Manager, Change and Project
Manager Coordination

Project Management
P3M3® Role Name Title
Head of Project Office Soraya Weber National Manager, Portfolio Programme
Office
Project Office (ICT) Annette Gordon- Director, ICT Portfolio Management Office
Cooke
Project Office Rebecca Gordon Director, Portfolio Reporting and Support
and Project Management Justin Keenan Assistant Director, Portfolio Design
Process Owners Support and Assurance
Director, Portfolio Risk Management
Paul Cain
Assistant Director, Portfolio Capability
Mel Peterson
Development and Frameworks
Programme Office Susan Cartwright National Manager, Budget Implementation
Branch, Social Services
Susan Brookes

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 38 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
Project Management Bianca Ruut A/g National Manager, Change and
Process Owners Project Coordination
Director, Departmental Benefits
Rebecca Tyler
Management
Anthony Perry
Director, Risk Management
David Norris
Director, Internal Budgets and Reporting

Independent Assurance
th

Interview 1 Thursday 14 August 2014 10:30am – 11:30am

Attendees:
KPMG

• Paul Coromandel
• Michael Adams
  Department of Human Services
• Soraya Weber
• Elaine Ninham
• Chris Parker
• Skye Finlay

  th

Interview 2 Monday 25 August 2014 2:00pm – 3:00pm

Attendees:
Craven Innovation

• Mr John Craven
  Department of Human Services
• Chris Parker
• Skye Finlay

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 39 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

5 APPENDIX B – INFORMATION PROVIDED TO ASSESSORS

Portfolio Management

1. Portfolio Management Framework Manual
2. Portfolio Management Framework “At a Glance”
3. Portfolio Dashboard Reports July 2013 - June 2014
4. Group Dashboard Reports July 2013 - June 2014
5. Glossary

Programme Management

1. Programme Management Framework “At a Glance”
2. Programme Management Framework Manual
3. Glossary
4. Registration Form
5. Programme Brief
6. Co-Design Service Intent Statement
7. Programme Business Case
8. Programme Blueprint
9. Service Blueprint
10. Programme Plan
11. Programme Strategy (Control Framework)
12. Interdependency Register
13. Benefits Guides and Templates
14. Stakeholder Engagement and Communications Plan
15. Risk Management Templates and Guides
16. Programme Exception Report Template
17. Programme Status Report Template
18. Issue Identification Form
19. Programme Closure Report Template
20. Post Implementation Review Template

Project Management

1. Project Management Framework “At a Glance”
2. Project Management Framework Manual
3. Glossary
4. Registration and Project Profile Modelling Tool
5. Project Profiling Guide
6. Intent Statement

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 40 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
7. Business Case Template
8. Project Management Plan Template
9. Project Management Logbook Tool
10. Stakeholder Engagement and Communication Plan
11. Benefits Management Templates and Guides
12. Risk Management Templates and Guides
13. Monthly Status Report Template
14. Exception Report Template
15. Change Request Template
16. End Stage Report Template
17. Issue Identification Form
18. Closure Report Template
19. Post Implementation Review Template

ICT Project Management

1. ICT Project Management Framework “At a Glance”
2. ICT Project Management Framework
3. ICT Project Mandate
4. ICT Project Brief
5. ICT Project Management Plan
6. ICT Statement of Work
7. ICT Project Governance Arrangements
8. ICT Project Monthly Status Report
9. ICT Project Manager Logbook
10. ICT Deliverables Completion Document
11. High Level Requirements Document
12. Detailed Requirements Document
13. Requirements Management Plan
14. Project Change Request Template
15. Project Closure Report Template
16. Program/Project Post Implementation Review
17. Fact Sheet: ICT Project Management Framework
18. Frequently Asked Questions: ICT Project Management Framework
19. ICT Project Delivery - Initiation, Planning, Execution & Closure Phases Checklist
20. ICT In Flight Project Compliance Checklist - Tier 1, 2 & 3 Projects

ICT Engagement Process

1. Business to ICT Account Management Relationships Matrix
2. Fact Sheet: ICT Engagement Process FAQ

   Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
   Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 41 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
3. Fact Sheet: ICT Engagement Process Costing Justification Tips
4. Fact Sheet: ICT Engagement Process Questions to Consider When Costing and
Approving
5. Role Definitions
6. ICT Contact List
7. ICT Governance Arrangements
8. Acronym Dictionary
9. ICT Proposed Solution Document Template

Benefits Management

1. Benefits Management Framework Overview
2. Benefits Management Policy
3. Internal Guidelines
   o Departmental Benefits Section Offer of Services
   o Identifying / Defining Benefits
   o Governance
   o Planning / Managing Benefits
   o Appraisal / Valuing Benefits
   o Departmental Register
   o Report
   o Evaluate / Review Benefits
   o Lessons Learned
4. Benefits Map Template
5. Benefits Profile Template
6. Benefits Realisation Plan
7. Benefits (Project / Programme) Register
8. Benefits Roadmap Template
9. Benefits Map Guide
10. Benefits Profile Guide
11. Benefits Realisation Plan Guide
12. Example Benefit Map
13. Example Benefit Profile
14. Example Benefit Realisation Plan
15. Benefits Management Presentation
16. Benefits Management Induction Presentation
17. Benefits Management Communications Strategy

Risk Management, Issues and Governance

1. Accountable Authority Instructions

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 42 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
2. Enterprise Risk Management Framework
3. Enterprise Risk Management Policy
4. Enterprise Risk Management Strategy
5. Risk Management Plan Template
6. Guide to Completing the Risk Management Plan Template
7. Risk Assessment Matrix Guide
8. Quality Review Checklist
9. Group Risk Reporting Dashboard
10. Project Risk Management FAQ
11. Risk Management in Projects (Training Package)
12. Issues Management Process
13. Governance Framework
14. Escalation Coordination Policy
15. Strategic Planning and Reporting Policy
16. Strategic Planning and Risk Management (all SES training)
17. Governance Committees Charters and Terms of Reference

Stakeholder Management

1. Intranet - New Work Team
2. Intranet - Agreements and External Relationships
3. Terms of Reference
4. DSS/DVA/PM&C Relationships Team
5. Service Delivery Policy - Emerging Issues
6. Discretionary New Work Processes
7. Bilateral Management Agreement - Between DHS and Department of Families, Housing,
   Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
8. Bilateral Management Agreement - Between DHS and Department of Education,
   Employment and Workplace Relations
9. New Work Proposal Form
10. External Costing Request
11. Head Agreement Template
12. Services Schedule Template
13. Head Agreement between Secretary - DHS and Commissioner of Taxation
14. Stakeholder Engagement and Relationship Management Presentation

Resource Management

1. DHS People Strategy and Framework Matrix
2. People Metrics Scorecard
3. Job Family Project - Information Sheet

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 43 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report
4. Work Level Standards
5. Portfolio People Strategy - Vision 2015
6. Employment Framework
7. Priority Learning Report
8. Training Investment Plan August to October 2014
9. Learning and Development Evaluation Strategy 2013 - 2016
10. Instrument of Delegation Authorisation for Human Resources Related Matters

Assurance Reports

1. KPMG Assurance Report 15 - Service Delivery Reform Programme Change (April 2013)
2. KPMG Assurance Report 16 - Service Delivery Reform Programme Governance and
   Financial Management (June 2013)
3. KPMG Assurance Report 17 - Child Support System Redesign Programme (July 2014
4. Mid Stage Service Delivery Reform Programme Gateway Review (June 2013)
5. Mid Stage Child Support System Redesign Programme Gateway Review (November
   2013)
6. 2013/14 KPMG High-Level Assurance Observations paper (June 2014)

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 44 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

6 APPENDIX C – P3M3® OVERVIEW

P3M3® is an overarching model containing three sub-models, Portfolio Management Maturity Model
(PfM3), Programme Management Maturity Model (PgM3) and Project Management Maturity Model
(PjM3);

PORTFOLIO

Management

Level 1 – Awareness of Process

Level 2 – Repeatable Processes

Level 5 – Optimised Processes
Level 4 – Managed Processes
Control

Level 3 – Defined Processes
Benefits
Management
PROGRAMME

Financial

PROJECT
Management
Stakeholder
Management
Risk
Management
Organisational
Governance
Resource
Management

For each of the three sub-models P3M3®examines up to 7 different process perspectives (Management

Control, Benefits Management, Financial Management, Stakeholder Management, Risk Management,
Organisational Governance and Resource Management). Within each perspective 5 levels are used to

describe maturity, these levels can be applied independently within each model, or across all three to assess

overall P3M3®maturity.
3 Sub-models
Sub-model Description

Portfolio (management) An organisation’s investment (or a segment thereof) in the changes
required to achieve its’ strategic objectives.
Programme (management) A temporary, flexible organisation created to coordinate, direct and
oversee the implementation of a set of related projects and activities
in order to deliver outcomes and benefits related to the
organisations strategic objectives.
Project (management) A unique set of coordinated activities, activities, with definite
starting and finishing points, undertaken by an individual or team to
meet specific objectives within defined time, cost and performance
parameters as specified in the business case.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 45 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
P3M3® Assessment Report

7 Process Perspectives
Process Perspective Description

Organisational governance This perspective looks at how the delivery of initiatives is aligned
with the strategic direction of the Organisation. It considers how the
start‐up and closure controls are applied to initiatives and how
alignment is maintained during the initiative’s lifecycle.
Management control This perspective covers the internal controls used by initiatives and
how the direction of travel is maintained throughout the lifecycle,
with appropriate breakpoints that enable initiatives to be stopped or
redirected by a controlling body.
Stakeholder management Stakeholder management includes stakeholder analysis and
communications planning; the effective identification and use of
different communications channels; and techniques to enable the
achievement of objectives.
Benefits management The benefits management perspective is focused on ensuring that
the Organisation defines and manages the value that it anticipates
gaining from the investment. It covers the initial definition of
requirements through to the release of benefits or value. The
perspective is active from the start and plans may continue past the
closure date of initiatives.

Resource management Resource management covers the management of all types of
resource required for delivery of the initiative. These include human
resources, deployment of building infrastructures, information
technology, and access to key assets and tools.
Finance management Finance management ensures that the likely costs of the initiative are
captured and evaluated within a formal business case and that costs
are categorized and managed over the investment lifecycle.
Risk management The risk management perspective reviews the way the Organisation
manages threats to, and opportunities enabled by, the initiative.

5 Maturity Levels
Maturity Level Description

1 - Awareness of process. Processes are mostly un-documented.
2 - Repeatable process. The organisation can demonstrate, by reference to particular
initiatives, that basic management practices have been established.
3 - Defined process. Processes will be documented, standardized and integrated with
some other business processes.
4 - Managed process. Processes are managed using metrics and quantitative techniques.
5 - Optimised process. The organisation focuses on optimising its processes account for
changing business needs and external factors.

Classification Unclassified Task DHS P3M3®
Version 1.4 Author Tanner James

Page 46 of 46 Created 8 August 2014 Updated 26 September 2014
Establishing a robust
management framework for

GAP
FaHCSIA’s management of the
Closing the Gap agenda

closing the…

…Gap

1
princE2® and mSp ® are registered trade marks

of the Office of Government Commerce in the United

Kingdom and other countries.

The Swirl logo™ is a Trade Mark of the Office of

Government Commerce

August 2010
© Tanner James Management

Consultants Pty Ltd 2010

printer: goanna

design: Whitefox

Images: iStock

tannEr JamES managEmEnt conSultantS

P:1300 774 623
CONTENTS

ExEcutivE Summary 2

Why thiS approach? 4

our undErStanding of fahcSia’S 6
managEmEnt rEquirEmEntS for thE
ctg agEnda

a robuSt ctg managEmEnt framEWork 8

thE tannEr JamES – oakton StratEgic
partnErShip 14

our propoSEd implEmEntation approach 16

appEndix 22

2
Establishing
a robust
management
framework
for FaHCSIA’s

management of the
Closing the Gap
agenda
Executive Summary

‘ The successful delivery of government programs requires the projects
that underpin their implementation to be well-managed from the point
of inception through to full implementation.’

Ian McPhee, Auditor-General

This was the opening statement in the An approach driven by text books,
Auditor-General’s foreword to a new jargon, processes and templates will

publication Planning and Approving not make the grade. The management

Projects—an Executive Perspective, framework must be implemented and

published by the Australian National applied in a manner which genuinely

Audit Office (ANAO) as part of its Better allows Indigenous communities and

Practice Guide series. their representatives to take their rightful
management role in planning and

There is a temptation for agencies to delivery.
develop a new approach to cater for
‘complex’ programmes and projects. OGC methods already have a strong

In fact, approaches to manage these foundation in Australian Governments

complex initiatives already exist, have and entities working with public service

been developed over several decades, agencies at a federal and state level.
are in use by thousands of organisations FaHCSIA does not need to re-invent a

and supported by internationally management framework for Closing the

accredited training. Complex project Gap to overcome known shortcomings—
management does not have to be instead it can build on existing APS

complex if proven methods are used. investment in OGC methods and shift
the focus to best apply these methods to

OGC methods are ideally suited to help manage CtG.
FaHCSIA establish a robust management

framework that reflects the complexity, International examples demonstrate how

size, scope and nature of the CtG agenda OGC methods have been tailored to suit

and FaHCSIA’s lead agency role in its non-government organisations delivering

delivery. projects in remote communities.
Tanner James has provided advice to
the National Congress of Australia’s
First Peoples on tailored use of these
methods.

2
OGC methods offer a practical way to

refine the management approach to CtG

during implementation, without stopping

or impeding on-the-ground progress, and

without having to take any risky leaps-of-
faith. The methods are well structured,
professionally published and easy-to-
understand.

As part of engaging with local

communities our approach will provide

the opportunity for Indigenous artists

in local communities to use the visual

arts to express how CtG issues affect

people living in remote areas, and their

aspirations for the future.

COAG agreements represent at the

highest intergovernmental level, an

agreed mandate for policy change and The effectiveness of an existing approach

the associated programmes of work to to managing large government initiatives

begin. These changes in policy inevitably can be tested by assessing how benefits

require issues to be addressed from a are identified, tracked and managed.
different perspective and challenges can COAG initiatives and agreements have

arise when the associated programmes provided an overview of the high level

of work represent a significant change. outcomes (benefits) that are desired,
Change programmes require a but it is the role of the departments, and

different approach to that used in the particularly the lead agency, to track how

management and planning of business as the effort and significant resourcing is

usual activities. It is important to operate progressing.
across established agency internal
‘silos’ and clearly plan for and manage With a greater focus on accountability,
the transition of this change into normal departments now need to ensure that

agency operations. they can clearly identify the desired
recipients of these benefits, how risks are

COAG initiatives provide a foundation being managed, and what real progress

for our nation’s future prosperity. The is being made to realise the benefits of

success of these initiatives depends on the governments’ investment. This is

ensuring they are ‘well-managed from possible by the use of OGC methods that

the point of inception through to full provide proven approaches to managing

implementation’. Proven tools exist for large scale and complex initiatives

this implementation.

3
Why this approach?

Tanner James Management Consultants This approach articulates our advice

Pty Ltd, working with our strategic for FAHCSIA’s Secretary and the CtG

partners oakton ltd wish to offer Committee to actively manage identified

FaHCSIA a best practice approach key risks impacting on the delivery of the

to establishing a robust management CtG agenda.
framework for the Closing the Gap

agenda (the CtG agenda). Tanner James is a specialist services
provider. Our mission is enhancing

FaHCSIA has previously sought our our clients’ programme and project

expertise to map all CtG activities management capability. We have

across the Department and advise on third-party accreditation to help

management practices and tools that organisations use the non-proprietary

may be useful in managing the CtG international best practice Office of

agenda. This advice also included Government Commerce (OGC) methods.
advise to the recent internal audit on These include Managing Successful

the implementation of the CtG which Programmes (MSP ®), Projects In

recommended the development of a Controlled Environments (PRINCE2®) and

robust management methodology. Much Portfolio, Programme and Project Offices

work was completed and implementation (P3O®)1. Oakton is also an accredited

is the next step. consulting organisation capable of
delivering OGC methods.

OGC methods are ideally suited to help FaHCSIA establish a

robust management framework that reflects the complexity, size,
scope and nature of the CtG agenda and FaHCSIA’s lead agency

role in its delivery

1 ® Registered Trade Mark by the Office of Government Commerce in the United Kingdoms and other countries

4
OGC methods are:

» non-proprietary international best practice
» consistent with the most recent ANAO Better Practice Guide (June 2010)
» consistent with the approach recommended in the comprehensive reform agenda
outlined in Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for Reform of Australian Government
Administration and, as such, has potential to be used as a pilot activity for strategic
policy delivery.

This approach:

» acknowledges and integrates the findings and recommendations of the June 2010
Internal Audit Report into FaHCSIA’s Management of the Closing the Gap Agenda
» maximises the involvement of Indigenous communities and their representatives in
the management framework
» builds on existing investments by government in management and organisational
capability—whole-of- FaHCSIA and whole-of-government (including states and
territories)
» empowers and up-skills the Australian Public Service (APS).

5
Our understanding

of FaHCSIA’s management requirements for the CtG agenda

We understand that CtG represents The complexity, size and scope of the

a significant financial investment that CtG agenda is extraordinary. The agenda

carries a high level of expectation. It is a unique challenge of translating

involves coordinating the work of several strategic COAG intent through various

Australian Government agencies and government agreements and programs

other entities to deliver benefits to reduce into real-world benefits for Indigenous

Indigenous disadvantage. This agenda Australians, many of whom are located in

attracts a high level of public interest and diverse and remote communities.
scrutiny.
The management framework therefore
needs to be best practice to meet the
National challenge.

An approach driven by text books, jargon, processes and

templates is not suitable. The management framework must be

implemented and applied in a manner which genuinely allows

Indigenous communities and their representatives to take their

rightful role in planning and delivery

6
To meet the challenge, the management framework must be best practice and

address:

» governance and organisational structure
» stakeholder engagement and communication
» benefits management
» planning and control
» financial management
» resource management
» monitoring and reporting
» risk and issues management.

To succeed, these elements must be implemented in a way that is embraced by

Indigenous representatives as useful and understandable, provides decision makers

with clear information, approaches the work in a flexible, segmented but interlinked

way, and adds real value.

7
A robust CtG

Management Framework

A robust CtG management

framework must be:

strategic
empowering
cohesive
innovative
practical
realistic.

8
Strategic The governance strategies and role-
based organisational structures detailed

The strategic focus of OCG methods is
in the methods offer an unequaled

the delivery of benefits.
degree of precision with flexibility, ideally
suited for managing the delivery of

These methods are practical and proven,
strategic change on this scale. FaHCSIA

having being adopted by more than
can use these clear and well considered

20,000 organisations in 150 countries.
concepts to refine arrangements for

A management framework based on
managing CtG.
OGC methods immediately overcomes

the problems of how multiple entities
Ultimately what matters is whether or not

from the government and private sectors
the expenditure results in measureable

can work together. These established
improvements, arising from outcomes

methods provide a common, teachable,
that are perceived as advantageous from

repeatable and understandable
the Indigenous perspective.
approach.

FaHCSIA does not need to re-invent a management framework for Closing
the Gap to overcome known shortcomings—instead it can build on existing
APS investment in OGC methods and shift the focus to best apply these
methods to manage CtG

9
International examples demonstrate how OGC methods can be tailored

to suit non-government organisations delivering projects in remote

Indigenous communities. Tanner James has provided advice to the

National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples on a tailored use of these

methods

Empowering Using OGC methods as the foundation
for the management framework also

OCG methods strongly emphasise
up-skills APS officers. The approaches

stakeholder engagement and
are internationally renowned and non-
communication. When properly applied,
proprietary with an established market

these key elements of the management
of third-party accredited professional

framework will help assure appropriate
service providers who deliver training and

involvement of Indigenous communities
consulting services. This focuses external

and their representatives. The methods
providers on helping the APS, rather than

also easily accommodate FaHCSIA’s
seeking to do all the work for the APS.
engagement protocols and strategies;
stakeholder engagement is embedded We propose an integration of the

into a contemporary and repeatable FaHCSIA’s successful Graduate Program

management framework. into this approach will provide new
graduates with a unique insight into

However, our approach goes further:
the leading role FaHCSIA is playing in

we want to work with Indigenous
the CtG agenda. It will also provide the

representatives in regional areas to train
graduates with practical experience and

them in relevant OGC methods in a way
first-hand understanding of how a diverse

that is useful and can be directly applied
range of activities can be managed by

to finding solutions to local challenges
OGC methods. Training received during

and issues.
this period is internationally accredited
and provides a valuable foundation to an

Providing such management training will
APS career.
enable people at the local level to better

engage with what can be perceived
Similarly, it is proposed that nominations

as ‘Canberra-centric’ agencies, by
are invited from the successful FaHCSIA

promoting deeper understanding
Indigenous Leadership Program for

of management elements. This will
training in project management and

maximise the involvement of Indigenous
involvement in piloting the use of these

communities and their representatives in
OGC methods. This is the first step

the management framework.
towards the goal of increasing the
number of Indigenous Project Managers
available to help coordinate and manage
CtG initiatives. It also complements the
start of a Tanner James initiative to offer
an annual scholarship for mentoring and
sponsoring the first Indigenous PRINCE2
trainer in Australia

10
Cohesive Innovative

Cohesiveness will be achieved by the use It is often said that taking the same

of the OGC management hierarchy—a action usually will produce the same

Portfolio of Programmes and Projects— result. However, using OGC’s Portfolio

which provides for line-of-sight of Programmes and Projects approach

accountability right across CtG, from the to reframe the way the APS and other

National Indigenous Reform Agreement parties consider how best to manage

to community infrastructure projects in CtG, will create a different focus. It will

remote areas. sharpen attention on envisioning and
creating a better future—identifying

The OGC methods use role-based benefits, mapping, managing risks and

organisational structures to overcome eventual realisation, and on designing

the inherent challenges associated with and delivering a coherent solution.
delivering cross-functional change across

multiple government agencies and other Using the OGC management methods is

entities. innovative, because it takes disciplines
for delivering strategic change and

Using OGC methods provides FaHCSIA applies them in a new way: to the

with a single management framework whole-of-government implementation of

to effectively manage the Department’s government policy.
separate but interwoven responsibilities

as an agency in its own right, and as the While this approach is innovative, it is

lead agency for whole-of-government also well-proven and safe. The methods

delivery of the CtG agenda. are tried and tested as suitable for all
types and sizes of programmes and
projects. OGC methods are referenced
in ANAO guidance and viewed positively
by the Cabinet Implementation Unit in
the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet (PM&C). FaHCSIA is aware of,
and has some experience with, OGC
methods—several people within the
Department have significant experience
in the use and application of these
methods.

FaHCSIA is specifically mentioned in
two cases studies in an international
text on PRINCE2. These case studies
highlight how FaHCSIA has used a
PRINCE2 approach to assist with project
management.

11
Practical Realistic

It is one thing to document a set of FaHCSIA executives need to ensure

management methods and another to an appropriate management response

bring them to life in a way that adds value to the findings and recommendations

and creates order and clarity. CtG is of the June 2010 Internal Audit Report

much more than an idea on paper—it is into FaHCSIA’s Management of the

a substantial initiative already underway, Closing the Gap Agenda. A realistic

involving multiple governments, hundreds response cannot be piecemeal. Adopting

of organisations, thousands of people a management framework based on

and billions of dollars. It takes significant OGC methods is a holistic and strategic

work just to collect and report the data response that will ensure remedial

required to track global progress in CtG. actions have a depth and credibility
founded on international best practice.
Communication of the methods is

based on need, and can range from a The structure of OGC methods includes

conversational explanation, through to elements that clearly match the audit

formal training or executive briefings. findings. This will empower FaHCSIA to

Internationally recognised qualifications structure remedial actions in a way that

can be attained by APS and on-the- will clearly establish a robust overall CtG

ground staff, as an assurance of management framework.
professional capability.

OGC methods offer a practical way to refine the management

approach to CtG during the project, without stopping or impeding

on-the-ground progress, and without having to take any risky

leaps-of-faith

12
This approach is also realistic, as it builds

on existing government investments

in management and organisational
This approach

capability, both at a federal and state

level (for example, the Queensland is also realistic,
Government has standardised the use

of OGC methods).
as it builds
on existing

OGC methods are structured in a way

that enables practical implementation for

the CtG management framework: The

government

nested nature of portfolio management

enables FaHCSIA to pilot the approach

to minimise risk and to demonstrate

results, then control the timing of further

implementation based on how rapidly

executives wish to see similar results
investments

across all delivery elements of the CtG

agenda.

13
The Tanner James – Oakton

strategic partnership

Tanner James Management Consultants Tanner James was the world’s first

Pty Ltd was established in Canberra Accredited Consulting Organisation

in 1994 as a specialist provider of in MSP. We are a Registered Training

programme and project management Organisation under the Australian

training and consultancy services Qualifications framework and are

accredited by the UK Office of accredited by the UK Office of

Government Commerce (OGC). We Government Commerce for both training

introduced OGC methods PRINCE2 and consulting services.
and MSP to the Australian market and

we are now the longest established Tanner James and Oakton formed a

and largest provider of accredited OGC strategic partnership in April 2010 to

services in Australia. (See Appendix A for help Australian Government agencies

details of the OGC methodologies and respond to the Department of Finance

accreditations.) and Deregulation’s P3M3® 2 (Portfolio,
Programme and Project Management
Maturity Model) mandates.

2 ® Registered Trademark of the Office of Government Commerce in the United Kingdom and other countries.

14
Having introduced PRINCE2 and MSP Oakton has a track record of successful

to Australia, and with our long history project and program delivery in the

working with the Australian Government, private and public sector. Recent

this partnership positions us as the examples include the Australian Customs

leading supplier of P3M3, PRINCE2 and and Border Protection Service Project

MSP services. Management Office and the Department
of Human Services Basics card program.
Oakton and Tanner James are OGC Both assignments received awards for

Accredited Consulting Organisations excellence.
and have assisted agencies to pilot

and evaluate P3M3 (2009). Following

the Department of Finance and

Deregulation’s endorsement of P3M3,
and advice to FMA agencies (November

2009), Oakton and Tanner James have

undertaken P3M3 assessments and

capability improvement planning for

several Australian Government agencies.

this partnership

positions us

as the leading

supplier of OGC

services

15
Our proposed

implementation
approach

Staged

We propose three stages to establish a robust CtG management

framework:

Stage 1 Reorientate » Identify two or more National
(indicative timing two months, for Partnership Agreements (NPAs) to

example Oct - Nov 2010) pilot MSP as a program management
approach. Conduct a gap-analysis
» Complete the investment mapping
to establish which MSP principles,
work started in 2009.
governance themes and management
» Implement the traffic light reporting, information are inadequately
issues and risk templates started in addressed. Agree a remediation
2009. plan to define and implement these
elements for each NPA.
» Design and implement governance
and support structures consistent » Create regular assurance checkpoint
with the role-based governance and forums where independent nominees/
organisational structures in OGC organisations with assurance roles
methods. provide feedback to programme/
teams. This provides a mechanism
» Deliver executive briefings and
for stakeholders outside the existing
practical training to executives and
government structure to question,
managers who will fill key MSP and
exchange information and provide
PRINCE2 roles.
feedback.
» Commence project management
» Establish a process for the
training for nominees from FaHCSIA’s
sponsorship of two PhD candidates
graduate and Indigenous Leadership
to research the use of the OGC
Program.
methods for CtG—providing a
way of comparing this approach
to use in other international arenas
and establishing a foundation for
evaluating this approach.

16
Stage 2 Pilot Stage 3 Embed
(indicative timing three months, for (indicative timing five months, for

example Dec 2010 - Feb 2011) example March - July 2011)
» Execute the remediation plans for the » Conduct a gap-analysis for all
two pilot NPAs to define and establish CtG NPAs to establish which
them as programmes. MSP principles, governance themes
and management information are
» Ensure the two pilot NPAs are properly
inadequately addressed. Agree
underpinned by effective business as
a remediation plan to define and
usual and project-level governance,
implement these elements for
plans and controls.
each NPA.
» Engage with Indigenous
» Any other actions as recommended
representatives and bodies to pilot
by third party assurance.
new and creative approaches that
will ensure a) genuine Indigenous
understanding of, and engagement in,
the CtG management framework and
b) ensure on the ground outcomes,
efforts and local plans are visibly
matched to strategic intent and
government funding.
» Begin a call for PhD candidates.
» Obtain third party assurance—
ANAO, PM&C (COAG Secretariat)
and representative Indigenous
body as to the effectiveness of the
approaches being piloted as well as
commencement of the assurance
checkpoint forums.
» Based on the above advice, the
CtG Committee would determine
broader implementation, adjustment
or cessation of the CtG management
framework using OGC methods.

17
Structured

Tanner James proposes to capitalise on the explicit structures

in OGC methods by implementing elements from three different,
but strongly interconnected, perspectives:

“Top-down” perspective “Bottom-up” perspective
» Governance and organisational » Planning and control. Using the
structure. The CtG Committee is OGC management hierarchy—a
positioned at the top of a cohesive Portfolio of Programmes and
role-based management hierarchy to Projects—will create an easy-to-use
provide line-of-sight accountability set of plans linked from the bottom
from the top to bottom of CtG. The to the top of CtG. This will show how
organisational structures will be based community infrastructure projects in
on recommended roles advocated by remote areas relate to the National
the OGC Executive Guide to Portfolio Indigenous Reform Agreement. Plans
Management, MSP, PRINCE2 and will be focused on deliverables and
P3O, appropriately integrated with benefits. They will describe what
existing FaHCSIA arrangements. FaHCSIA must deliver as an agency
in its own right and also what others
» Financial management. By
must deliver to achieve the CtG
completing the investment mapping
agenda, and therefore what FaHCSIA
work started in 2009, the CtG
must monitor as the lead agency for
Committee will obtain a complete
whole-of-government delivery.
picture of FaHCSIA’s total known
investment supporting CtG, which » Risk and issues management.
can then be related to benefits Tanner James has already developed
and managed as a single coherent the core mechanisms for managing
investment portfolio through risks and issues on projects. By
programme, business as usual, and monitoring potential problems, actual
project structures. problems and opportunities at the
project level (that is, at the level
» Resource management. CtG will
where work is actually happening)
succeed through the efforts of
and escalating major matters, the
APS employees, state government
CtG Committee will provide a robust
employees and community members.
foundation for effective strategic
Most of these resources are not
control. Applying the same risk and
under the direct control of FaHCSIA.
issue management processes to
Applying OGC methods will ensure
external deliverables and benefits
that fahcSia has appropriate
will alert FaHCSIA to problems or
resource management plans and
opportunities that need to be raised
processes to ensure effective and
with other agencies and entities.
efficient coordination, monitoring and
reporting of all work towards on-the-
ground delivery and realisation of
benefits.

18
We want to see Indigenous artists in local communities using the visual arts
to express how CtG issues affect people living in remote areas, and their
aspirations are for the future.

Indigenous perspective There must be clear bottom to top
» Stakeholder engagement and traceability between on-the-ground
communication. Genuine Indigenous benefits as defined by Indigenous
partnership should be at the forefront stakeholders and the six specific
of CtG management. This means coag targets of:
engaging and equipping Indigenous – closing the life expectancy gap
communities and their representatives within a generation
so their vision for a better future, the
– halving the gap in mortality rates
benefits they seek, and the plans
for Indigenous children under five
they have, are fully articulated and
within a decade
managed as the real drivers of CtG
expenditure. – ensuring all Indigenous four-
years-olds in remote communities
Tanner James proposes to explore
have access to early childhood
novel ways Indigenous communities
education within five years
and their representatives can express
what they seek from the delivery of – halving the gap for Indigenous
CtG programmes and projects. students in reading, writing and
numeracy within a decade
We have staff with expertise and
experience in engaging artists in field – halving the gap for Indigenous
studies in association with innovative students in Year 12 attainment
work undertaken by The Australian or equivalent attainment rates by
National University in this area. 2020
» Benefits management. The OGC – halving the gap in employment
methods define a benefit as ‘the outcomes between Indigenous and
measureable improvement resulting non-Indigenous Australians within
from an outcome perceived as a decade.
an advantage by one or more
stakeholders’. We believe that OGC methods provide an effective
Indigenous communities and their framework for integrating stakeholder
representatives are the primary and desired government benefits.
stakeholders, and therefore they
must have a central role in defining,
measuring and monitoring the
benefits that underpin the objectives,
outcomes and performance measures
set out in the National Indigenous
Reform Agreement.

19
Skilful To ensure that OGC methods are tailored
to suit the needs of CtG, the approach:
The elements that we propose must be

implemented and applied such that: » Places an emphasis on ensuring
FaHCSIA Executives have a clear
» The management framework
understanding of how the OGC
is embraced by Indigenous
methods can be tailored through
representatives as a powerful tool for
briefings and mentoring.
engaging Canberra-based senior APS
officers and others to ensure efforts » Ensures operational staff receive
and expenditure reap real on-the- internationally accredited training in
ground benefits. methods with follow up mentoring and
guidance.
» The information available and tools
used in the pilots, provide decision » Caters for the needs of APS graduates
makers and stakeholders with and ensures FaHCSIA is providing
easy-to-understand and useable new graduates with a practical insight
representation of complex variables. into approaches endorsed by the
ANAO and PM&C.
» The approach is broken into
interrelated and manageable chunks. » Respects the need of Indigenous
partners through tailoring, mentoring
» The scope of work remains flexible
and training on the use of these
but always controlled and linked to
methods via delegates involved in the
benefits.
Indigenous Leadership Program.
» The management framework adds
To achieve this, our approach will use a
real value, rather than another layer of
range of skilled people personnel from
bureaucracy, and creates clarity not
the Tanner James – Oakton partnership,
confusion.
with proven (and independently

The Tanner James – Oakton partnership accredited) experience as Registered

delivers a unique skill base, nationally Trainers and Consultants in the use of the

recognised as a leader in OGC OGC methods.
implementation, supported by a team

that has worked closely with FaHCSIA at Involvement in this approach will not be

many levels. restricted to a ‘classroom’ education
model. This approach also offers other
innovative methods that are proven,
backed by scholarly research, and
internationally recognised.

20
Some of these additional methods Benefits of the use of this approach are

include, but are not limited to: that it is:

» engaging artists to capture existing » based on current best practice, which
perceptions and a vision of the future delivers real and measurable benefits
benefits and overall vision to clients
» providing computer-based training » reinforced by internationally
for remote participants, backed up by accredited training
video conferencing for tutorials and
» aligned with the current FaHCSIA
group mentoring
internal audit recommendations
» using social media tools to assist
» building on existing CtG work
with the capturing and sharing of
undertaken by FaHCSIA
knowledge
» using expertise that is Canberra
» conducting innovative workshops to
based with a unique and proven skill
help plan communication strategies
base
and supporting tactical plans
» staged to ensure that the approach
» using workshops to assist with
meets stakeholders needs
practical application of specific
processes required in the OGC » bringing together key elements in a
methods, and to establish how these cohesive manner.
processes can be tailored to suit
practical application
» creating regular assurance checkpoint
forums where independent nominees/
organisations undertaking an
assurance role provide feedback to
programme/teams
» creating a short-term knowledge
exchange process within the APS
where specific expertise can be
harnessed and shared to improve
gaps in knowledge
» sponsoring by the Australian
Government of two PhD candidates
to research the use of the OGC
methods for CtG—comparing this
approach to use in international
arenas and establishing a foundation
for evaluation.

21
Appendix 1.0

Office of Government How OGC achieves its goals:
Commerce
» It provides policy standards and

The Office of Government Commerce guidance on best practice in
(OGC) is an independent office of HM procurement, program, projects and

Treasury, established in 2001 by the estate management.
Blair Government to help government » It monitors and challenges

deliver best value from its spending. The departments’ performance against

OGC works with central government these standards, grounded in an

departments and other public sector evidence base of information and

organisations to ensure the improvement assurance.
of central government capability in

procurement, project and program » It promotes and fosters collaborative

management, and estates management procurement across the public sector

through the development of people skills, to deliver better value for money and

processes and tools. better public services.
» It provides innovative ways to
develop government’s commercial
and procurement capability, including
leadership of the Government
Procurement Service.

22
OGC methods In addition to these three methodologies,
the OGC has developed:
The OGC methods, which are

non-proprietary, comprise: » P3M3—a maturity model, which
provides an organisational
» PRINCE2 (Projects IN Controlled
capability assessment tool to
Environments)— a process-based
allow organisations to identify the
approach for project management
key practices that need to be fully
providing an easily tailored and
embedded within the organisation to
scalable method for the management
achieve the next maturity level.
of all types of projects.
» From the perspective of a strategic
» MSP (Managing Successful
planning activity, P3M3 assesses
Programs)—an OGC-developed
‘where we are NOW’ as the base from
best practice guide on program
which an organisation needs to move
management. The guide comprises
to achieve strategic re-alignment with
a set of principles and a set of
an envisaged future level of capability.
processes for use when managing a
program. MSP is very flexible and is » P3O (a Portfolio, Program and
designed to be adapted to meet the Project Office)—the latest best
needs of local circumstances. practice guidance from OGC to
bring together a set of principles,
» ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library)—the
processes and techniques to align
only consistent and comprehensive
the OGC methodologies to set-up
documentation of best practice for
an improvement project, set up a
IT Service Management. ITIL is used
PMO, train people and provide initial
by hundreds of organisations around
support.
the world. A complete ITIL philosophy
has developed around the guidance
contained within the ITIL books
and the supporting professional
qualifications scheme.

These three methods are siblings to the

Gateway Review process currently used

by the Australian Department of Finance

and Deregulation to better test policy

and implementation options of major

policy initiatives proposed by Australian

Government agencies.

23
OGC methods—accreditation OGC Accreditation is

and the role of the APM Group internationally recognised
(APMG) » APMG maintains working relationships

To maintain the integrity of these with all industry bodies including the

methodologies the OGC has established Institute of Project Management in

a formal accreditation process for Australia and the Global Alliance for

qualification of both individuals and Project Performance Standards.
organisations. » APMG accredits training organisations
and training materials that conform to
» APM Group Ltd (APMG) is the sole
specific technical and management
accreditation body worldwide for all
standards, and which have been
services offered in the marketplace
developed and agreed by the
associated with OGC methods.
Independent Examination Board.
» APMG-Australasia accredits This accreditation process has been
organisations that deliver consulting assessed by the United Kingdom
and training services in OGC methods Accreditation Service to verify that
and administers the examination and it conforms to European Standard
qualifications system. EN45011.

Organisation and Accredited

Training Organisation
» Achieving Accredited Consulting
Organisation (ACO) status requires
a thorough competence-based
assessment of an organisation and
each registered consultant.
» Achieving Accredited Training
Organisation (ATO) status is an
additional qualification to that of
registered training organisation
under the Australian Qualifications
framework.
» All ATOs and Approved Trainers are
formally re-assessed on a three-yearly
cycle as well as being subject to ad
hoc monitoring by APMG.

24
tannEr JamES managEmEnt conSultantS
1300 774 623

P:

25
26
How to improve your chances of policy implementation success
(A brief synopsis to introduce the tagged version of the Shergold Review report)

I am pleased to have been a contributor to the report “Learning from Failure”1 by Professor Peter

Shergold AC, which was published in early February 2016. On page one of the report he says:

“Leadership begins with finding the courage to say, ‘I accept personal responsibility for
contributing to the failure to which I was a party’. That recognition can steer the resolve to
make changes, try again, and do better. Acknowledging errors publically is a form of self‐
improvement, not self‐abnegation. Failure, and how we respond to it, is where leadership is
born.”

This synopsis is for SES officers who wish to make changes, try again, and do better with

programmes2 and projects.
Note 1: Content in italics has been sourced directly from this ASPC publication. This material is licenced for reuse under a

Creative Commons BY Attribution 3.0 Australia licence. The Tanner James version of the report is identical to the original,
we have simply bookmarked it and highlighted elements of the text to enable you to quickly assimilate the key points.

Note 2: The report uses the spelling “program”. As an AXELOS provider Tanner James uses the spelling “programme”. We

hope you share our opinion that how the word is spelled is unimportant.

Where to begin?
You may have read the review, but how closely did you look at the front cover? Apart from the title
“Learning from Failure” it contains two descriptors of what lies within:

“Why large government policy initiatives have gone so badly wrong in the past and how the
chances of success in the future can be improved” and

“An independent review of government processes for implementing large programs and
projects”

There is a strong implication here: large government policy initiatives should be implemented as

programmes and projects.

Given this implication I recommend that you begin by contemplating what departmental policy

initiatives should be managed using programme and project management disciplines, taking a much

broader view than you might previously have done.

What are the key points for you?
In his review Professor Shergold identifies 10 key lessons to be learned:

1. Policy is only as good as the manner in which it is implemented.
2. Policy advice can only be frank and fearless if it is supported by written argument.
3. Deliberations, oral and in writing, need to be protected.
4. Deliberative documents need to be preserved, whether written on paper or delivered by
   digital means.
5. It is up to ministers, not officials, to make policy decisions.
6. The effective management of risk is just as important in the public sector as in the private—
   perhaps more so.
7. As the public service fully commits itself to measuring results by outcomes, program
   management needs to be accorded far greater professional status.
   8. Good governance increasingly depends on collaboration across sectors.
8. The APS needs to be further opened up.
9. An adaptive government can respond rapidly to changing circumstances without taking
   unnecessary (and unforeseen) risks.

He made 28 proposals for improvement, in the form of conclusions, grouped under 7 main headings:

A. Providing Robust Advice.
B. Supporting Decision Making.
C. Creating a Positive Risk Culture.
D. Enhancing Program Management.
E. Opening Up the APS
F. Embracing Adaptive Government.

What do I need to do next?
If you are an SES officer involved in policy implementation I recommend ensuring that you and your

SES colleagues read the pdf version of the Shergold Review Report that Tanner James has created.

The pdf version is identical in content to the original, we have simply added bookmarks and

highlighted text to enable you to quickly assimilate the key points.

Want to know more?
If a you would like to know more about, please call me personally on 0407 404 688 or email me at

john.howarth@tannerjames.com.au . I would be very happy to come to meet you, answer questions

and provide further information on topics such as:

 The difference between programme management and project management, and what
considerations apply when determining what departmental policy initiatives should be
managed using these disciplines;
 The programme management and project management methods available to you, and how
they need to be tailored for the APS context and nature of initiatives with which you are
involved.
© Commonwealth of Australia 2015

All material produced by the Australian Public Service Commission (the Commission)
constitutes Commonwealth copyright administered by the Commission. The Commission

reserves the right to set out the terms and conditions for the use of such material.

Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 and those explicitly granted

below, all other rights are reserved.

Unless otherwise noted, all material in this publication, except the Commission logo or

badge, the Commonwealth Coat of Arms, and any material protected by a trade mark, is

licensed under a Creative Commons BY Attribution 3.0 Australia licence.

Details of the licence are available at .

Attributing Commission works

Use of Commission material licensed under a Creative Commons BY Attribution 3.0

Australia licence requires you to attribute the work in the manner specified by the

Commission (but not in any way that suggests that the Commission endorses you or your

use of the work). Almost any form of words is fine provided that you:

 provide a reference to the publication, its author, and, where practical, the relevant
pages
 make clear whether or not you have changed Commission content
 make clear what permission you are relying on, by including a reference to this page or
to a human-readable summary of the Creative Commons BY Attribution 3.0 Australia
licence
 do not suggest that the Commission endorses you or your use of our content.

For example, if you have not changed Commission content in any way, you might state:
‘Sourced from the Australian Public Service Commission publication Learning from Failure

by Professor Peter Shergold. This material is licensed for reuse under a Creative Commons

BY Attribution 3.0 Australia licence.’

If you have made changes to Commission content, it would be more accurate to describe it

as ‘based on Australian Public Service Commission content.

Enquiries

For enquiries concerning reproduction and rights in Commission products and services,
please contact communicationsunit@apsc.gov.au.

ISBN: 978-0-9943750-0-1
Letter of Transmittal

The Hon Greg Hunt MP

Minister for the Environment

Parliament House

CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Minister

In accordance with the Terms of Reference issued to me on 24 December 2014, I have

undertaken an independent review of government processes for implementing large

programs and projects, including the roles of ministers and public servants.

As requested, the review has taken account of the findings and recommendations of the

Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program, the report of the Independent Audit of

the NBN Public Policy Processes (the Scales Review), and best practices in Australia and

internationally.

I have pleasure in presenting you with my report, Learning from Failure: Why large

government policy initiatives have gone so badly wrong in the past and how the chances of

success in the future can be improved.

I very much appreciate the opportunity you have given me to consider such important issues.
You will note that whilst I have come to conclusions as to how to improve the management

of major projects I have not made recommendations to the Government. My strong

preference is that the review be made widely available for public comment and discussion. I

hope, in particular, that the views of the Australian Public Service on its proposals will help to

inform the Government’s response.

In preparing this report I was assisted by a secretariat drawn from a number of Australian

Government agencies. I record my appreciation for their insights, commitment and

enthusiasm. I also express my thanks for those who met with me and the secretariat over the

course of the review, and I am particularly grateful to the peer reviewers who commented on

an earlier draft of this report.

Yours sincerely

Professor Peter Shergold AC

12 August 2015
Table of Contents

Letter of Transmittal ...................................................................................................................
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................
Terms of Reference................................................................................................................... i

The Future: Avoiding Repetition of Failure ...............................................................................ii

Executive summary: 28 proposals for improvement ................................................................ iii
A Providing Robust Advice ............................................................................................. iii
B Supporting Decision Making........................................................................................iv
C Creating a Positive Risk Culture.................................................................................. v
D Enhancing Program Management.............................................................................. vii
E Opening Up the APS ................................................................................................. viii
F Embracing Adaptive Government ...............................................................................ix

Reflections on Failure............................................................................................................... 1

Lessons from the Past.............................................................................................................. 8

A | Providing Robust Advice ................................................................................................... 15
Problems exposed ............................................................................................................ 15
Problems addressed ......................................................................................................... 16

B | Supporting Decision Making ............................................................................................. 25
Problems exposed ............................................................................................................ 25
Problems addressed ......................................................................................................... 26

C | Creating a Positive Risk Culture ....................................................................................... 36
Problems exposed ............................................................................................................ 36
Problems addressed ......................................................................................................... 37

D | Enhancing Program Management .................................................................................... 45
Problems Exposed ............................................................................................................ 45
Problems Addressed ........................................................................................................ 46

E | Opening up the APS ......................................................................................................... 53
Problems exposed ............................................................................................................ 53
Problems addressed ......................................................................................................... 53

F | Embracing Adaptive Government ..................................................................................... 63
Problems exposed ............................................................................................................ 63
Problems addressed ......................................................................................................... 64

The Future: Learning from Mistakes ...................................................................................... 83

Acronyms ............................................................................................................................... 84

Appendix | Acknowledgements and Consultation .................................................................. 85
Organisations ............................................................................................................ 85
Individuals.................................................................................................................. 86
Secretariat ................................................................................................................. 87
Reviewer.................................................................................................................... 88

Endnotes ................................................................................................................................ 89
Terms of Reference

1. The Government has asked Professor Peter Shergold AC to lead an independent
   review of Government processes for the development and implementation of large
   public programmes and projects, including the roles of ministers and public servants.
2. The Review will make practical recommendations to enhance the capacity of the
   Australian Government to:

   a. Design and implement large public programmes and projects;

   b. Develop robust and effective governance and accountability arrangements
   for such programmes and projects;

   c. Understand the broader environment in which programmes and policies are
   design and implemented (including through effective public consultation and
   harnessing external expertise);

   d. Identify, understand and manage risks; and

   e. Provide accurate, timely, clear and robust advice to ministers and within the
   APS.

3. The Review will take account of the findings and recommendations of the Royal
   Commission into the Home Insulation Program, and the report of the Independent
   Audit of the NBN Public Policy Processes (the Scales Review).
4. It will take account of best practices on the nature and effectiveness of public policy
   processes and the implementation of large public programmes and projects in
   Australia and internationally.

   24 December 2014

i
The Future: Avoiding Repetition of Failure

Ian Hanger AM QC

“I do not think the deficiencies I have identified are
ones that could only have occurred in the specific
circumstances of the Home Insulation Program.
Several systemic or fundamental shortcomings can be
identified which not only are capable of repetition …
but which might be avoided through diligence and the
taking of some additional measures.

I would recommend that the Australian Government
use the experience of the Home Insulation Program as
a means by which to learn from the mistakes identified
in the report, many of which can be traced to
overconfidence and unrealistic optimism.” (2014) 1

Ian Hanger AM QC was the Royal Commissioner
who led the Royal Commission into the Home
Insulation Program in 2014

ii
Executive summary: 28 proposals for improvement

A PROVIDING ROBUST ADVICE

Good government is founded on

good policy, and good policy Ian Hanger AM QC

depends on good advice. One of the “The APS ought to reinvigorate its willingness

Australian Public Service’s (APS) to provide, in writing, advice that is as frank
and robust as the advice it is willing to give

core roles is to provide advice to verbally. . . What the process has revealed is a

support the government of the day so quite inadequate system of document

that it can deliver its policy agendas management and record keeping.”2

and priorities. Senior public servants

advise not only on the design, but on the delivery and evaluation of major programs and

projects. They recognise that they should be held accountable to their ministers for the

quality of advice that they provide. The APS holds a position of unique access to ministerial

decision-making. It enjoys positional authority. Nevertheless, it must deliver well-argued and

persuasive advice if it is to maintain influence with government. Counsel must be responsive

and timely. It needs to acknowledge political direction. It must be strategic, providing a wider

context for particular decisions. It must be frank and fearless.

Good advice is factually accurate and backed by evidence. It presents proposals based upon

considered interpretation of alternative viewpoints and often reflects multiple perspectives.
On occasion the APS appropriately provides a range of options to government, but it must

not be afraid of taking a position on what is regarded as the best path forward. Fortitude is

required. Sir Humphrey Appleby, in his inimitable style, would counsel against action by

describing a proposed ministerial decision as ‘courageous.’ In truth, it is Secretaries who

must be willing to exhibit courage.

Openness and transparency are fundamental to good government. There is room to further

improve public access to information that is held by government. There is a strong public

interest case for citizens being able to know the basis of decisions that affect their access to

services. There is considerable value, too, in publishing as much publicly-collected data as

possible and making it available to citizens to use and apply as they want through a ‘Creative

Commons’ license. This is the basis on which this Review is released.

At the same time, it is imperative that governments be allowed a measure of confidentiality in

the policy-making process. Without free and uninhibited exchange of views between

ministers and senior public servants, good public policy is jeopardised. Policy debate

depends upon mutual trust and respect between both sides. That depends on arguments

taking place in private. Deliberations on matters of policy, whether oral or in writing, need to

be kept in confidence.

Where there is a risk of advice being made public, sensitive topics are less likely to be the

subject of full and frank written briefing. This increases the risk that decisions will be made

iii
on partial information, feebly presented. It means that there will be an incomplete record of

the decision-making process. The Freedom of Information Act 1999 should be amended to

provide an explicit exemption from release for information that would compromise the ability

of public servants to provide ministers with frank advice. Such changes would apply to only a

very small proportion of government information.

Advice on significant matters must be written down. There will rarely be a single document.
The development of policy (as any good public servant knows) is an iterative process of

argument, counter-argument, negotiation and compromise. Records of deliberative

discussions in all forms, including emails and texts, should be retained.

CONCLUSIONS | Providing robust advice

A.1 Public service advice is vital to good government and, to this end,
Secretaries should be held accountable for the quality of advice provided to
ministers by their departments.

A.2 Whilst acknowledging the value of frank and fearless oral discussions,
the Australian Public Service Commissioner should issue a Direction that
significant advice also be provided to ministers in writing. Ministers should insist
on receiving frank written advice from the APS, noting that it is generally their
decision whether to accept or reject all or part of the advice.

A.3 The Freedom of Information Act should be amended to ensure that
advice and opinion provided to support the deliberative processes of
government policy formulation remain confidential.

A.4 An APS-wide policy on record keeping should provide practical guidance
about when and how records must be created, including that records of
deliberative discussions in all forms, including digital, should be retained.

B SUPPORTING DECISION MAKING

Ministers operate in an environment of high pressure, fast pace, intense scrutiny and great

complexity. They are responsible for making decisions—individually, and collectively as

members of Cabinet—that have significant and far-reaching effects on individuals,
businesses and communities. The
Ian Hanger AM QC

importance of ministerial decision-making,
and the circumstances under which it “Ministers and their advisors must not, by
subtle suggestion or otherwise, dictate what

occurs, underscore the need to have well- advice they receive.”3

functioning support systems in place for

ministers.

iv
Cabinet processes support government decision-making. When functioning properly they

provide an important safeguard against rushed, uninformed or poorly conceived decisions.
Individual ministers have ownership of the proposals that they bring to Cabinet. They need

strong support both from their staffers (on the one hand) and their public service

departments (on the other). Good working relationships between departments and advisers

depend on unambiguous rules of engagement. Clarity on the responsibilities of each is

critical to ensuring that ministers can do their jobs well.

CONCLUSIONS | Supporting decision making

B.5 To acknowledge ministerial ownership of Cabinet proposals,
submissions should open with a personal Ministerial Statement outlining
the policy’s purpose, expected outcomes and anticipated
implementation risks.

B.6 In preparing Cabinet documents, Secretaries should ensure that
the arguments presented reflect the viewpoint of their ministers.
Assisted by government coordination processes, they also need to
make certain that all relevant considerations for government are
addressed in a clear and succinct fashion.

B.7 The Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff should be
tightened to provide explicit and unambiguous statements that advisers
must not direct public servants without ministerial authorisation nor seek
to make executive decisions.

B.8 Joint forums for ministerial advisers and APS senior executives
should be conducted regularly to raise the efficacy of their working
relationship and build mutual respect and understanding of the
importance of their respective roles.

v
C CREATING A POSITIVE RISK CULTURE

Governments take risks for the good of the people of Australia. Delivering new policy

initiatives—changing taxation structures, reforming the welfare payments regime, building

public infrastructure or delivering major new programs—is necessarily perilous.
Governments strategically intervene where there are perceived to be market failures, and

invest taxpayers’ money to drive outcomes that they believe the private sector is unwilling or

ill-equipped to deliver.

The political risks of such activities will
Ian Hanger AM QC

inevitably be at the forefront of a minister’s

mind: perhaps less obvious are the financial, “The identification and management of

operational and strategic risks. Yet no matter risks under the HIP was seriously
deficient.”4

how brilliant the policy, and however clever

its political goals, poor design and ineffective

delivery will harm governments. Ministers need an APS that can help them identify their

appetite for strategic risk, identify its characteristics and mitigate the possibility of failures.

On paper, the APS has significantly advanced its management of risk in recent years. The

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) and associated

Commonwealth Risk Management Policy have established an outcomes-based framework

to integrate risk oversight and management activities within the core business of

government. It needs to be implemented with vigour. Progress has been too slow. In the two

years since the Act was passed, its underlying ethos of ‘earned autonomy’ is a long way

from being realised.

Most public service agencies still have a way to go in moving from reactive, defensive risk

management to proactive, performance-focused risk engagement. Too often there remains a

tendency to focus on compliance (have payments to aged care providers been properly

acquitted?) rather than on performance (is the aged care system providing options that result

in better health outcomes, improve the quality of life of senior citizens and deliver greater

consumer choice?). There remains too much focus on looking backwards, relying on

evaluation and audit to identify problems after the event. There is not enough looking forward

to prevent mistakes occurring.

The management of risk, whether of particular major projects and programs or across the

entire government, needs to be improved. New organisational structures and workplace

systems can contribute to this goal, but the major challenge is to embed new approaches

within a strong risk culture. APS agencies continue to struggle to instil a risk culture and

behaviours across their workforce so that every employee fully appreciates that they have a

role to play in identifying and managing areas of uncertainty.

vi
CONCLUSIONS | Creating a positive risk culture

C.9 To inform and improve policy design, departments and major agencies
should gauge their ministers’ appetites for risk on individual programs and
across their portfolio, and reach agreement on how implementation challenges
will be identified, accepted and managed within agreed resources.

C.10 Departments and major agencies should appoint a Chief Risk Officer, at
a senior executive level, who will be responsible for embedding a strong risk
culture and behaviours across all levels of the organisation.

C.11 All major Cabinet proposals should be supported by a minister’s
endorsed Risk Management Plan, submitted to PM&C and the Department of
Finance, and available for perusal by other Cabinet ministers.

C.12 In order that governments remain aware of the cumulative impact of their
decisions, the Department of Finance should facilitate a bi-annual whole-of-
government Risk Assessment for the Cabinet, analysing the system-wide
impact of operational, financial, strategic, legislative and procurement risks
faced by government.

D ENHANCING PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Program and project management are too often seen as control activities based on

templates and Gantt charts. They are actually creative processes. In practice, they require a

collaborative approach to aligning multiple delivery tasks to achieve agreed objectives in the

most effective way, within time and budget constraints. They require discipline in maintaining

single point accountability while being open and flexible to the opportunities of networked

governance structures. That calls for professional expertise. The APS needs to build a

stronger cohort of skilled and experienced program and project managers rather than relying

on the ‘accidental’ practitioners who are often selected when no-one with greater ability is

available. Some experts already work in the APS, but their experience and qualifications are

still not sufficiently recognised and their professional status and career development rarely

receive the attention they deserve.

Public servants need to value program management skills. APS recruitment practices should

better recognise the strategic relationships between design, delivery and evaluation in order

to promote more diverse experience among senior executives. Increasing core capability,
mobilising expertise and valuing leadership in program and project management will

strengthen the APS as an effective, professional and resilient institution that—supported as

necessary by outside help—has the capacity to deliver the agenda of the government of the

day.

vii
CONCLUSIONS | Enhancing program management

D.13 The Australian Public Service Commission should work with industry
associations to develop standards of proficiency for public sector project and
program managers, with agencies committing to support these staff through
career development opportunities, continued education and participation in
professional communities of practice.

D.14 For all projects and programs, there needs to be a clear understanding
about who accepts end-to-end responsibility for managing implementation,
wields delegated authority and where accountability resides.

D.15 The APS should establish a ‘tiger team’ capacity by which service-wide
expertise can be harnessed to assist Senior Responsible Officers in the
management of high risk, large-scale projects.

D.16 Whilst acknowledging that different departments have different workforce
needs, Senior Executive Service selection criteria should place greater
emphasis on program leadership when considering a candidate’s demonstrated
breadth of experience.

E OPENING UP THE APS

Private and public sector organisations

around the world have come to Ian Hanger AM QC

recognise that diversity of perspectives “Before Government intervenes in a market in

in the workplace and the boardroom which it has previously had almost no

improves performance. Diversity involvement, it needs first properly to
understand the industry. . . [and] end users or

increases critical analysis of deliverers.”5

information, results in better decision-
making and challenges ‘groupthink’. A mix of backgrounds, viewpoints and experience can,
wielded together, generate more creative processes and better service. Productivity is

enhanced.6

The APS leads the private sector in the representation of women on boards and in senior

executive roles.7 It also maintains a commitment to the employment of Indigenous

Australians, people with disabilities and those from non-English speaking backgrounds.8

Whilst complacency must be resisted, this comparative advantage provides a positive

foundation upon which to build. However, diversity cannot be created by demography alone.
The challenge for the APS is that, for all its heterogeneity, it can remain inward-looking. It

can become too comfortable with its own way of doing things. Diversity—in the sense of

welcoming the views of the private and the community sectors—needs to be enhanced. The

APS must open itself to a wider diversity of perspectives.

viii
There is a need to build a more permeable public sector, providing greater opportunities for

mobility within the APS, between jurisdictions and across sectors. People should be enabled

to move in and out of the public service more easily. This will increase cross-sectoral

collaboration in designing and delivering public policy, facilitate better partnerships and

broaden the range of experiences that the public sector can call upon. For some people the

APS will remain a lifetime career: for others, it will be a place to work temporarily on projects

that capture their interest. The APS needs to be opened up.

CONCLUSIONS | Opening up the APS

E.17 Secretaries should support their staff to undertake career development
opportunities outside the APS in order to gain beneficial experience.

E.18 Building on existing departmental initiatives, an Australian Public Service
Scholarship should be established that provides financial support for ten APS
leaders each year to undertake an important project in the business or
community sector for up to 12 months.

E.19 A highly prestigious Public Sector Fellowship should be established to
provide financial support each year for ten exceptional leaders from the
business, community and academic sectors to contribute to significant initiatives
in the APS for up to 12 months.

E.20 For high priority large-scale projects, departments should actively source
specific talent from outside the APS on a temporary basis to provide a wide
range of relevant skills, experience and entrepreneurial energy.

E.21 Program advisory groups should be established within departments that
include representation drawn from outside the APS in order to capture a
broader diversity of perspectives and knowledge.

E.22 A Prime Minister’s Public Service Advisory Committee should be
established that includes leaders from business and community organisations,
to support the Australian Public Service Commissioner build a more open,
collaborative and outward-looking public service.

F EMBRACING ADAPTIVE GOVERNMENT

The work of government is hard. Its challenges are wicked. Problems do not always have

defined boundaries, solutions can (and should) be contested and authority is ambiguous.
Political change can occur unexpectedly and at breakneck speed. Administrative change

generally takes place in an almost imperceptible fashion but can be transformative in nature.
These challenges are exacerbated by the rapidity and level of scrutiny that is now brought to

bear by the 24-hour news cycle, the increasing influence of social media and the ‘hyper-

ix
connectivity’ of community networks enabled by the internet.9 Both politicians and public

servants must grapple with unrealistic citizen expectations and low levels of public trust.10

The market is also becoming more competitive on a global scale. In response to the pace,
complexity and connectedness of modern
Ian Hanger AM QC

life, successful organisations are learning to

function differently. Their operating ‘“Nothing ever becomes real, as Keats

environments are becoming increasingly said, “’til it is experienced”.’11

unpredictable. Well-established companies

suddenly find their business models undermined by emerging providers snapping at their

heels. They discover that their customers are attracted by new services delivered in different

ways. Companies rise to prominence quickly and amass great value rapidly—but many fail

with equal speed. The organisations that thrive are flexible. They seize opportunities, learn

rapidly and recognise that partners will be needed to deliver long-term goals. When they

enter uncharted territory—or find themselves under threat from new forms of competition—
they respond fast, start small, test new approaches, watch market responses, learn from

doing, scale-up their activity or, if necessary, try again.

Most importantly, they are honest about failure. They recognise that mistakes happen,
interrogate why they occurred and set in place remedial measures to ensure that they

perform better next time. Failure and its lessons are an inevitable part of entrepreneurial life

but are also central to maintaining the corporate competitiveness of well-established

businesses. It is true as much for social enterprises as for companies. Competition for the

philanthropic dollar is relentless.

The Australian Government can be informed by the organisational agility required for survival

in the private and community sectors. It is true that the APS has a larger market than the

vast majority of Australian companies and not-for-profit organisations and, for both better

and worse, has been more protected from market pressures. That legislative and regulatory

shelter is now under threat: citizens demand better services and greater choice and

governments want more flexibility and higher productivity. Without abandoning the traditions

of public service, new approaches need to be embraced that acknowledge that the delivery

of government programs is increasingly contestable. These propositions can be usefully

grouped under the conceptual framework of adaptive government.12

Adaptive government involves directing performance towards the achievement of outcomes

in an increasingly competitive environment. To the extent that performance-based outcomes

can be agreed and measured, the process allows contracted providers much greater

flexibility in how they undertake delivery. This does not mean less oversight. Monitoring will

still be required to assure not only that outcomes are being achieved, but that the process by

which they are pursued has the integrity and accountability that public spending demands.
Nevertheless, done properly, there will be less need for prescriptive red tape.

x
Adaptive government calls for greater organisational flexibility. It demands more willingness

to experiment—starting small, testing what works and (in the worst case) failing quickly. It is

premised upon facilitative leadership, in which collaborative partnerships are formed with

others to deliver results. It requires much more agility than the traditional structures and

workforce systems of public administration allow. It demands whole-hearted acceptance of

the virtual world by which government can better engage with citizens.

Some of this is already happening in pockets of the APS. Such initiatives need to be

embraced with greater enthusiasm. An adaptive approach has the potential to create

momentous change in the effectiveness of public service. It can help to restore confidence

that governments can meet the expectations of their citizens. ‘One APS’ needs to reimagine

itself as an adaptive organisation—flexible, experimental, facilitative and agile.

CONCLUSIONS | Embracing adaptive government

F.23 The default position that new policies proceed straight to large-scale
roll-out should be reversed and instead new policy proposals should include a
trial or demonstration stage, allowing new approaches to be developed fast and
evaluated early.

F.24 Staged decision-making for large projects should incorporate the
allocation of seed funding to agencies to develop a business case and
proof-of-concept, which can be tested before the project moves to a further
stage.

F.25 The Australian Government should fund an innovation competition to
encourage experimental, innovative community and business proposals for
improving the delivery of programs and services.

F.26 In order to improve contestability and citizen choice, departments should
facilitate the ability of contracted providers to take their own approaches to the
delivery of agreed performance-based outcomes.

F.27 As part of continuing effort to reduce red tape, greater efforts need to be
made to engage with communities and businesses to understand how
contractual conditions and administrative guidelines can be less prescriptive,
making it easier to work with government.

F.28 The APS should promote new forms of civil participation, including digital
and deliberative democracy techniques, in order to enhance consumer-directed
care, improve customer service, encourage greater citizen engagement and
inform the public economy.

xi
Reflections on Failure

No matter how objective an inquiry intends to be, it necessarily reflects the distinctive

perspective that the reviewer brings to the task.
Peter Shergold AC

This report is no exception. I have been drawn to

the task because I am genuinely interested in “Leadership begins with finding the

how government processes for implementing courage to say, ‘I accept personal
responsibility for contributing to the

large public programs can be improved. The failure to which I was a party’. That

question is important. I am well aware that the recognition can steer the resolve to

review has been prompted by the manifold make changes, try again and do
better. Acknowledging errors

failures identified by the Royal Commission into publically is a form of self-
the Home Insulation Program (HIP), undertaken improvement, not self-abnegation.
Failure, and how we respond to it, is

by Ian Hanger AM QC, as well as by the array of where leadership is born.” (2015) 13

problems associated with the design and delivery

of the National Broadband Network (NBN). But, Peter Shergold was the Secretary
of the Department of the Prime

as my terms of reference suggest, similar issues Minister and Cabinet from 2002 to

have been evident in other national projects. Of 2007

course, the challenges are not confined to

Australia. The Blunders of Our Governments, published in 2013, catalogues three decades

of big, failed projects in the United Kingdom.14

With the help and assistance of a dedicated Secretariat team, I have sought to reflect

critically on the lessons that need to be learned by public servants about how to execute

such programs more effectively in the future. I have arrived at conclusions, informed by

discussions that have been held with present and former members of the APS, as well as by

suggestions made by those in the business and community sectors who have experience of

working closely with governments. I am particularly grateful to the peer reviewers who

provided their insightful comments on a draft of this report. Many of my sentiments have

been expressed already by politicians and public servants (as is evident from the boxed

quotations). Indeed a number of my proposals are already in train. They need to be pursued

in a systematic way with greater vigour.

It is important to emphasise, however, that the report reflects my own conclusions. It has

been drafted from the viewpoint of someone who has been a senior public servant, who

remains deeply engaged with matters of public policy and who believes profoundly that the

quality of public administration is of great consequence to the manner in which Australia is

governed. It would be foolish not to admit up-front that the judgements at which I arrive have

been significantly influenced by my own experience. They are one perspective, but I hope a

useful one.

I had the singular good fortune to be a senior public servant in the Australian government for

two decades. I enjoyed extraordinary opportunities to contribute, in large and small ways, to

matters of great public importance. Of course, even when I exerted positional authority, I was

1
on occasion frustrated in my ambitions by the lumbering scale of administrative hierarchy.
The APS, I came to realise, is a brilliant creation, delivering a huge number of transactions

every day in an efficient and ethical manner. Yet it remains shaped by its origins as an

industrial scale, command-and-control organisation. A century ago it mostly delivered letters:
today, mostly welfare payments. Officialdom still weighs heavily on it. Bureaucratic

processes, just as much as drawn-out political negotiation, can slow the way in which things

are done. Innovation can be stymied. Yet I could always discern the significant purpose of

the job, enjoy the chance to make a difference and recognise the need to exercise influence

with integrity.

Such attitudes are not limited to the senior ranks of the APS. The ethos of public service

runs deep. Indeed, I have been frequently inspired by those more junior public servants,
often outside Canberra, who have greater direct contact with citizens and for that very

reason find their jobs rewarding and fulfilling. They often display considerable ingenuity in

seeking creative ways to improve the service that they offer. Do not imagine that they are

paper-pushers, dedicated to circumlocution. Rather, think of frontline workers as talent

spotters for new ideas and discerning critics of existing approaches. To a very large extent,
they are the face, or voice, of public service to the ‘customers’ of government.

Public service was not my lifetime career. I had worked for a long period as a university

historian before I entered the APS. Since leaving the Service, I have spent eight years

developing a portfolio career of non-executive positions in private, public, community and

academic governance. But on reflection I realise that public service was my vocation. I

slowly came to discern its challenges. To take a silent vow of non-partisanship in order to

offer impartial advice and to serve successive governments with equal commitment is not a

decision to be taken lightly. It involves sacrifices. For most public servants in senior

positions, it can be a tough gig. There is a personal cost that goes with wielding influence

from the inside.

Yet, too rarely recognised in educational textbooks, an apolitical public administration is

fundamental to the good health of Westminster-style democracy in Australia. First-year

university students of political science soon learn that the exercise of executive authority by

the government of the day is constrained by the need to wield it through the legislative

authority of the Parliament, and that its decisions are subject to the scrutiny of an

independent judiciary with its own powers. They are introduced to the complex and

ambiguous relationship of Commonwealth, State and Territory jurisdictions operating in a

Federal structure, founded on a written Constitution.

Generally, much less attention is devoted to the role of professional public administration in a

participatory democracy, and the manner in which it influences power. Perhaps that is

because much of what senior public servants do is necessarily hidden from view. The role of

appointed departmental Secretaries, their executive teams (and increasingly their middle

2
managers) is to provide advice to the elected ministers they serve. On occasion, to employ a

well-worn cliché, that needs to be done in a frank and fearless fashion.

Yet—and here’s the rub—however forceful and robust the advice that is conveyed to

ministers or their political advisers in private, it is vital that once government casts its

judgement, its policies should be implemented with energy and dedication. Cabinet decisions

need to be given effect, administratively or through legislation, by public servants. No matter

whether the policy proposal has emanated from the APS or the minister’s office; no matter

whether public service advice has been accepted, adopted, adapted or ignored; no matter

whether public servants think that the outcome is brilliant or foolish (or even, perhaps,
courageous)—their immediate task is to execute decisions on time, on budget and to the

government’s expectations.

Equally important, a political Opposition or an enquiring media should not be able to discern

from words or actions a senior public servant’s views on the wisdom of the policy. A

government should be judged by the public for the decisions that it makes, rather than for the

decisions it might have made had it been more persuaded by the informed entreaties of its

administrators. In short, confidentiality lies at the heart of the democratic processes within

which policy is deliberated upon. Without it, government decision making and public policy

outcomes will be the poorer—outcomes like the HIP will be more likely.

In contrast, the manner in which ministers and public servants administer policy is

appropriately subject to intense scrutiny. At the Commonwealth level, they face rigorous

scrutiny before a range of Parliamentary bodies, not least at regular hearings of the Senate

Estimates Committees. An independent Auditor-General routinely evaluates departmental

performance in delivering programs or overseeing projects and, on occasion, the

assessments have been scathing. Individual citizens, on occasion with the support of the

Commonwealth Ombudsman, and through the use of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws, are

able to gain access to the basis of decisions that directly affect them. The Ombudsman will

investigate their complaints to see if those decisions were wrong, unjust, discriminatory or

just plain unfair. Citizens can also challenge the decisions to which they have been subject

before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), an institution which promises to provide

prompt review with as little formality and technicality as possible. They can seek redress

through the courts.

This is as it should be. Public servants exert considerable power over the public that they

serve, and it is important that they are held accountable to the Australian community for their

actions, within the framework of ministerial responsibility. Mistakes can be costly, and not

just because taxpayers’ funds may be wasted, misapplied or used profligately. Poor

administration can, on occasion, deprive citizens wrongly of their liberties, constrain the

application of their rights, fail to inform them of their responsibilities or even, tragically, cost

them their lives. Public servants need to answer for their actions. They remain accountable

3
even when, as now, so many government services are delivered under contract by

outsourced providers.

Policy sits at the interstice between what is confidential (the development of policy) and what

is public (its delivery). For that reason, when things go wrong, as they did so profoundly in

the HIP, it is often difficult to attribute responsibility. I have an instinctive sympathy for public

servants who find themselves subject to criticism and perhaps disciplinary action for their

failures. That is not just because when big but unintentional mistakes occur, one looks at

one’s own career and thinks quietly, “there, but for the grace of God, go I”. It is also because

memories of what exactly happened are notoriously unreliable, especially when the written

record of decision-making is sketchy. In an environment in which decision-making is too

often opaque and responsibility diffuse, it can be difficult to attribute blame. Indeed, the

attempt can create a sense of injustice that inhibits a proper understanding of the array of

reasons why events went so terribly wrong. Public servants are often aggrieved by accounts

of their avowed incompetence: often they feel that they have worked around the clock on a

large project, had their good advice ignored, done their best to implement the government’s

decisions and then borne the blame when things went awry.

The hearings held by the Royal Commissioner show clear evidence of this tendency. In

general, when projects turn out well, one’s mind will naturally tend to ascribe a greater

significance to one’s own role; and when decisions go badly, it can be comforting to think

that one’s actions were of relatively minor consequence in a system-wide organisational

failure.

Yet it is crucial that organisations and individuals are able to learn from their mistakes.
Thankfully the evidence that is available from enquiries into the design and delivery of the

HIP, the roll-out of the NBN, the construction of school buildings as part of the Building the

Education Revolution (BER) policy—and from a range of other major government programs

that have been marked by managerial shortcomings—suggests that there are a number of

common factors that reduce the chances of success. There are also measures that can

enhance the prospect of positive outcomes. Understanding both threats and opportunities

can help to increase the likelihood of effective implementation of major projects in the future.

Over the past few months I have read, discussed and thought about these matters, focusing

on the delivery of large programs and the development of the policies that underpinned

them. I have come to the conclusion that there are ten key lessons that emerge and that can

be learned. These are the matters that this review seeks to address.

First, policy is only as good as the manner in which it is implemented. The

development of a policy and its delivery are inextricably linked. Implementation should be

integral to policy design. A policy cannot be elegant if its execution is poorly communicated,
ineptly administered or inadequately evaluated. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

4
Second, policy advice can only be frank and fearless if it is supported by written

argument. Good government is founded on good policy, and good policy depends on

forthright advice. Ministers look to their public servants (although not to them alone) to

provide or challenge ideas. Discussion of proposals should be robust. Yet oral advice,
however strongly it is conveyed, can too easily be ignored or misinterpreted. Worse, it

becomes possible to argue about whether it was actually given or received.

Third, deliberations, oral and in writing, need to be protected. Ministers (and their

advisers) and Secretaries (and their senior executives) need to have complete trust that

public service advice will remain confidential. If private discussions become public, mutual

respect will be eroded. If confidentiality is not assured, public servants will be tempted to

temper their counsel and ministers will prefer to receive advice only orally. That’s a bad

outcome for governance. Anodyne advice undermines effective decision-making. Oral advice

leaves no trace of the reasoning behind the decisions that were made.

Fourth, deliberative documents need to be preserved, whether written on paper or

delivered by digital means. Nothing symbolises significance more than handing a minister

a sheet of signed advice. Increasingly, though, policy is developed in real time by email and

text message communication between departments and ministers’ offices. These important

electronic documents need to be managed as confidential records. They are the files of the

future. They are our protection against ‘digital amnesia’.

Fifth, it is up to ministers, not officials, to make policy decisions. The important role of

senior public servants is to ensure that Cabinet ministers make their decisions with eyes

wide open. Advice should seek to identify the risks, envisage unintended consequences,
indicate threats to successful implementation and proffer alternative options. Public servants

should not seek to impede a government’s ambitions but to help it find the best way to give

them effect, ensuring that ministers are cognisant of the full ramifications of their decisions

and the impact that they will have on business and community interests and on the general

public.

Sixth, the effective management of risk is just as important in the public sector as in

the private—perhaps more so. Governments need to be apprised of the strategic,
financial, operational, regulatory and political risks to the implementation of major projects.
This is particularly the case when successful implementation depends on the co-operation of

other tiers of government and/or delivery by third-party agents. Public servants need to

indicate how risks can be mitigated or accepted, not avoided. Problems often emerge a long

way from Canberra. Risk culture and behaviours need to be embedded across the whole

department, from the departmental Secretary to the most junior regional officer. Prevention is

the first line of defence.

Seventh, as the public service fully commits itself to measuring results by outcomes,
program management needs to be accorded far greater professional status. The Public

Service Act 1999 places equal emphasis on members of the Senior Executive Services

5
(SES) exhibiting the capacity to provide policy advice or deliver programs. That is not

reflected in cultural attitudes or behaviours. Too often in the APS, policy advice is accorded

significantly greater status than program delivery. In truth, conceptual, analytical and

strategic skills (the foundation of SES selection) are just as important to program

management as they are to policy design. Project and program managers need to be

recognised as a community of practice in the public service, with attributes as important as

those who possess legal, accounting, medical or veterinary skills. Capability needs to be

progressively enhanced across the APS in a systematic fashion. In the past, public servants

tended to administer by the prescription of process. Management directed its attention to the

distribution of allocated inputs. Today the focus is far more heavily on performance-based

outcomes. Results matter. New professional skills are required.

Eighth, good governance increasingly depends on collaboration across sectors. The

private and community sectors are now central to the construction of public infrastructure

and delivery of public programs. They are commissioned to deliver government services.
The public market is becoming contestable, offering citizens greater choice. Unfortunately,
too often the relationship with providers is conceived merely in contractual terms. Their

expertise is not given full expression. Public servants need to facilitate the engagement of

business leaders, not-for-profit CEOs and senior academics in the design of major projects.
They should be seen as partners rather than as stakeholders. Their experience should be

tapped. That will help to ensure that there is more evidence-based policy and less policy-
based evidence. The key to transforming the delivery of major projects is to focus less on

contract compliance and more on collaborative performance.

Ninth, the APS needs to be further opened up. More opportunities should be found for

those who work in business and community organisations to work in the public arena. This is

not to suggest that public servants are second class. An increasingly graduate workforce is

probably more qualified and capable than ever before. However, there is considerable

benefit in increasing the diversity of perspectives brought to public administration.
Conversely, public servants should be actively encouraged to undertake periods of relevant

work in companies, social enterprises or universities. Greater experience will enhance their

performance when they return to the APS. There is significant advantage in enabling people

to stand in the shoes of others, appreciating the different constraints under which they

operate, and learning new approaches. Such exchanges will not undermine the public sector

ethos but reinvigorate it.

Tenth, an adaptive government can respond rapidly to changing circumstances

without taking unnecessary (and unforeseen) risks. On occasion, governments have an

appropriate desire to act quickly. Public servants are often seen as an impediment. They can

be perceived as cautious, guarded, even unimaginative. They can seem risk-averse. Yet

their circumspection is based on the knowledge that the rollout of major national programs is

fraught with danger. With wicked, complex and deep-seated public problems, it is uncertain

exactly what policies will work, or how they should be delivered in the most effective way.

6
There are benefits to experimentation: often it is more sensible to test out ideas on a small

scale rather than across the whole nation. More attention should be given to using trial or

demonstration sites to begin implementation expeditiously, trialling different delivery options

and learning by doing. Success can be demonstrated early. Failure can be addressed fast.

These views frame the report that follows. It endeavours to do justice to the perspicacious

insights of the Royal Commissioner, Mr Ian Hanger AM QC, and others who have reviewed

the mistakes made by those who have designed and executed major government programs.
I have sought to listen empathically to the responses of public servants to these swingeing

criticisms. I have tried not to cast judgement on individuals. I admire and respect the APS.
While I have not shied away from frankness in acknowledging its past failures, I hope that

the conclusions at which I have arrived will help the process of improving the manner in

which the APS wields its significant power in the future.

Several of my conclusions reflect a need for the APS to critically examine and reshape how it

does its business. In places I have recommended new structures, not for their own sake but

as means to an end. New tools, administrative structures and bureaucratic positions can too

easily become red tape. Anything that becomes routinised in government process can

invoke a compliance mindset. Some of my suggestions will sit awkwardly with established

culture and practices. They point to the need for changes that some will find uncomfortable,
but which need to be pursued. These are not superficial changes. They will be demanding

and even at times troubling. The goal is to build a more mature culture, a more constructive

environment and a more sophisticated public sector approach. The end result, while it will

take time, will be worth it.

This report, whilst transmitted to the Australian Government, is intended to open up ‘strategic

conversations’ across public services. I hope that its arguments will inform public discourse,
and perhaps even stimulate heated debate. If so, my review will in large measure have

achieved its objectives.

7
Lessons from the Past
The HIP was a major project, the design and delivery of which involved
Why do we need to massive failures and led to tragedy. The large-scale program was beset

learn from the failure of by far-reaching errors. Mistakes were manifold: irreconcilable policy
the HIP
objectives, flawed program design, rushed implementation and
inadequate monitoring. Mediocre record-keeping makes it difficult to tell the full story of
which public servants provided what advice to ministers when, and to what effect.
Responsibility for decision-making was diffuse and opaque. Accountability for consequences
was unclear. Yet it is apparent that the advice provided by public servants to ministers was,
in many instances, poorly given, poorly received and poorly communicated. Consultation
across government, between jurisdictions and with industry bodies was all but absent.
Citizens were not consulted on what they wanted and installers were not asked how it would
be best to deliver those aspirations.

The development and delivery of the HIP was not just marked by a plethora of mistakes: the
consequences were stark. Four young workers lost their lives, houses caught fire and long-
standing businesses were destroyed.15 It is important that the lessons of the tragedy are
learned. It is vital that when governments decide to instigate large new initiatives in the
future, that the process of execution has been improved. I hope that ministers, advisers and
public administrators will be able to say that “we will never have another HIP: we have
learned the lessons from what went wrong”.

The Royal Commission into the HIP was established on 12 December 2013. Mr Ian Hanger
AM QC was appointed as the Royal Commissioner and delivered his report on 29 August
2014. There had already been a number of other reports into the HIP, notably by
Dr Allan Hawke AC in his 2010 Review of the Administration of the Home Insulation Program
and by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in its Performance Audit Report No. 12
(2010—11). The program, and others explored in this review, provides a catalogue of
lessons for governments here and around the world. They allow us to learn from failure.

In late 2008, Australia was facing a severe economic downturn. The
The HIP was designed
to stimulate the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) threatened to end an era of prosperity. In
economy response, the Australian Government deployed a range of measures to
stimulate the economy.

On 3 February 2009, the Prime Minister, the Hon Kevin Rudd MP, announced a $42 billion
Nation Building and Jobs Plan.16 Included in this plan was an Energy Efficient Homes
Package, of which the Homeowners Insulation Program (later renamed the Home Insulation
Program or HIP) was a major component. Around $2.7 billion was allocated for the
installation of insulation into the ceilings of some 2.7 million existing Australian houses over a
period of two and a half years.17 The HIP was extremely ambitious in its scale. Prior to the
announcement there were only about 200 businesses installing insulation into just under

8
70,000 homes annually.18 The HIP aimed to achieve a fifteen-fold increase in the number of
installations carried out each year.19

The objectives of the HIP were to create employment for thousands of low-skilled workers in
the building industries, whilst delivering improvements to the energy efficiency of housing,
and contributing to a reduction in Australia’s carbon emissions.20 These competing
objectives made the execution of the HIP difficult. Hanger emphasised the tension between
the economic stimulus objective of the policy, which required the need for expedited
progress, and its environmental objectives, which in normal circumstances would have been
far more carefully pursued.

Things went wrong from the very start. The pre-announcement design of
The HIP was developed
the HIP was rushed, with two officials required to develop a policy
quickly and without the
usual safeguards of the proposal over the Australia Day long weekend in January 2009. They
Cabinet process were given express instructions “ … not to contact industry and not to
speak with colleagues”.21 This set the tone of achieving speed by stealth.
Many government decisions on the HIP were not subjected to the usual procedural
safeguards provided by Cabinet process. Indeed much of the initial program development
was overseen only by a sub-set of four ministers which, extraordinarily, did not include the
minister responsible for the delivery department, the Department of Environment, Heritage,
Water and the Arts (DEWHA).22

The Prime Minister announced that the HIP would commence on 1 July
Implementation design
2009. That left just five months from its announcement to develop and

was flawed and was done
without consultation begin to implement the program. In keeping with an ethos of supporting
construction projects that were ‘shovel-ready’, the aim was to get public
funds out of the door and pink batts into roofs as fast as possible. The start date was
perceived as non-negotiable.23 Political imperatives dominated.

According to many witnesses to the Royal Commission, this led to “crucial and material
compromises to the proper design and implementation of the HIP”.24 Concessions were
made in the name of expediency and had disastrous consequences: they included relaxing
training requirements for workers, and assigning the skill competencies to supervisors rather
than those performing the installation. This “unnecessarily exposed workers, particularly
inexperienced ones, to an unacceptably high risk of injury or death”.25 These late changes to
the delivery model were imposed on DEWHA by the (now defunct) Office of the Coordinator
General (OCG) in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). Under political
pressure, the OCG seems to have been driven by a ‘can-do at any cost’ mentality. The
Royal Commission concluded that, “if given an extended timeframe [DEWHA] could have
delivered the regional rollout program on which it was working”.26 However, no evidence was
found that a formal written request for a time extension was ever sought by any public
servant.27

9
It was not just that judgement was poor. Hanger found that DEWHA was ill-equipped to
deliver such a large and complex program, even if it had not been rushed to deliver at scale
from the outset.28 DEWHA’s development and implementation of HIP coincided with a
significant expansion of the department’s responsibilities. It had little experience of delivering
programs. It was unprepared for the task. Post-implementation reviews of the HIP identified
problems with the department’s governance structures, program design capability, corporate
administration, risk management behaviours, audit and compliance mechanisms, and
effective monitoring. 29 When the Hon Greg Combet AM became Minister for Climate Change
and Energy Efficiency in September 2010, he found that the APS had been ill-equipped to
run the HIP program: “As a consequence, given the lack of systems—administrative, IT and
financial—running that from Canberra was easily penetrated by fraudsters.”30 Unsurprisingly,
given the mood at the centre of government, DEWHA did not consult widely. There was
insufficient consideration given as to how government intervention would impact a relatively
small and largely unregulated industry. The Commonwealth abrogated responsibility for
industry compliance and licencing activities to State and Territory governments but without
listening to their frontline experience. Officials failed to talk to local government. Warnings
from international experience were not heeded.31 In-house expertise was not developed and
external advisers were inadequately briefed on their responsibilities.32 Time was not made
available to organise pilots to test the suitability of the program design.33

Confusion reigned. Roles within the Project Control Group (PCG) were
Accountability was
not clearly articulated or understood. A deference to ‘team-work’ diffused

blurred and risk poorly
understood responsibility for decision-making.34 Critical decisions, such as lowering
training and competency requirements, were taken by the PCG in a
committee environment which discouraged members from being active participants in the
deliberative process. The outcomes failed adequately to address risks to the safety of
installers.35 The perceived problems with the change to the delivery model by the OCG,
which significantly increased implementation risks, were not communicated to senior officials
and did not get updated in the risk register.36 Similarly, while safety concerns were raised
early in the HIP’s implementation by industry representatives, they were not added to the
register, and did not inform the risk management strategy.37 Warnings appear to have been
ignored. Even in the late stages of the HIP, when the Australian Government had received
specific advice about the risk of injury to installers and had the information necessary to
make a decision to ban unsafe products and procedures, it was far too slow to act.38

Of course, the responsibility of government for the proper design and implementation of the
program in no way obviates the responsibility that businesses also had in implementing safe
work practices for their staff. However, as program designers and contract managers, public
servants should have made far more effort to manage a greater proportion of the risk of
failure, particularly for project implementation and monitoring. Government, too, must take
responsibility. All Cabinet ministers should have been involved in discussions of such a
major project, including managing the risks. Ministerial advisers should have alerted their
ministers to the changes. Senior public servants, too, should have exhibited greater fortitude

10
in advising ministers and insisted on having their advice recorded, and (in the event that they
could still not persuade government to agree to a more realistic timeframe), should have
collaborated with State, Territory, local governments and industry associations to identify and
mitigate the program’s major risks.

As evidence accumulated on emerging problems, the HIP was formally suspended on
19 February 2010. Dr Allan Hawke AC was commissioned to undertake a review of the HIP.
He recommended against its continuation. On this basis the Government formally terminated
the program.

The fallout from the HIP was considerable. The consequences were

The consequences of tragic. The failure of the Australian Government to identify and
failure were great
manage the risk of injury and death to installers until very late in the
HIP was a major cause of four young men dying whilst they worked on
the program: Matthew Fuller, Rueben Barnes, Marcus Wilson and Mitchell Sweeney.39 This
is a consequence that their families will live with forever. Some workers and home owners
were injured and have ongoing health issues.40 It contributed also to house fires attributable
to poorly installed (and unchecked) home insulation.41 Previously viable businesses became
insolvent and many business owners lost their livelihoods.42 Large sums of public money
were wasted on delivering a major project ineffectively. The government also found itself
having to commission, assist and respond to eight inquiries into the program.43

There was also a large financial impact on the Australian taxpayer for remediation. On
termination of the HIP, two safety programs were established.44 These programs were
implemented at a cost in excess of $100 million. In addition, two industry assistance
schemes were established.45 The total cost of remediation was well over $400 million.46

In late 2014, the Coalition Government instigated further measures in response to the Royal
Commission.47 These included making payments to the families of the deceased installers;
providing financial compensation to pre-existing insulation businesses adversely affected by
the HIP;48 improving safety for workers in roof spaces; ensuring future Commonwealth
programs would minimise work health and safety risks; and addressing APS Code of
Conduct matters relating to the of the roles and responsibilities of individual public servants
during HIP.

My review of government processes for implementing large programs and projects is part of
the suite of actions that have been set in train. The Minister for the Environment, the
Hon Greg Hunt MP, has asked for an independent assessment of the failures identified in
the Royal Commission (as well as the Independent Audit of the NBN Public Policy
Processes). The review is to identify what lessons can be learned both by ministers and
public servants and to provide practical recommendations to enhance the capacity of the
Australian Government to deliver large programs and projects. The starting point is clear:
HIP was an unmitigated disaster that need never have occurred. The capacity of the

11
Australian Government needs to be enhanced. Ministers, their advisers and public servants
should all heed the lessons.

The review is also to consider the design and delivery of another large

What went wrong with the
public program, the NBN. The idea of the NBN was taken to the 2007
National Broadband
federal election by the Labor Opposition, with the ambition of providing
Network
all Australians with fast broadband to their homes and businesses.49 In
government, Labor sought to implement its mandate. It proved difficult. The NBN
implementation design had to be changed quickly and substantially after a tender process
conducted in April 2008 did not result in any viable proposals.50 A revised approach was
developed in January 2009, with the establishment of a new Government Business
Enterprise (known as NBN Co). At that stage, the legislative and regulatory framework of the
program was still undefined.51

The 2014 Independent Audit of the NBN Public Policy Process, conducted by
Mr Bill Scales AO, identified significant failures. Many echo and reinforce the problems
identified with the HIP. They relate to ‘closed-door’ policy design. Scales emphasised that
the process for the development of the revised design of the NBN did not involve any
consultation with industry. The proposal did not include any cost benefit analysis or business
case.52 There was poor understanding of risk and its management was sub-standard. Scales
saw the development of the NBN as a program that never clearly defined the problem that it
was trying to solve: instead, it assumed that the answer was already at hand.53

Common to the development of both the HIP and NBN was a poor comprehension of the
operating environment for the programs. There existed little or no understanding of industry
dynamics and regulatory frameworks, nor of the manner in which government intervention
would affect businesses.54 Scales found that NBN Co was not fit for purpose. In comparison
to established telecommunications companies, it did not have the capacity to deliver
outcomes in the timeframe determined by the government.55 Furthermore, the APS was
unable to influence the discussion of risks with the government. Scales suggested that the
issues which he identified were characteristic of a deeper problem within the public service.56

The HIP and NBN are not the only large government projects that have
What went wrong with
been marked by poor design and/or inadequate implementation. They
Building the Education
Revolution are simply the two most recent egregious examples. The BER was
another part of the then Government’s economic stimulus package.
Administered by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations
(DEEWR), most of the $16.2 billion program was designed to provide schools with new and
refurbished school halls, libraries and classrooms.57

Following fierce public controversy about whether the program was delivering quality
outcomes, the Government established a BER Implementation Taskforce in April 2010. The
Taskforce, headed by Mr Brad Orgill, presented its final report in July 2011. Whilst the report
found that the projects were successfully delivered, it also identified significant variations in

12
infrastructure cost, with public schools in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria paying
an average of 25% more than Catholic schools and 55% more than independent schools.58
Mr Terry Moran AC, who was Secretary of PM&C at the time, was of the view that the BER
should have been undertaken in tranches to create flexibility and, if necessary, halt the
process. In the absence of staged implementation the program, according to the political
commentator Paul Kelly, “was inefficient, failed to deliver value for money, and its waste
became a political issue… quotes were inflated and the work was often sub-standard.”59 A
2014 academic study examined whether the BER was “another case of government failure”.
It concluded that it represented a case study of how governments should not pursue large-
scale expenditure programs.60 The BER, it was argued, failed to deliver value-for-money.

Beyond the HIP, NBN and BER failures, there are lessons to be learned
Many other programs from many other major projects, both in Australia and overseas. Many
here and overseas have involve the introduction of new information technology. The
failed
implementation of the former Australian Customs Service’s Cargo
Management Re-engineering Strategy was woeful. According to the
ANAO, “the management framework that Customs had in place to support the project lacked
many of the basic fundamentals necessary to successfully implement a large ICT project.”62
From 1999 to 2006, costs blew out from $30m to $205m and recurrent failures resulted in
severe adverse business consequences for importing industries. Because of the
incompatibility of importers’ legacy software with new cargo management systems,
coordinating cargo became extraordinarily difficult.63 Similarly, the disastrous opening of
London Heathrow’s Terminal 5 in 2008 saw thousands of bags caught up within the airport’s
handling systems. The backlog was attributed to a lack of thorough and realistic operational
planning for the launch and inadequate staff training in new ICT systems.64 Over-optimism
and inadequate appreciation of the complexities inherent in implementing ICT systems seem
to be recurring causes of project failure.65 In fact, only 6 per cent of large software projects
from an international sample between 2003 and 2012 were on time, within budget, and had
satisfactory implementation.66

Reading reviews of Jane Halton AO PSM

But let's remember what's failure can be a
going right “I think we have a fantastic quality of public
dispiriting exercise. It servant in Australia and I do think our history
can also create a distorted perception of of innovation and our history of staying at the
cutting edge is an important legacy that we
reality. Reform of the implementation of
need to honour, so the opportunity to look at
large programs and projects should not how we do our business and to improve it is a
just be based on a litany of what has terrific opportunity and I think everyone
should embrace that.” (November 2014)61
gone wrong. Many things go right and,
for that very reason, go unnoticed. It is Jane Halton is the Secretary of the
important to acknowledge what has Department of Finance

worked in Australia and around the world
and looked for what the common drivers of success seem to be. These are reflected in my
conclusions.

13
It is important to emphasise that the APS has not been waiting passively for this report,
steeling itself for its recommendations. Already, significant new approaches are in train to

improve the quality of public administration. Since the HIP, the Department of the

Environment (DEWHA’s current successor) has made deliberate improvements to its

program management capability, particularly in gauging pressures and risks in early program

design, monitoring the challenges that emerge during implementation, and setting an

expectation of high-level management attention and strong collaboration with external

stakeholders.67 There is widespread recognition of the need for continued reform across the

APS. In some areas things are moving too slowly: in many instances, public servants

themselves would like to progress faster. I hope that I have been able to capture the

underlying frustration of many public servants: that it is difficult to make the key changes

which they believe can improve the influence of the innovative ideas they have; strengthen

the advice that they provide; enable them to be more responsive; and enhance their capacity

to deliver and evaluate major projects that the government instigates. Progress would be

enhanced if the Government was explicitly to authorise and encourage the change process.
The six reform directions identified in this review seek to provide a coherent framework for a

structured conversation on the failures that have occurred, the lessons that are being

learned and how they can be most adequately pursued.

14
A | Providing Robust Advice

PROBLEMS EXPOSED

The program design and implementation of the HIP and the NBN were compromised by the

APS failing to provide robust advice. Public servants did not draw sufficiently on external

views and expertise,68 and the partial evidence they did muster was unable to exert influence

through its advice to ministers.69 There was a failure to provide sufficiently frank and

forthright advice to ministers on important elements of policy design and risk.70 There was a

significant gap between the inadequate levels of candour displayed in written advice and that

reportedly conveyed in oral briefings. Public servants failed to keep detailed records of key

decisions and how they were arrived at, nor did they put into writing concerns regarding

design features of the program, despite testimony that this was raised orally with ministers.71

The APS, Hanger concluded, “ought to reinvigorate its willingness to provide, in writing,
advice that is as frank and robust as the advice it is willing to give verbally”.72

Ministers themselves frequently bemoan the quality of the advice that they receive. There

have been recurrent complaints over recent years from ministers about their departments’
apparent lack of innovative ideas and inadequate standard of advice. This may not be the

experience or perspective of most ministers, but it is a complaint that I have frequently

heard. “Don’t public servants have interesting ideas?”, I am asked, usually accompanied by,
“Why do they always tell me that things can’t be done?”. The answer, I hope, is that public

servants do like to contribute to good public policy but need to be encouraged to present

their views forthrightly on a confidential basis.

Providing advice to ministers has long ceased to be the exclusive domain of the public

service. Ministers have access to a wider range of sources than ever before, including their

party colleagues, political advisers, industry lobbyists, community advocates, policy think

tanks and academia. They also hear from their constituents and individual citizens. This is a

good thing: being able to draw on more information and multiple perspectives supports better

decision-making. Public servants need to have the capacity to argue their case against

alternative views.

Even in this contested environment, the APS remains in a position of strategic importance at

the centre of government. Public servants are privy to ministerial decisions in a way that

others are not. While outsiders may engage at different points in the policy process, the

APS’s involvement spans every stage—from bouncing around ideas, setting agendas,
formulating policy and undertaking design to delivering, monitoring and evaluating a

program’s implementation. Continuous proximity to political power contributes to the unique

role of public servants. They are privy to many (but not all) of the important conversations.
But these advantages do not guarantee influence or relevance. For this, public servants—
individually and collectively—must establish and maintain a reputation for reliably delivering

the best-argued and most persuasive advice.

15
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
Good advice should be responsive and timely. Responsiveness

Good advice should be
requires public servants to be sensitive to government priorities and
responsive and timely
alert to the intent and direction of policies. Advice and options should be
based on an understanding of ministers’ expectations, but also identify their unintended
consequences and what alternative approaches might help a minister to deliver their goals
more effectively. Responsive advice needs to be politically astute. It should recognise the
choices and constraints ministers face and include options to address them. It is also
proactive, vigilant for opportunities and anticipating problems. Good advice reflects an
understanding that policy development often takes a long and circuitous path, progressively
adapting to the unexpected twists and turns of political debate, discussion and circumstance.
Over-responsiveness—where public servants hold back on giving critical advice in a display
of undue deference to their ministers’ views—can be fatal to good policy outcomes. When a
minister says “jump”, the response should not be “how high?”. Nor should it be “no”. A better
question is “in what direction and for what purpose?” Advice that is contrary to ministers’
expectations is justified where it is based on a solid grasp of the government’s objectives
and aimed at supporting their achievement in the best way possible. It must reflect
departmental knowledge, obtained by thorough analysis and consultation, of the likely
benefit of alternative approaches. It should be informed by a clear assessment of what can
go wrong, because there is a good chance that it will.

Ministers frequently lament that advice from the public service is too slow. I have, on
occasion, been the recipient of such remarks. The APS needs to prevent advice getting
weighed down by process. Hierarchical processes can play an important role in ensuring
quality control and ethical standards. On the other hand, taken too far, the burden of
bureaucratic process can create unnecessary delay and crush innovative ideas. Papers
sometimes go through a long succession of clearances by progressively more senior public
servants before they are deemed ready for submission to a minister’s office. The time lost is
generally greater than the quality added. At the same time, it needs to be recognised that the
preparation of good advice on complex issues can take time. This is more likely to be the
case when governments are forging new policy directions, or are taking on functions with
which they have had little experience. Uncharted waters take longer to navigate safely. In
such circumstances, establishing demonstration projects may afford useful opportunities to
learn by doing, rather than taking the risk of rolling out an untried program nationally.

Advice needs to be analytically rigorous, carefully balanced and

Good advice should be
factually accurate, unbiased in its assessment of evidence and options. This does not

supported by evidence
mean that it cannot be succinct. Conclusions should not be based
and shaped by
experience upon—or worse, hidden within—voluminous appendices. A good public
servant, from training and experience, should be sufficiently skilled to

16
transform mountains of information into pinnacles of knowledge. Advice should be informed
by the latest thinking and practice from around the world while being alert to the Australian
context. Assumptions and uncertainties need to be made explicit.

The gathering of evidence should not stop once initial design decisions are made. It must be
ongoing. Often interventions do not work as planned when they are implemented. Always the
objective of early stages of program delivery should be to learn from the experience of doing.
Policy makers need to be attuned, responsive and ready to make the adjustments necessary
to ensure that the best possible approach is put in place.

Advice should present a range of viable options and set out the potential unforeseen or
unintended consequences of each, together with a delivery strategy and a risk management
plan. Implementation must be properly
considered throughout the policy cycle. Mike Pezzullo
Execution should be built into policy design
“Will this era be seen as one of… a close
rather than treated as an afterthought. Too partnership between effective governments,
often delivery matters are given tokenistic high-calibre public servants working
diligently together, and in partnership with
treatment, or settled without proper civil society, industry partners and
consultation with those who best others?... These days departmental advice
has to be highly influential and compelling.
understand the environment in which a
It has to be based… on strong evidence,…
policy will be delivered—often the public it has to be actionable, it has to be clear,
servants or community representatives on and it has to relate to a clear public policy
problem that’s been defined, [and] we have
the frontline. Departments should ensure to be completely conscious of the fact that
that ministers are briefed on strategic our advice and our views are going to be
implementation issues, including on what impacted, and properly so, by contested
views.” (April 2014) 73
options exist for implementation. In many
instances that will require consideration of Mike Pezzullo is the Secretary of the
Department of Immigration and Border
whether responsibility for delivery should
Protection
be commissioned to providers outside of
the APS. That will involve benchmarking and seeking alternative implementation
mechanisms.

The public service has a role as a broker of information, perspectives

Good advice considers a
range of perspectives
and opinions. It must exercise the leadership of facilitation by consulting,
arranging expert discussions, collaborating with business and not-for-
profit organisations and ‘crowdsourcing’ a broad range of community views. Advice should
be as open as possible to outside experience, with alternative ideas considered and
assessed rather than ignored or peremptorily dismissed. Advice should harness knowledge
from across government, other sectors and the public.

Consultation on large government programs and projects is often conceived far too narrowly.
Good policy should harness the views of those likely to be impacted by the proposal. It
needs to reflect a willingness to ‘co-design’ with those from other sectors who have on-the-

17
ground experience of delivering major projects. As performance-based commissioning of
public services becomes more commonplace, it will be increasingly important to ensure that
program design and implementation are ‘co-produced’. The possibility that there may be
perceived conflicts of interest in involving community and business organisations that, in the
future, may wish to tender to deliver government services, can be carefully managed.

Most importantly, good advice is frank and fearless. Good advice is not

Frank and fearless only responsive—but also responsible. It is forthright, honest and
advice is
impartial. It should seek to be as objective as possible. This can mean
written down
telling ministers things that they may not wish to hear, but of which they
need to be aware. Only then can we be assured that decisions are made in full knowledge of
all the facts. Governments should act with eyes wide open. At that stage, even if the
Secretary believes the government is acting unwisely, the answer is necessarily, ‘Yes,
Minister’. Only very occasionally will the response of a Secretary have to be firmly in the
negative to ensure that their minister operates within the law, in accordance with
parliamentary conventions or in line with established policy.

Giving frank and fearless advice can be difficult. It can be complicated by the desire to
preserve good working relationships with ministers. There can be pressure to be ‘pragmatic’
and act in a way that is expedient or convenient. The community’s legitimate expectation that
the APS serves the public interest with integrity requires more than this. It can require steely
resolve. More generally, it requires innovative ideas and strategic thinking in order to present
ministers with alternative options to meet their political objectives. Fearlessness should
never become obstructionism.
Michael Thawley AO
Courage in giving ministers robust advice
“I don’t think there is any reason not to
may be required regardless of whether it is
give direct advice to government. People
delivered face-to-face or in a written briefing. outside the public service talk about frank
Yet I have come firmly to the conclusion that and fearless advice as if there was a state
of perpetual hostility, but that’s not right.
fearless advice delivered orally is not the Public servants are interested in getting
same as frankness written down. Oral the right outcome and will do their best to
persuade. Their interest is in the outcome,
advice can too easily give rise to
not a fight. If the government likes the
misinterpretation or misunderstanding. It is advice it will choose it. If the government
more easily dismissed or forgotten. decides otherwise, it may reflect on our
ability to provide a convincing argument
Committing advice to writing requires more or there may be other factors. It is not our
coherent articulation of arguments and helps business if there is a political reason.”
(April 2015)74
assure a shared understanding. For these
reasons, policy advice can only be truly Michael Thawley is the Secretary of the
frank and fearless if it is supported by Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet
written argument. Ministers should demand
that advice on the most challenging issues
they face should be presented in written form. Ultimately, they should be able to expect that
the advice received from their departments, whilst written in the interest of supporting them

18
to achieve their objectives, is also forthright. Done well, this should enhance rather than
erode an effective relationship between ministers and officials.

Responsibility for raising the bar on the quality of advice rests with all
Accountability for the APS employees. However, some problems will only be overcome by the
quality of advice begins exercise of strong leadership at the highest levels. Ministers are entitled

and ends with Secretaries
to expect that Secretaries will be proactive in ensuring that the
preconditions for robust advice exist within their agencies, take responsibility for maintaining
high standards, and be clear and decisive in responding where organisational performance
falls short. For their part, ministers should create an environment which is conducive to
encouraging and receiving the best possible public service advice.

A review’s conclusions cannot depend on entreaty alone. A few modest initiatives might help
to give effect to what most Secretaries know only too well already. First, Secretaries should
be willing to be held accountable for the quality of advice provided by their departments. The
question is how best to implement this. Ultimately, it is up to the Prime Minister of the day to
decide how this should be achieved, in consultation with the Minister Assisting the Prime
Minister for the Public Service, the Secretary of PM&C and the Australian Public Service
Commissioner. Secretaries’ annual performance discussions are one existing opportunity to
discuss the quality of advice provided to ministers by their departments. Written briefing can
also provide an opportunity to enable ministers to comment on the timeliness, relevance, and
value of the advice they have received: some departments already include a summary box
on each submitted paper to allow the minister to comment in this manner. Shortcomings
need to be identified and addressed in a considered fashion.

Second, the minister-department relationship is strengthened when a
Ministers need to set
Secretary has the good fortune of working to a minister who actively

expectations of frankness
encourages frank advice. There may be value in capturing these
sentiments in a Charter of Expectations which can serve as a guidepost for departments,
ministers and their offices. The Charter could provide a standard against which performance
can be assessed.

Third, in order to set a clear expectation about the requirement for significant advice to be in
writing, the most effective mechanism would be for the Australian Public Service
Commissioner to issue a binding Direction under the Public Service Act 1999.

Transparency of government processes and public access to government information is an
important characteristic of participatory democracy in Australia. Making administrative
decision-making more open to the public empowers citizens. It improves the quality and
responsiveness of services. Similarly, increasing access to government data supports
innovation by unlocking the economic and social value of information.75 Freedom of
information helps to assure transparency in the expenditure of public money and ensure
accountability for the impact of decisions on individual citizens: indeed the community should
be actively encouraged to use public information for all sorts of public purposes. Factual

19
information collected at public expense should generally be available to the public to use as
it pleases.

When it comes to advice based on opinion and judgement, and intended
Frank advice should be
to inform deliberative decisions on policy, there needs to be a different
confidential
approach.76 Here the requirement for a relationship of trust between
ministers and senior public servants means that arguments for confidentiality have much
greater strength. It is far more difficult to be frank about politically sensitive policy matters
when there is a real risk that one’s advice will become publicly accessible. This is not to
suggest that, where there are different views, the department’s perspective will always be
the correct one. Indeed my own experience suggests otherwise. Nonetheless, healthy
differences of opinion between a minister and a Secretary will soon become a political issue
if they are made public and can seriously damage the relationship between the two. Public
servants, in the heat of a party political contest, face pressure to answer questions not on
how they are administering a program but on whether departmental advice had supported it.
If confidentiality is not assured, public servants will be tempted to temper their advice and
ministers will prefer to receive advice only orally. This is a conclusion which is supported by
an examination of the behaviours exhibited during development of the HIP.

Whilst openness and transparency are fundamentally important for good government,
governments must be allowed a measure of confidentiality in the policy-making process. Not
to do so burdens ministers and their advisers in a way that other decision-makers are not.
The executives and board members of both for-profit and not-for-profit organisations rely on
confidential discussions, and a CEO is not generally required to disclose details of the
board’s deliberations. Nor is there an expectation that the courts will circulate draft opinions
or records of discussions held on the way to presenting a judgement. Indeed this would be
seen as inimical to good process.

John Fraser
The introduction of
Australia’s FOI laws go “Freedom of information has made
Australia’s Freedom of

further than comparable people extremely careful in the public
Information (FOI) Act in
jurisdictions service about what they put on paper,
1982 (and comparable and that’s sad. Freedom of information
legislation in other jurisdictions) created a is not a bad thing in itself. But open
policy debate means people have got to
legally enforceable right of access to be candid. And at the moment a lot of it
government documents. Changes to Australia’s is done orally, which is a pity. It’s a pity
FOI laws in 2010, undertaken as part of a for history …. And writing something
down is a great discipline.” (May
broader push for more open government, were 2015)77
designed to further improve transparency and
John Fraser is the Secretary to the
support public engagement in government
Treasury
decision-making and policy development.78 The
Commonwealth’s FOI laws are now arguably
the most pro-disclosure among comparable jurisdictions in Australia and overseas. The 2010
reforms involved a reformulation of the ‘public interest’ test that is applied to FOI requests,

20
creating a stronger presumption in favour of release (accentuated by listing the factors that
must be considered in favouring release, but identifying none that count against).79
Compared to other jurisdictions with Westminster-style systems, the Australian Government
is now an outlier when it comes to making accessible frank and fearless advice that is
intended to be provided to ministers in confidence. The United Kingdom (UK) and New
Zealand Acts include specific exemptions to protect such advice.80 The Queensland and
Tasmanian Acts stipulate the factors that must be considered in favour of granting access
and favouring non-disclosure.81 Relevant legislation in most other Australian states applies a
more balanced public interest test, similar to that in place at the Commonwealth level prior to
the 2010 reforms.82

The Commonwealth’s FOI laws now present John Lloyd PSM

a significant barrier to frank written advice. “FOI laws are very pernicious. I think they
The Commonwealth laws have had the have gone beyond perhaps what they
intended to do and I think they do make us
unintended consequence of constraining the a bit over cautious and make some of the
content, form and mode of advice presented advice more circumspect than it should be,
to ministers. Ironically, application of the and I hope the government will address
that and perhaps reassess the extent of
revised public interest test has now had the some of those FOI laws.” (March 2015)83
unforeseen effect of lowering standards of
John Lloyd is the Australian Public
public administration and, as a consequence,
Service Commissioner
undermining the public interest in good
policy. The public interest is certainly not
served by having no public record of how and why decisions were made. Nor is there much
benefit in gaining access to written advice that has purposefully been prepared to appear
innocuous when released under FOI.

Former ministers and current and former agency heads have gone on the public record to
say that the potential for public disclosure is constraining advice to ministers.84 Today, when
frank advice is required, it is too often delivered orally rather than being committed to writing.
Fewer records are being kept, and the written advice that is provided is more likely to be
anodyne, carefully constructed to minimise any sense of vigorous disagreement. The
consequences include a patchy record of decision-making and an increased likelihood of
decisions being made based on incomplete or poorly argued information. This can ultimately
only be detrimental to good governance and the public interest.85

Advice that is honest and forthright is important. It ensures ministers make decisions with full
knowledge of the facts and with their eyes open to the risks. The HIP involved instances
where this did not occur. Of course, these failings took place prior to the 2010 reforms to the
FOI laws but, given the impact of more pro-disclosure FOI laws since, one might conclude
that public servants are even less disposed to offer frank written advice today.

In truth, the problems with the application of FOI legislation are deeper
The FOI Act should be than the 2010 amendments. The FOI Act should be rebalanced to remove

rebalanced so that frank
advice can be
confidential

21
barriers to frank and fearless written advice being provided to ministers. The Act needs to
explicitly recognise the value of robust perspectives in the advice process. In particular, the
provision of frank advice and the benefits of a frank exchange of views as part of the
deliberative process of government should be recognised as an important public interest
consideration against providing access to documents.

A range of possible amendments to the FOI Act could support the above objective. The
current public interest test, which is applied to requests for access to deliberative material,
lists only factors that must be considered in favour of release. This could be rebalanced by
listing those factors favouring non-disclosure (including the need to protect the frank and
fearless advice given to a minister by a senior public servant). Alternatively—or in addition—
an explicit exemption for frank and fearless advice could be introduced into the Act. The
simplest and most attractive option under the current framework would be to strengthen the
drafting of the current exemption for deliberative process to clearly describe the harm it
seeks to avoid. This would make the construction of the exemption consistent with most
others in the FOI Act and address the issue, identified by Allan Hawke in his 2013 review of
the Act, that “the absence of a clear indication of the harm that the exemption is designed to
protect results in the exemption being subject to differing interpretations and difficult to
apply.”86

There would also be value in widening the current exemption for Cabinet documents to make
it clear that it includes drafts, early advice and other preliminary material that may not
ultimately be submitted to Cabinet, but which is of such close proximity that its release could
impair the confidentiality of Cabinet processes. At the same time there would be benefit in
implementing one of the recommendations made by Hawke in 2013: namely, to add an
exemption to the FOI Act to cover incoming government and incoming minister briefs (a key
part of helping to prepare governments for office), briefs written for question time and Senate
Estimates hearings.87 The public interest in protecting the confidentiality of these briefings
has already been recognised in recent decisions of the Australian Information
Commissioner.88 The matter should be put beyond doubt.

Such modifications to the FOI Act would make the conditional exemption for ‘deliberative
matter’ easier to apply but only in a limited set of circumstances—where disclosure of
information could compromise the ability of public servants to provide ministers with frank
advice.89 It needs to be explained that this protection would apply only to a tiny proportion of
government documents. In 2013-14 the exemption for deliberative matter was applied to only
two per cent of all FOI applications.90 The proposals should not, be misinterpreted as part of
a move to limit access to government information more generally.

Indeed, making more government information accessible is important. The
Much more arguments put forward in Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of
Australian
Australian Government Administration in 2010, that “the Australian
Government

information should
Government become more open and that public sector data be more widely
be open and
available

22
available, consistent with privacy and secrecy laws,” needs to be given full effect.91 Major
data sets and the factual information on how decisions are made should be in the public
domain for all to use as they wish. Similarly, the results of policy and program evaluations
should be made publicly available as a matter of course. With the huge advances in digital
technology, shared information can build a stronger relationship between government and
citizens. Equally important, individuals can often find new methods of using public
information in unexpected ways to create public benefit.

Placing restrictions on freedom of information is extraordinarily sensitive. For that reason, the
Government should undertake a thorough assessment of options for removing barriers to
frank advice in the FOI Act. This should take into account not only the detrimental impact of
existing legislation but relevant experience in comparable jurisdictions. It may be that a
bipartisan group of former ministers, together with former Secretaries, could be appointed to
investigate and report back to government on options and recommended approaches.

The duty of public servants to provide frank advice in writing needs to be made
Written records of
clear and unambiguous. The HIP Royal Commission asked whether the
deliberative

discussions need to deficiencies highlighted in departmental record keeping were indicative of a
be made and broader deficiency across government.92 They are. Indeed, it is surprising how
retained many APS employees are unaware of their legal and professional obligations
to record the business of government. As a result, record-keeping is too often
treated as a low priority. This is something that should be corrected.

All significant advice and decisions that are part of an ongoing process of deliberation should
be recorded. Much advice is part of an ongoing and iterative discussion. Part of the public
servant’s role is to assess the points at which a record is required. This might initially occur
in an email or a diary note, but it is important that all documents that inform decisions find
their way into formal records management systems. Proper record-keeping allows others in
the future to fully understand the reasons for a decision or action.93 In the case of sensitive
information, records may be tightly held and only released to the public after considerable
time has passed. The record is no less important in these circumstances.

Ensuring a record of decisions is more challenging in the digital age, when ministers, their
offices and departments deal with massive volumes of information. Today, most written
communication takes place not on paper but through electronic media, and the iterative
process of policy development is regularly conducted over email and SMS. Unfortunately,
the most comprehensive guide to APS recordkeeping was completed in 2007, well before
the current proliferation of smartphones and tablets within government.94 The APS should
rebuild the discipline of good record-keeping and modernise it for the digital age. Texts
matter.

A requirement to create records is implied, though not explicitly stated, in the
Archives Act 1983. The ANAO notes the lack of a single clear and explicit requirement for
the public servants to create records of all of its key business activities and decisions,

23
although some categories of records are now specified under the PGPA Act.95 Given the

lack of consistency on record keeping, the National Archives of Australia should issue

updated APS-wide guidance on the creation of new records, especially digital material,
which should be endorsed by Secretaries. The foundation work to support such guidance is

already underway.96

We need to go back to the first principles of the Westminster tradition. Ministers are elected

and appointed to make decisions. It is in the public interest that they make themselves as

well-informed as possible in carrying out these roles. Whether ministers choose to accept the

arguments of a public servant must be up to them. They, and the governments they serve,
should be judged in the court of public opinion on the decisions that they make, not on the

advice they choose to reject. It is not in the public interest to undermine good public

administration by deterring public servants from writing down the full force of the advice that

their ministers need to read—nor by prompting ministers to ask for such advice to be

conveyed orally. It is far better to have a deliberative document held confidentially than for it

not to exist at all.

Conclusions | Providing robust advice

A.1 Public service advice is vital to good government and, to this end,
Secretaries should be held accountable for the quality of advice provided to
ministers by their departments.

A.2 Whilst acknowledging the value of frank and fearless oral discussions,
the Australian Public Service Commissioner should issue a Direction that
significant advice also be provided to ministers in writing. Ministers should insist
on receiving frank written advice from the APS, noting that it is generally their
decision whether to accept or reject all or part of the advice.

A.3 The FOI Act should be amended to ensure that advice and opinion
provided to support the deliberative processes of government policy formulation
remain confidential.

A.4 An APS-wide policy on record keeping should provide practical guidance
about when and how records must be created, including that records of
deliberative discussions in all forms, including digital, should be retained.

24
B | Supporting Decision Making

PROBLEMS EXPOSED

In the past I have extolled Australian Cabinet processes, arguing that only Australia—in

contrast with the UK and Canada—maintains the true tradition of Cabinet government.97

Collective discussion and decision-making provide a firm foundation for good policy and

effective public administration. When it fails, good governance is undermined. The HIP and

NBN prove the case.

A major factor in many of the poor decisions taken in relation to both programs was failure in

the operation of the Cabinet. Cabinet consideration was either perfunctory or replaced by an

inner group of ministers making decisions free from wider scrutiny. Hanger found that

significant decisions regarding the HIP were made by the Strategic Priorities and Budget

Committee of Cabinet—three or four ministers that did not include the minister responsible

for the program.98 In the case of the NBN, the full Cabinet was not engaged in

decision-making. That was one of the major reasons for policy failure.99 As Scales

recognised, “effective use of Cabinet processes is critical to better practice public policy

process. The rigours of a well‐argued Cabinet submission contribute to scrutiny, informed

debate and decision-making within government.”100

Collective perusal of a proposal provides a powerful antidote to peremptory decision-making.
Each person can ask their questions and put forward their views. In presenting the

2013 Sir John Monash Oration, the Minister for Communications, the

Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, reflected on the fact that, under the Australian Cabinet system,
“the Prime Minister is surrounded by people who have a standing of their own. They have a

power base of their own. And that is very important. . . decisions have to be taken in a

collective manner or should be taken in a collective manner.”101 Unfortunately, it would seem

that such processes of collective decision-making were falling apart by the time HIP, NBN

and BER were under consideration. According to David Epstein, who was the Prime

Minister’s Chief of Staff, by late 2008, “[p]roper functioning Cabinet government ceased to

exist. More and more the discussion was about politics and the real business was not

conducted.”102 Many areas of government were affected. With respect to the development of

an emissions trading scheme, for example, the “catalyst for the long slide towards a policy

fiasco was [the] decision to abolish Cabinet’s climate change subcommittee.”103 The former

Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Hon Tony Burke MP, shared Epstein’s

view. As he told Paul Kelly: “In the end we stopped making decisions at Cabinet. The official

business of Cabinet took no time and then we’d have a political discussion, but with no

agenda, no direction, no decision.” Terry Moran, then Secretary of PM&C, conveyed his

concerns about the weakening of Cabinet processes, but to no avail.104

Cabinet operations involve a difficult balancing act. Too much policy discussion in Cabinet,
and the politics can be forgotten. Too much politics, and public administration can be

25
weakened. In the case of HIP and NBN the balance moved too far away from collective
discussion and assessment of administrative challenges. The perceived need for quick
decision making and rapid implementation drove the Prime Minister to circumvent traditional
Cabinet processes. Critical perusal was avoided. As a consequence, government made
extravagant promises based on ill-considered optimism. Most Cabinet ministers remained
blissfully unaware that their public service agencies believed that they would be unable to
deliver on the commitments. The consequence turned out to be catastrophic.

Another area of failure affecting the systems that support ministerial decision-making was
the relationship between the APS and ministerial advisers. The relationship can go awry
when there is a breakdown in mutual trust. Advisers, as gatekeepers, can make it harder for
public servants to gain access to a minister and, worse, make it difficult to know if a minister
has actually received the advice that the minister needs to consider. Blurring of
accountabilities around policy advice to ministers leads to confusion and poor outcomes. In
the case of the HIP, there appears to have been a breakdown in communication between
departments and the responsible minister. Despite conversations between senior public
servants and advisers about aspects of program implementation, too few of the officials’
concerns reached ministers. At times, the minister did not receive written briefings and as a
consequence decisions were made without awareness of all the relevant facts.105

PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
(i) Cabinet

Policy starts with an idea, which is worked up by departments and prepared

How a good Cabinet for discussion by the Cabinet. Its submission requires the authority of the
process works
Prime Minister. Public servants in the lead minister’s department prepare
papers for the Cabinet’s consideration, including submissions and
memoranda. Occasionally, they provide short-form updates to facilitate an early discussion
with their minister on the options for design and delivery of a new proposal. All
documentation, formatted to address key issues, is meant to be informed by thorough
research, rigorous analysis and genuine consultation across government departments.
Central agencies—PM&C, Treasury and Finance—have an opportunity to provide their
views. Often this process is iterative and conducted over several months; at other times the
process is necessarily much faster.

Draft papers are circulated to other departments for comment, leading to further refinement
of the proposal. The submission evolves into a document used to communicate the proposal
to a minister’s Cabinet colleagues. Whilst the majority of other ministers are not generally
subject-matter experts on the policy at hand, they will have an interest in the implications for
their own portfolios and constituents. They will assess a major project or program against the
government’s wider political agenda and the policy commitments already underway. By this
stage, details of the proposal (and volumes of supporting analysis) have been distilled to
their essence. A good Cabinet submission explains to ministers succinctly what they need to

26
know to make an informed decision, and ensures they are alert to the risks, possible
unintended consequences and threats to successful implementation.106 The submission is
circulated well ahead of the Cabinet meeting so that ministers have time to consider it.
During the Cabinet meeting, the relevant minister presents the submission and it is
thoroughly discussed amongst the Cabinet, before a decision is made. Public service
note-takers, seated around the corners of the Cabinet room, carefully record the discussion
and, in consultation with the Cabinet Secretary, set down the decisions made.

There are well-established requirements designed to ensure good Cabinet process,
particularly when a major new project or program is being proposed. The forward planning of
agendas, oversighted by the Cabinet Secretary, assists ministers to properly prepare.
Cabinet documents are made available to all ministers at least 10 days before they are
considered by Cabinet. This gives responsible ministers the time to hone their arguments
before they are put to Cabinet for decision. Central agencies and other departments are
provided with the opportunity to review proposals and provide their perspectives on the
merits of a policy and the manner in which it should be delivered. Coordination comments
are an important opportunity for departments to signal their concerns.

If too many so-called ‘under the line’ papers (matters which are considered by Cabinet
without the benefit of a supporting submission) are being prepared at short notice it is a sign
of a Cabinet process in trouble. Except in true emergencies, they indicate that the policy
commissioning process is poorly planned and that competing perspectives are either not
valued or actively discouraged. Nearly always, implementation risks will be understated.
Whilst urgent and unforseen under the line proposals will be needed on occasion, these
should be supplemented by a later submission to Cabinet that includes a properly
considered implementation strategy. The same expectations ought to apply to decisions
taken during the expedited phases of the Budget process.

Good process is fundamental to supporting good Cabinet decision-making. It

When good Cabinet
is designed to allow policy ideas to be tested and contested before they are

process falters, bad
decisions happen put to the Cabinet for decision, and to ensure that ministers are as
well-informed as possible about proposals before they enter the Cabinet
room. They can be full participants in discussions. They can raise their concerns and have
them addressed. Consensus can be reached.

Collective decision-making lies at the heart of Cabinet government. It requires ministers to
be open and committed to a contest of ideas. Views which may have been firmly held can be
reshaped based on considerations of merit, practicality and risk. Ministers can together
decide if they wish to spend their limited political capital on a major new program.
Departments contribute to the debate by providing coordination comments on the
submission and briefing their ministers before they attend Cabinet.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that the HIP and NBN (particularly in its second
phase) were poorly designed policies, borne of inadequate consultation. Because good

27
Cabinet processes were compromised, public servants were unable to ensure an
appropriate level of ministerial scrutiny and informed debate. The opportunity to seek further
work to address weaknesses in design and execution was lost.

It is almost impossible to imagine either the HIP or the second phase of the NBN emerging
from a proper Cabinet process in the shape in which they were ultimately implemented. Even
before the proposals reached Cabinet, risks that had been overlooked or underplayed would
almost certainly have been identified; the lack of consultation with the states or industry
bodies would have rung alarm bells; implementation difficulties would have been highlighted;
and, in all likelihood, a more realistic timeframe agreed. In the case of the HIP, the tensions
between policy objectives would have been debated and resolved between departments or,
failing that, in discussions between ministers in Cabinet.

Good Cabinet processes are not a matter of administrative convenience.
Cabinet submissions
belong to ministers Governments can decide how they want Cabinet to operate most effectively.
Certainly ministers should have a strong investment in the submissions that
they present to Cabinet. After all, they own them. By convention, ministers take full
responsibility for the content, quality and accuracy of advice provided to the Cabinet under
their name.107 Ministers are expected to ensure that their Cabinet submissions provide
enough detail on risk and implementation challenges to ensure their Cabinet colleagues can
make an informed decision on the merits of the proposal.108 When these responsibilities are
eschewed—for example, when ministers disown submissions as the work of their
departments rather than a proper expression of their own views—the foundations of
Westminster ministerial accountability are undermined. Conversely, departments are
expected to cede ownership of submissions. Cabinet memoranda are the appropriate vehicle
for conveying a department’s own views to the Cabinet where this is required. When it
comes to submissions, any misgivings that public servants have about a minister’s preferred
approach should be argued out beforehand. That is a key purpose of frank and fearless
briefing. The submission is intended to reflect the minister’s perspective. It needs to win over
the support of their Cabinet colleagues.

The quality of Cabinet submissions is a common topic of complaint from
Submissions need
ministers. Each government publishes a Cabinet Handbook which sets out a
to contain the

information needed preferred version of the Cabinet submission template. Often it undergoes
for Ministers to subsequent revisions during the government’s term in attempts to address
make the best perceived shortcomings in the advice that Cabinet receives. It is important to
possible decisions
get the template right. It needs to facilitate efficient drafting by public servants
and, most importantly, serve the needs of the Cabinet of the day by
supporting good decision-making. It is for this reason that the key matters to be addressed
are carefully prescribed. The present standards incorporate a statement of purpose;
justification for the proposed policy direction (including the canvassing of options); the impact
of the policies on those who will be affected; the views of stakeholders; information on how
any proposals are to be implemented; key sensitivities and risks; regulatory, regional,

28
legislative and financial implications; financial costs; and, crucially, a clear set of
recommendations.

The hallmarks of good Cabinet process need to be assured by PM&C as part of its
coordination role, acting with the imprimatur of the Prime Minister and supported by his or
her staff, including the Cabinet Secretary. This role should extend to providing assurance
that the quality standards for submissions are met. This does not mean that submissions
need to be long. Ministers do not have time to wade through pages of detailed supporting
argument and analysis, but they need to be assured that the work has been done. At their
best, Cabinet papers represent the apex of a ’policy pyramid’, supported by extensive
research, analysis, reasoning, consultation and testing.109 A proposal should be refined and
made shorter and simpler as it progresses through the coordination process and into
Cabinet. The supporting information can be available to ministers should they wish to see
it—and some of it may be sufficiently important to include in attachments to the proposal—
but the essence of the argument and the critical supporting information should be condensed
into a few pages. That is what public servants are trained to do. It takes skill, experience and
(on occasion) a bit of savviness.

In a well-functioning Cabinet, submissions drafted by public servants that do not meet the
quality standards agreed by the Cabinet—that have arguments that are poorly presented or
are mired in too much unnecessary detail—should be sent back for more work before they
get to the Cabinet Room. The ability of PM&C to reject submissions as part of its
coordination role is paramount to maintaining these standards. Without this signal there is
less incentive for departments and ministers to put their very best work in front of Cabinet.
This should be the least we expect of the highest-level decision-making forum in our
democracy.

Inevitably, ministers can sometimes feel hemmed in by ‘bureaucratic’
Practical ways to
guidelines. If the format is too rigid and ministers feel unable to present

ensure ministerial
ownership of information to colleagues in the way that they think best, it can contribute to a
submissions reduced sense of ministerial ownership. Ministers can come to the view that
Cabinet requirements effectively empower public servants at their expense. It
is important to find ways of allowing ministers greater flexibility to make their case to
colleagues without loosening the standards required of Cabinet submissions. A clear
advantage is that a minister’s ownership of a major program (and the burden of
answerability, responsibility and accountability that goes with it) can be reinforced.

With this in mind, there would be value in setting aside the first page of all submissions for a
ministerial statement, outlining in the minister’s own words the policy’s purpose, expected
outcomes and anticipated implementation risks. They can be assisted by their advisers.
Whilst it is likely that the body of a submission will still be drafted in the department (in
consultation with the minister), the ministerial statement would provide a more personalised
pitch to their Cabinet colleagues. With the agreement of the Prime Minister, ministers can be

29
given the freedom to present their proposal as they see fit whether by talking to their
submission or using a PowerPoint presentation to highlight the key issues.

Notwithstanding PM&C’s role as a custodian of Cabinet process, it must be
The proper role of
careful not to overstep the boundaries of its power. PM&C is at its best when
PM&C coordination
it plays a coordinating role across government, honing arguments,
reconciling differing views, facilitating a whole-of-government approach and encouraging the
contestability of views to support more productive Cabinet deliberations. Their positional
authority gives extra weight to their views. But coordination can become control. The HIP
processes illustrate that the value of having PM&C co-ordinating policy development is
“ … undone when PM&C itself pushes a particular agenda at all costs and without having
any detailed knowledge of the program or project.”110 When such views are imposed on
other departments they can unduly influence the advice provided to ministers and
compromise individual ministerial accountability. When PM&C conveys a direction, whether
of its own initiative or at the request of the Prime Minister or their office, a legitimate
response by departments—indeed the responsible and prudent course of action—is to
discuss with their own ministers the risks of the proposed approach and the merits of
alternative options.

(ii) Ministerial offices

My views on advisers have been made clear in the past.111 I think they
Ministerial advisers
perform a valuable role in contemporary governance. They ensure that

play an essential role
ministers (and shadow ministers) can be advised by people who share their
in supporting
ministers political ideology. Their presence makes it easier for public servants to focus
on apolitical advice. The advisers help their ministers to question and
challenge the views of their departments. Monopoly is never a good thing, and in the
provision of policy advice it can be particularly dangerous. On occasion public servants and
ministerial advisers may vie for the ear of the minister. More often they will work together,
respecting each other’s particular roles.

My perspective is not universally shared. Staffers are increasingly portrayed as the villains of
public administration. Critics suggest that they have grown too big for their boots.
Jennifer Westacott, the Chief Executive of the Business Council of Australia (BCA), has
called for the number or influence of ministerial advisers to be reduced. She characterises
them as “political gatekeepers, with little experience and no accountability.”112 The BRW
journalist, Leo D’Angelo Fisher, has gone further, claiming that “ministerial staffers treating
public servants like second-class citizens is a feature of modern government.”113 I am not of
this view. Staffers play a valuable role in helping overburdened ministers cope with the
increasing complexity of modern government. I concur with Lynne Ashpole, a former chief of
staff, that advisers “work on behalf of ministers to mediate between policy committees,
stakeholders, and interest groups like the BCA, in a way that apolitical public servants
cannot”.114 During my time in the APS I generally found that advisers made a positive

30
contribution to policy development. Of course, arguments can become heated, but the
relationship is best perceived as one of critical collaboration, not a perpetual state of war.

Ministerial advisers play an essential role in supporting ministers to fulfil their duties. It is a
diverse job: they apply political judgement to their advice on policy issues and media
relations as well as providing personal and administrative support for their ministers. They
broker relationships between ministers and their political parties, public service departments,
broader interest groups, and constituents. The volume and complexity of ministers’
workloads make ‘staffers’ an indispensable part of ministers’ support structure. Ministers are
assured that they can rely on people who share their political philosophy and with whom they
have built a relationship of deep trust.

The roles of public servants

The distinct roles of Don Russell
and advisers are distinct. The

public servants and
two groups operate under “Departments should be able to provide
advisers can help
support better different legislative and policy advice on any subject within the
minister’s responsibilities that is better
decision-making frameworks. The Whitlam
structured and better considered than
Government introduced anything that can be produced in the
partisan ministerial advisers when it came to minister’s office; the department has
resources; the adviser tends to be on his
power in 1972, primarily to ensure that or her own.” (March 2014)115
ministers would receive support from a cadre of
Don Russell was the Secretary of the
individuals who shared their political
Department of Industry from 2011 to
convictions. The role of ministerial advisers 2013. He is now the Chief Executive
was formalised by the Hawke Government with of South Australia’s Department of
State Development
the passage of the Members of Parliament
(Staff) Act 1984 (the MoPS Act). While the role
of the APS is detailed in legislation, those of advisers are largely governed by convention.
This is true not only in Australia but in other Westminster-based systems of government.

In contrast to the roles of apolitical public servants, many advisers are explicitly political.
While public servants provide non-partisan advice, advisers offer a partisan perspective. For
the most part, these distinctions are complementary and ultimately beneficial to ministers.
They add to the diversity of skills, experience, perspectives and ideas available to support
decision-making. The presence of advisers allows public servants to be robustly independent
in their advice, knowing that those in the minister’s office are there to focus on the political
challenges it may present. It brings competing ideas to the minister who, on occasion, can
witness the clash of viewpoints played out before them. That’s a good thing. As a Secretary,
I always felt that if I could not win an argument on the basis of my intellect or experience,
and marshalling the full resources of my department, then I was either ineffective or wrong.
Often, I discovered, the informed perspective of an adviser was valuable.

31
The area in which the roles of advisers and public servants most converge is

Both public servants in providing policy advice to ministers. Both groups have a part to play here,
and advisers have a
and there can be competition between advisers and public servants as they
legitimate role in
providing policy
each seek to influence ministers. Both sides will be seeking to persuade one
advice to ministers another to their own point of view. Senior public servants may lament the
increasing influence exerted by inexperienced ‘wet behind the ears’ political
advisers, or ‘the boy scouts in the minister’s office’. Advisers may rail against the caution of
‘stodgy bureaucrats’ or the irritating self-importance of ‘mandarins’. But advisers and public
servants who respect each other’s roles can together improve rigorous, informed and
considered decision-making.

Of course, there can be tensions when advisers over-reach. Advisers should never be mere
post boxes for conveying a department’s views: they play a legitimate role as gatekeepers to
ministers. The ever-present danger is that they may seek to use their position to block APS
advice with which they disagree, or leave public servants unclear whether or not the minister
has seen departmental advice. In the case of the HIP, it seems clear that on at least one
occasion information provided by the lead department did not find its way to the minister.116
Advisers should not prevent advice being seen by ministers without formal notification to the
department and the creation of a record of this decision. When the source of advice
becomes blurred—for example, if advisers seek to override advice provided by the APS
without the authority of their minister, or if the APS too readily acquiesces to the position of
the adviser—lines of accountability can be eroded and decision-making is compromised.117
At all times a minister needs to be clear on what advice has been provided by their
department and what alternative views may be held by their advisers. It is then for the
minister to decide which direction to take.

Advisers do wield significant power, but it comes from the minister. They are accountable to
Parliament through their minister. Only with the authority of their minister do advisers have
the right to instigate policy, to comment upon it and, on occasion, to veto it. They do not have
the power to direct public servants to change their advice where it differs from their own view
or that of the minister, nor to prevent departmental advice from reaching their minister in a
timely manner. Notwithstanding FOI concerns, most ministers want to know the views of
their department, even if they later chose to amend or reject them. When departmental
advice does not reach the minister, it can only mean two things: poor management within the
minister’s office or a misuse of positional power.118 In either case, particularly when the issue
at stake is a major new program or large-scale project, decisions will be compromised.

32
The Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff sets out well the principles
There should be of personal integrity, professionalism and behaviour expected of ministerial

stronger guidance on staff.120 It clearly recognises appropriate behaviours but it is not as
the relationship
unequivocal on these matters as it should be. The Standards says that
between ministerial
advisers and senior advisers must “acknowledge” they are not authorised to direct public
public servants servants and “recognise” that
executive decisions are the John Fraser
preserve of ministers and public servants.
“[Advisers] add value, there’s no doubt
Comparable policies and guidance in other about it… it is a bit of a battle for
jurisdictions instead instruct advisers on what departments at times, not just Treasury,
to make sure there is cohesion on policy
they “must not” and “may not” do.121 Such advice, and… order in how things go
explicit directions are likely to be more effective through.” (2015)119
as a guide to practice. John Fraser is Secretary to the
Treasury
There are also doubts about the level of
awareness that advisers or public servants have of the Standards. The Prime Minister’s
endorsement of changes to make the Standards more definitive, which would be a
necessary part of any revisions, would raise their profile with both audiences. It would
establish a strong ‘authorising environment’ by which to underpin cultural mores in the public
sector.

There are other means that could be employed towards the same ends. The Standards
could be strengthened by a formal system of enforcement and sanctions. It could also be
legislated. That is the view of Terry Moran, my successor as Secretary of PM&C. He came to
the conclusion that legislation is necessary because ministerial advisers are “becoming a
black hole of accountability within our parliamentary democracy”.122 I do not propose
legislation. It is true that not all actions of an adviser are an expression of the ‘persona’ of a
minister, and that public servants need to be absolutely assured that the ministers have seen
and expressed their own judgement on departmental advice. My view, however, is that the
principle of ministerial accountability should provide an adequate check on the behaviour of
ministerial staff and is in keeping with the nature of their employment contract—one of direct
responsibility to their minister, who holds ultimate accountability for the conduct of their
staff.123 Given that advisers do not exercise executive decision-making powers, it would be
inappropriate for them to be called before Parliamentary committees.

Despite the demands of their positions, ministerial advisers receive little role-specific training
or institutional support. There is no formal induction process for new advisers. Most of their
learning is on-the-job. They can be thrown into deep and often treacherous waters to sink or
swim, with few people around able to throw them a lifeline should they need it. The inherent
volatility of advisers’ roles, together with the vagaries of ministerial reshuffles and electoral
cycles, means that the turnover of ministerial staff can be high. Of course there are trade-offs
for these hardships. Working at the very heart of government can be a hugely rewarding,

33
stimulating and exciting opportunity. Yet few public servants really appreciate how difficult
and tenuous the adviser’s position can be.

Conversely, advisers may not fully appreciate the role of the APS and the constraints within
which public servants operate. Advisers often do not comprehend that much of the
bureaucratic ‘process’ surrounding the manner in which departments work is intended to
deliver a better outcome. Secretaries have to run large ‘businesses,’ and much of it may be
outsourced. Increasingly, they are required to oversight organisations outside government
that have been contracted to deliver major programs. Unlike advisers, Secretaries know that
they face the prospect of having to account for their administrative actions before
Parliamentary committees and to have their conduct scrutinised by the Ombudsman,
Auditor-General and Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Not surprisingly, public servants feel
much more keenly than advisers the responsibilities of management and the level of scrutiny
under which they operate.

Investing in the relationship between advisers and public servants, and
There should be building mutual understanding, will benefit officials, advisers and ministers
more structured
alike. Providing regular opportunities for ministerial advisers to participate
opportunities to build
in joint activities with those senior APS staff with whom they work would
relationships between
advisers and senior result in improved knowledge and shared understanding of each other’s
public servants distinctive roles and would also create stronger working relationships.
These joint forums should involve experienced advisers and public
servants as well as newcomers. The agenda should cover the principles, policies and
legislation on which the roles and relationship are based, and the perspectives and
experiences of both groups in advising ministers. This could be achieved in a number of
ways. For example, the Australian Public Service Commissioner, in consultation with senior
political advisers, could convene a regular half-day workshop for advisers and public
servants, with course materials developed and presented jointly by former parliamentarians,
advisers and senior public servants. Alternatively, an external organisation such as the
Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) could be engaged to present
seminars on practical policy development, available both to Commonwealth and state
jurisdictions, with senior public servants and advisers encouraged to attend together.

There are few insights available on the relationship between advisers and public servants
beyond the anecdotal. APS employees were last surveyed on their interactions with advisers
in 2011, when over one-third of public servants who had direct contact with advisers reported
that they had experienced difficulties balancing the need for responsiveness and
impartiality.124 In contrast, the views and experiences of advisers on their interactions with
the APS have never been formally sought. Joint workshops, well facilitated, would allow
perceptions to be tested and concerns addressed.

Another initiative that can deliver strong benefits for ministers, their staff
Movement of staff and departments is the rotation of public servants through ministers’
between departments

and offices is beneficial

34
offices as advisers. These well-established arrangements should be actively encouraged.
Relatively little investment is required. The process helps to demystify the practical

differences between respective roles. Ministerial offices benefit from the subject matter

expertise and practical knowledge of experienced public servants, while APS employees

gain valuable insights and experiences into the inner workings of government. The challenge

is to ensure that an offer to work in a minister’s office is viewed as a valuable opportunity

with personal and broader public benefits, rather than being regarded as a poisoned chalice.
People coming back to the APS (or joining for the first time from ministerial offices) must not

be regarded as politically tainted. People join ministerial offices with a variety of

motivations—often because they want to extend their career experience but also from a wish

to make a fuller contribution to public life. Their learning can be harnessed on both sides of

the role divide. It should be made as easy as possible for public servants to be reintegrated

into their departments once they have done a stint as a ministerial adviser. Their return

should be welcomed.

Senior public servants and ministerial advisers each have a duty to inform, and an

opportunity to influence, government decision-making. At the end of the day, though, it is up

to ministers to make decisions, and they are best able to do so when their advisers and

officials work well together. By standing in each other’s shoes, by openly recognising the

nature of their different roles, mutual respect can be built. Good policy will be the reward.

Conclusions | supporting decision making

B.5 To acknowledge ministerial ownership of Cabinet proposals, submissions
should open with a personal Ministerial Statement outlining the policy’s
purpose, expected outcomes and anticipated implementation risks.

B.6 In preparing Cabinet documents, Secretaries should ensure that the
arguments presented reflect the viewpoint of their ministers. Assisted by
government coordination processes, they also need to make certain that all
relevant considerations for government are addressed in a clear and succinct
fashion.

B.7 The Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff should be tightened to
provide explicit and unambiguous statements that advisers must not direct
public servants without ministerial authorisation nor seek to make executive
decisions.

B.8 Joint forums for ministerial advisers and APS senior executives should be
conducted regularly to raise the efficacy of their working relationship and build
mutual respect and understanding of the importance of their respective roles.

35
C | Creating a Positive Risk Culture

PROBLEMS EXPOSED

The potential for failure goes with the territory of public administration. Risk cannot be

avoided. Not all potential dangers can be foreseen. The important thing is to identify as many

risks as possible and to develop a strategy by which they can be handled. In discussion with

ministers and advisers, a flexible plan needs to be prepared to manage program risks, which

can be revised as execution challenges become more apparent.

Government needs to weigh carefully the risks of a major project against its expected

benefits. In the case of the HIP this did not take place in a considered manner. There was no

clear understanding or agreement between the Government and the APS on risk appetite.
While the Government exhibited a heightened willingness to countenance risk in response to

the Global Financial Crisis,125 the reservations of officials, particularly about the proposed

speed of implementation, were not effectively conveyed. Nor were public servants upfront

with ministers about the ramifications of changes to program design which materially

increased risks.126

Hanger recognised that the “APS ought to brief ministers on the risks inherent in a

recommended approach”.127 This did not occur. In fact, the identification and management of

risks in the HIP “was seriously deficient”.128 It is imperative that risk assessments are

hard-nosed and do not provide an overly optimistic view of what may eventuate. With the

HIP this was not the case. A crucial step in risk management, understanding the operating

environment, was skipped entirely in favour of identifying internal or procedural risk.129

Responsible officials did not demonstrate capability in assessing, documenting and

analysing risks within the broader context of the industry. Nor did they employ information

from similar program roll-outs in order to assess emerging problems as they manifested.
Effective risk management was hampered by poor understanding of industry dynamics, of

regulatory frameworks, and of how government intervention would impact the existing

industry and behaviour of individuals within it. Time pressures exacerbated the failures.130

A lack of responsibility and accountability for managing the risks also proved to be a major

problem. Responsibility for risk was abrogated. Hanger found a governance structure in

which no-one seemed to accept personal accountability for ensuring that risks were

appropriately managed.131 Teamwork became a convenient excuse to cloak individual

responsibility. Internal management structures prevented effective review and oversight of

risk management once things started to go wrong.132 When a significant number of parties

are involved in program delivery, it is critical to understand how risks are allocated between

them. This did not happen. Hanger found that the APS failed to consider what would happen

if its delivery partners (whether the States and Territories or the insulation installers

themselves) did not understand or accept responsibility for risk management.133

36
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
At one level, risk management can be perceived as just a term for ‘what could go wrong’.
That is only one aspect. Indeed, too often in the APS, ‘managing risk’ is reduced to
‘managing issues’ – seeking to address problems that have already emerged. Moving from a
culture of issues management to one of risk management is difficult: it involves thinking
systematically rather than reactively and identifying opportunities and not just threats.

The APS still places the weight of program and risk management on
Risk management is
still focussed on templates, tools and processes, rather than instilling a culture of judgement,
process, not practice initiative and capability. Risks often manifest because the desire to ‘do
something’ results in ‘solutioneering’: governments announce a solution
before properly scoping the problem, and then try to retrofit the appropriate risk, governance
and oversight requirements. Whether because of policy arrogance or ‘cookie-cutter’
compliance, this is a lost opportunity.

Public servants have a reputation for risk-aversion when it comes to implementation design
and for taking the path of least innovation. Often this is deserved, and it reflects in part at
least the higher public expectations and levels of scrutiny that apply to government
compared with the private sector. Yet when it comes to considering risk during the policy
design phase the public service has too often been impetuous, designing policies without
reference to those that best understand the risks.

Comcover conducts an annual benchmarking exercise of agencies’ risk management
maturity, where maturity ranges from ‘fundamental’ through ‘developed’, ‘systematic’,
‘integrated’ and ‘advanced’ to ‘optimal’ (the highest level of maturity). Benchmarking also
enables participating agencies to identify areas for improvement and compare themselves to
peers. While some significant progress has been made in recent years, most agencies’ risk
maturity remains well below the ‘optimal’ status.134 It is true that agencies are encouraged to
strive for risk maturity ratings that are fit for purpose for their organisation, and that not all
agencies will need to achieve the optimal rating. Nevertheless, the link between risk practice,
the day-to-day administration of agencies and their strategic objectives remains weak.135

The PGPA Act represents a significant and positive step towards developing better risk
practice and culture. The risk management policy established under the PGPA Act is
designed to assist Accountable Authorities (departmental Secretaries, agency heads and
governing boards) to engage positively with risk, in order to embed risk practice into
business processes.136 If fully implemented, the notion of ‘earned autonomy’ enshrined in the
Act has the potential to be a game changer, creating a strong incentive for agency heads to
embrace the necessary cultural and organisational changes to achieve this status.137
However, if the PGPA Act is to achieve its objectives, APS risk culture needs to evolve.
Legislation will not change culture: people and their actions do. As recently noted by the
Chair of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, good risk practice is about behaviour,
not structure.138

37
Setting a risk appetite starts with a structured conversation between ministers

Setting risk appetite
and Secretaries. It is essential that ministers clearly articulate their risk

starts with ministers
appetite to departments, having regard not just to a particular project, but to
the gamut of risks embodied in the range of programs already being delivered. Once agreed,
Secretaries need to devolve this information throughout their agency to align departments’
functions with their ministers’ risk appetites. Everyone should understand their responsibility.
More junior staff should have a clear line of sight to the minister’s risk appetite, and the
Secretary should have a strong understanding of risks taken at the front line.139 Information
needs to flow freely in both directions.

Risk appetite will vary between programs and sectors. Secretaries and ministers should
meet regularly to consider the risk profile of new policy and program initiatives, assess
progress to date and identify emerging risks to implementation.

Risk management is a skill that can be learned. A recent survey of Senior Executive Service
participants in the APSC’s risk management program found that, prior to attending, around
half did not feel confident in talking to ministers and senior leaders about risk. Encouragingly,
more than 90 per cent of attendees reported that training gave them the confidence, skills
and understanding they felt they needed to pursue these conversations.140

Cabinet scrutiny of risk is a fundamental part of the decision-making process.
Cabinet decisions
must be made with Since 2009 a number of steps have been taken to improve the consideration
eyes wide open to of risk information in the Cabinet process. Currently, all new policy proposals
risk
require completion of a Risk Potential Assessment Tool (RPAT), indicating
strategic risk, implementation complexity, legal risk and an overall risk
assessment. Compliance is checked by the Department of Finance before the proposal
proceeds to Cabinet, but the information from
Ian McPhee AO
the RPAT is not included in the submission
itself. “As for many organisations, in the public
sector there is still more to be done to
embed risk management in organisational
For ministers to make informed decisions, behaviour in a way that means all
they need to be provided with clear employees contribute positively to
information about the risks they are stronger outcomes through more effective
engagement… risk management and
accepting and the resources available to business planning need to be integrated so
manage these risks. This must be contextual. that the organisation’s models and
approach are readily understood, at least
Ministers need to understand the specific in a general way, by all employees.”
risks associated with individual projects and (October 2014) 141
the cumulative impact of accepting further
Ian McPhee was Australia’s Auditor-
risk (financial, legislative, procurement and General between 2005 and 2015
implementation) relative to the government’s
overarching risk appetite. Departments now complete a preliminary risk assessment when
developing a new policy proposal. Some also formulate a risk plan. This is excellent. There
would be value in making these plans mandatory for major projects and programs, and

38
having them scrutinised by the Department of Finance and PM&C and endorsed by the
responsible minister(s) before the proposal proceeds to Cabinet. This would provide all
members of Cabinet with a degree of comfort that risks had been appropriately assessed,
while still ensuring that responsibility for accepting, managing and treating risks sits squarely
with the responsible minister and department. The risk plan should be made available to any
minister who wants to see it prior to the Cabinet meeting. Critical information about risk that
could alter the course of a decision should sit front and centre in the documents that are
prepared for Cabinet.

Considering risk on a case-by-case basis at the time of decision does not
Informed decision
provide adequate insight into the wider whole-of-government risk landscape
making requires
assessment of the within which the proposal sits. Just as Cabinet, or its Expenditure Review

specific risks being
accepted and the
Committee, considers the aggregated out-year cost of individual proposals,
broader context. so it should also be aware of the government’s cumulative forward risk
profile. Without this, it is difficult for Cabinet to appreciate the full suite of
risks to which it has committed across government and make an informed decision about
how a particular program may fit with, or be adapted to, the prevailing risk appetite.

In other sectors, decision-makers now play an important role in setting risk appetite and
instigating a positive risk culture. Governance boards in companies and not-for-profit
enterprises receive robust and regular risk briefings, which enable them to align each
decision or investment with an overarching organisational strategy. Indeed, such informed
decision-making is a core part of the fiduciary duty of directors.142 Decisions are based on
historical experience, aggregation of risk and treatment options throughout the business and
the balance of risk versus reward. Cabinet needs to be supported by APS executives to
oversight risk in a similar manner. That discipline is as important to public good as it is to
profit or social mission.

A periodic risk statement to Cabinet analysing operational, financial, strategic, legislative and
procurement risks across government would strengthen its decision-making functions. This
should not take the form of a portfolio-by-portfolio co-ordination exercise of detailing every
single risk currently present in Commonwealth operations. That would be unnecessary red
tape. Rather, it should be a smart, targeted and strategic exercise to identify and assess the
status of the most significant risks facing government. The information could be presented in
a concise, dashboard-style manner so as to clearly convey the manifestations of risk across
government. This periodic Risk Assessment could be developed by the CROs oversighted
by the Department of Finance. CROs are discussed below.

39
Reliance on process at the expense of informed professional judgement
Individuals need
support to adopt a destroys individual autonomy, diffuses responsibility and compromises the

positive risk culture
future success of new policies or programs from the start. With performance
indicators for risk maturity appearing to
Glenys Beauchamp PSM
have plateaued across the APS,144 a
catalyst is needed to drive cultural change “I want people who take risks. I think we
and improve risk engagement and rigour. need to promote and encourage resilience,
although we get criticised when we try to
Despite the gains made through the PGPA do this.” (March 2015) 143
Act, there is still significant work to be done
Glenys Beauchamp is the Secretary of
to embed a positive risk culture in many
the Department of Industry and Science
government agencies. Legislation alone
does not change culture—it is up to the
people and the support and leadership they receive.

A positive risk culture allocates resources to monitoring of risk and puts in place efficient
systems to escalate information to the person best placed to judge a plan of action. Too
often in the APS, more effort is put into managing things that have already gone wrong. Risk
management, by contrast, involves identifying and monitoring the potential for things to go
wrong, and putting in place lines of defence to mitigate against these. The old adage that
‘prevention is better than cure’ remains appropriate. While risks cannot be prevented, it is
easier and less expensive to manage them when they are considered early in the design
phase. However good the planning, implementation risk needs to be considered at every
stage of policy development. This is particularly so when delivery is outsourced to third-party
organisations. Agency risks need to be addressed in the commissioning process—including
the danger that a heavily prescriptive risk-averse process will undermine effective delivery of
intended government outcomes.

There is no doubt that this approach is challenging. It requires foresight, judgement and
commitment from individuals at all levels to be effective. In organisations that have achieved
positive risk cultures, individuals are expected to identify and respond to risks in their own
sphere of influence, rather than assuming that responsibility sits with senior managers or risk
committees. They know who to approach in their agency if they need help, they receive
support to identify and treat risk as early as possible, and they know that when they identify
problems their concerns will be appropriately addressed by management. Knowledge of risk
needs is widely shared.

There is much to learn from this approach. The APS too often places exclusive responsibility
for risk management too high up the bureaucracy, away from the people who may be best
placed to identify and act on it. This unwittingly creates two new problems: it overcrowds
senior leaders’ agendas; and it removes management of implementation risk from those who
may be most informed about how to manage it.

40
Understandably, the APS focuses risk management on big risks to the
Smaller risks can
accrete to form government, but as a consequence it may underplay the smaller risks which,
significant risks to
over time, can lead to significant program failures such as fraud, wastage,
implementation
delay or poor service. The HIP has taught us that the accretion of multiple
minor risks can lead to catastrophe. Devolving more responsibility for risk management to
junior levels and paying more attention to ‘near-miss’ events, especially on the front line, will
help build a positive risk culture and minimise the likelihood of large-scale failures in the
future. Tasked with identifying and investigating the causes of risks, operational staff should
be empowered to contribute their own perspective to the design of new programs and
projects. This increases the likelihood that risk can be ‘engineered out’ at the design stage.

The management of uncertainty should sit at the core of public policy design.
Risk must be built
into policy design Major programs, if they are to be fit for purpose, need to be able to achieve
intended outcomes even in adverse circumstances, rather than only
delivering effectively in benign conditions.145 That will be more likely if management
experience gained from policy implementation is incorporated into design. Agencies with
positive risk cultures conduct risk workshops at the beginning of policy design and involve
their risk experts at every step of the journey. Risk-based policy design creates a clear
relationship between individuals implementing a major new program, the leadership of their
organisation, and a minister’s risk appetite. Importantly, it can reduce the overall impact and
number of material risks associated with the program, allowing active risk management to be
more focused and easier to execute. Crucial to this approach is close collaboration between
ministers, the public service, service delivery agents (public, private or community
organisations) and industry stakeholders. This enables risk to become part of day-to-day
business, rather than treated as a ‘one off’ activity.

Dedicated leadership is needed to grow and nurture a culture of positive risk
Chief Risk Officers
management. The appointment of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) can put in

can be change agents
place a change agent to drive organisational innovation. CROs can play a
major role in assisting organisations to build more positive, engaged and
active behaviours around risk. They can play the role of a ‘critical friend’—not simply saying
“no” to proposals, or “have you thought of all the things that could go possibly wrong”, but
asking “on what basis can we say yes?” and “what needs to go right for this to succeed?”.
Their strategic importance to an organisation should be reflected in their seniority and by
their position as a member of the senior executive team. In the public sector they need to
have detailed knowledge of the government’s objectives, their operating environment,
organisational capability and available resources. It is best if they are directly accountable to
the agency head, and have the authority to effectively challenge activities and decisions that
may materially affect the department’s risk profile.146 Ideally CROs should look beyond
individual risks to appreciate broader trends.147 No government department should initiate a
major new program or large project without the active participation of a CRO.

41
The position demands full authority from the top to go everywhere and explore everything,
ensuring that risk considerations influence work practices, funding decisions, program design
and delivery and organisational strategies. The CRO should be tasked with developing a
control framework for effective implementation of major projects. More generally, they need
to instigate discussions across the agency on what risks can be accepted and managed, and
what level of management engagement will be required. Of course, there is a danger that the
CRO will be perceived as the ‘fall guy’ for organisational failure.148 Even worse, the creation
of such a position might allow others to abrogate risk management without exercising their
own judgement or shouldering their own responsibilities. This must not be the role of a CRO.

The PGPA Act establishes duties for departmental Secretaries and agency heads to
establish and maintain appropriate systems of risk oversight and management.149 But
Secretaries and agency heads have limited time. Appointing suitably experienced and
empowered members of the Senior Executive Service as public sector CROs to support
them will provide a catalyst to drive best practice risk management and behaviour. In
agencies with large project responsibilities, the position should be a full time job. They
should have the ability to motivate others and work across organisational boundaries. They
should add value, not add new lines of reporting. The CRO must support the agency head to
lead the longer term shift to a positive risk culture, creating an organisation in which
consciousness of potential failure is part of everyday practice for every employee. A CRO’s
success should be judged not by the number of systems and structures that they set up, or
by the number of guidelines they issue, but by the positive behavioural change they bring
about. For this, they will need access to the ‘top table’, so that risk consideration is brought
into the strategic and operational decisions of the agency. They will need to be visible. They
also need to be properly resourced. A rule of thumb in the private sector is that around 1 per
cent of resources should be devoted to risk management activities. Perhaps that is a good
guide to organisational expenditure. However, as will be apparent from any course on Risk
Management 101, the key is to recognise the potential returns on investment achieved by
reducing future costs.

It is appropriate for the CRO to oversee and co-ordinate the development, monitoring and
maintenance of risk management plans by Senior Responsible Officers (SROs). The plans
need to be ‘living documents’ as implementation progresses. Risk planning cannot be a
one-off exercise, with a ‘set and forget’ template mentality. Risks must be continually
reassessed to prevent unintended accumulation of risk beyond the agency’s and
government’s risk tolerance. CROs should also be responsible for working with the
Department of Finance to prepare the proposed bi-annual Risk Assessment for Cabinet.

Supporting the CRO and the agency head, effective risk and audit
Audit and Risk
processes provide an important means of assurance to the agency head

Committees play an
integral role in and minister. Audit committees play a critical role in public accountability,
effective program
reducing the risk of fraud and improving financial processes.150 It is good
governance
practice that they incorporate the experience of independent experts from

42
outside the public sector. Many already do so.151 However, audit committees, by their nature,
tend to look backwards at what has already transpired, rather than forwards at what risks

might be approaching.

In some large agencies—particularly those with complex program initiatives to deliver—
separation of risk and audit functions would better serve the move towards a positive risk

culture.152 Membership of a risk committee should be sufficiently broad to fully consider the

strategic risk posed by the delivery of services to the public, rather than focus only on

internal corporate and financial risks. Specialist external appointments may be needed to

support this function. A separate risk committee would also provide a forum to proactively

address the major risks that may impede the organisation successfully implementing the

goals of government. Just as importantly, a risk committee would also consider the potential

for activities to adversely impact the community and environment in which the organisation

operates. Over time, this will build organisational capability, helping departments and

agencies to achieve earned autonomy status as envisaged in the PGPA Act.153 In addition,
SROs for large or complex projects or programs should regularly provide updates to the risk

committee on the challenges facing their business and how they propose that

implementation obstacles will be overcome.

Risk is one of the most important considerations in the design and delivery of large projects

and programs. Unfortunately, as the former Auditor-General Ian McPhee told the

Department of Parliamentary Services, good risk management is invisible because, “only risk

management failures attract attention and headlines”.154 The challenge is to stop bad things

happening. That requires ministers and Secretaries to show by example that engaging with

risk is what governments do, and that it is the job of every public servant to play their part in

managing it. Risk management lies at the heart of getting the best value from public funds.

43
CONCLUSIONS | Creating a Positive Risk Culture

C.9 To inform and improve policy design, departments and major agencies

should gauge their ministers’ appetites for risk on individual programs and

across their portfolio, and reach agreement on how implementation challenges

will be identified, accepted and managed within agreed resources.

C.10 Departments and major agencies should appoint a Chief Risk Officer, at

a senior executive level, who will be responsible for embedding a strong risk

culture and behaviours across all levels of the organisation.

C.11 All major Cabinet proposals should be supported by a minister’s

endorsed Risk Management Plan, submitted to PM&C and the Department of

Finance, and available for perusal by other Cabinet ministers.

C.12 In order that governments remain aware of the cumulative impact of their

decisions, the Department of Finance should facilitate a bi-annual whole-of-
government Risk Assessment for the Cabinet, analysing the system-wide

impact of operational, financial, strategic, legislative and procurement risks

faced by government.

44
D | Enhancing Program Management

PROBLEMS EXPOSED

The APS’s professional capacity and technical capability in program management was

roundly criticised in the HIP Royal Commission. Hanger found that DEWHA had next to no

project management capability. Nor did it have the capability necessary to deliver a program

of such size and complexity.155 Despite being aware of this deficiency, the department failed

to recruit staff with the necessary skills. Hanger was struck by the numbers of departmental

staff, often in senior positions, who had no program management experience or

qualifications.156

Perhaps we should not be surprised. Of the twenty Peter Shergold AC

Capability Reviews conducted by the APSC and
“If there were a single cultural

released to date, eleven have noted that
predilection in the APS that I would

departments struggle with project management change, it would be the unspoken

skills and program management practices.158 belief of many that contributing to

Successive ANAO reports have confirmed these the development of government

findings, finding evidence of poor program and policy is a higher order function—
more prestigious, more influential,
project management capability, particularly on
more exciting—than delivering

more complex initiatives. Risk management, results” (2005)157

governance controls, financial and stakeholder

management and benefits realisation have been Peter Shergold was the Secretary
of the Department of the Prime

identified as major areas of weakness in a number
Minister and Cabinet from 2002

of programs.159 The HIP was unusual in the scale to 2007

and seriousness of its consequences, but the

problem of not having in place people with the professional skills and experience to do the

job is all too familiar. Hanger was well aware that past failures had engendered statements

from government agencies of good intentions to lift their game. He argued that agencies’
commitments to ‘increase capacity’ were too often a euphemism for promising to redress

glaring skills gaps. The difficulty of building institutional competence and capacity was

generally underestimated.160 Too little changed.

Poor program management capability in DEWHA was compounded by inadequate

governance structures, including a lack of clarity about who was accountable for what aspect

of implementation. No Deputy Secretary was given the exclusive responsibility for

oversighting the program. Hanger found evidence of officials’ inability or unwillingness to

make decisions, exercise judgement, or express contrary opinions within the HIP PCG. This

led to poorly informed decisions: by omission or by committee.161 External experts were

brought in to take responsibility for critical aspects of the program, such as risk assessment,
business planning, project management and evaluation, but some of these consultants

considered that they had a relatively limited role. They may have taken care but they did not

accept responsibility.

45
Whilst there can be a strong temptation to outsource ‘process’-oriented tasks, in practice this
runs the risk of de-skilling staff and failing
to harness essential practical and subject- Terry Moran AC
matter knowledge. External consultants
“Our sector tends to lack many of the
have their place. Used properly they can
‘strategic policy’ capabilities common in the
contribute good value. But they should not private sector, including commercial strategy,
supplant fundamental departmental know- business planning, project management, IT
how nor be a means of abrogating and systems, capability development and
accountability.” (October 2014)162
responsibility. Indeed, the HIP should serve
as a cautionary tale against undue reliance Terry Moran was the Secretary of the
Department of the Prime Minister and
on external consultants for functions that Cabinet from 2008 to 2011
should be core to departments’ program
management accountability.

Almost a decade ago I delivered an address to the Department of Environment and Heritage
(ironically, a precursor to DEWHA), extolling the virtues of project management. The
message was simple: it is better for a government to have no policy at all than to develop a
policy, announce it and then find out that the public service is unable to deliver on it. It is
much more damaging politically to dash the public’s expectations. Watching from the outside
the roll-out of the HIP has reinforced these views. The APS continues to have a problem.163

PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
The terms ‘project management’ and ‘program management’ are often

The characteristics of
used interchangeably in the APS without full understanding of their
good project and

program management meaning. This reflects in part the relatively low priority that they have
received, compared to other professional disciplines in the APS.

Project management is a formally recognised, often certified, discipline. It is based on a
prescribed but adaptable methodology that trains practitioners to deliver clearly defined
results, often in the short term. Program management, on the other hand, is a more
multifaceted and complex discipline. While program management is underpinned by project
management skills, it is a more complex and demanding discipline. Sometimes a ‘program’
—as governments define them—may comprise one large and complex project. More often,
though, the task involves aligning multiple projects in pursuit of longer-term strategic
objectives. The defining feature is a focus on delivering outcomes and achieving results.
Good program managers typically have experience in policy design as well as project
implementation. Sometimes they have been engaged in co-design, where delivery and policy
work together. They understand the importance of good governance and external
engagement to the successful management of programs. Program management is difficult
work. It involves planning, organising and allocating resources to achieve goals. Too often
forgotten, it requires the ability to motivate people across the organisation and outside it to
realise the outcomes and benefits of a government program.

46
In the APS, program managers may be responsible for numerous multi-million dollar projects
that are running concurrently. Effective program management involves more than strict
adherence to a prescriptive methodology. Leadership skills, judgement, common sense,
initiative, effective communication, negotiation skills and a broad perspective on the
surrounding environment are all essential. Program management is a creative and
collaborative process.

Program management in the public sector continues to evolve as a practice due to greater
demand for innovative, citizen-focused delivery models. Program managers are now
required to understand how to apply market-based mechanisms (such as reverse auctions or
consumer-centred funding) and outcome-based contracts.164 They must embrace digital
engagement as a means of encouraging real-time feedback. They need to learn quickly.
Program management in the APS now calls for agility and adaptability.

Project and program management are best viewed as placed on a

Tracing the career of a
program manager continuum of complexity: a practitioner progresses from oversighting
simple to more challenging projects and then goes on to develop a more
strategic approach to integrating a diversity of longer-term management objectives.165 The
level at which a person is able to operate is an indicator of their career progression.
Typically, a new project officer may commence their career with a short online course, and
then work their way through internal training and accredited workshops in order to build their
capability. Through further practical experience and competency-based training, the project
officer may progress to a more senior role, taking on a full range of tasks from project
initiation to completion. Program managers in the top echelon are likely to have years of
experience, tertiary education, a commitment to continued professional development,
demonstrated leadership and a track record of success. Often they possess a specialty in a
particular aspect of program management such as benefits realisation or risk management.
This progression may take over a decade. Managers will probably sport battle-scars.

Public service departments with mature program management capabilities value the
experience and skill of their professionals. They assist them to gain experience and acquire
professional accreditation. They provide financial support for participation in communities of
practice. Some agencies, like the Department of Human Services, have already established
a centralised model of program management to build internal capability, provide an
independent level of assurance for programs with enterprise-level risks and oversee effective
program delivery.166 Such initiatives are to be warmly welcomed. They should be shared.

Having a single point of accountability is a cornerstone of project
The need for clarity management methodologies.167 The evidence from the HIP reveals that

about who has end-to- there was a lack of clear articulation of the role of the senior responsible

end responsibility and
officer and the abrogation (and devolution) of responsibility to ‘the
accountability for
managing team’.168 A named individual needs to be accountable for the end-to-end
implementation delivery of a project or program, within agreed timeframes and conditions,

47
through their Secretary, to the minister.169 While they can, and should, delegate tasks to
suitably experienced and qualified members of their team, including those tasked with
delivery from outside government, accountability for the success of a policy’s implementation
must remain squarely with the SRO.170

Single point accountability is not about greater bureaucratic proceduralism or endless layers
of reporting. Indeed, bureaucratic concerns about probity and agency have, traditionally,
hindered exactly the kind of collaboration and flexibility required between the APS and the
non-government organisations involved in the co-production of public policy outcomes.171
Emerging forms of governance, such as ‘network governance’ offer the promise of more
‘joined up’ services without a concomitant reduction in the accountability of all of the actors
involved.172

Network governance models may at first glance appear to blur these lines of accountability,
with multiple government agencies and third party delivery agents being responsible for
aspects of implementation at different stages of the project or program. The establishment of
program advisory committees, capable of engaging in both formal and informal stakeholder
consultation, is a useful way of formalising channels of advice from diverse perspectives to
the SRO. This does not mean that the SRO can abrogate their responsibility to
‘management-by-committee’. Rather, SROs must ensure that each contributor is clear on
their responsibilities, how performance will be indicated and measured,173 their
decision-making capacity and where they fit within the program governance structure. In the
end, they remain accountable for ensuring that the job gets done well.

Many competent project managers work in the APS. They oversee the
Project and program multitude of projects which abound throughout government. Surprisingly
managers require however, there appears to be a decline in the number of high-quality,
minimum standards of experienced and qualified practitioners at the very time that the complexity
competency and
of government projects is increasing. The emerging capability gaps are
ongoing professional
development being filled by public servants who have fallen (or been pushed) into these
roles. Often they have limited experience and qualifications and are given
insufficient support.

The importance of formal qualifications should not be underestimated. One of the best levers
to mitigate risks associated with program delivery is to have properly trained and certified
practitioners. It seems inconceivable that an agency would put an ‘unqualified’ manager
(someone lacking accredited proficiency) in charge of a multi-million dollar program, but in
fact this occurs regularly. Formal qualifications and demonstrated proficiency are a
prerequisite for many professions that are given authority for financial and administrative
risks inside and outside of the APS: consider, for example, lawyers, engineers, veterinarians,
accountants and auditors. These professions have long-standing educational requirements
which provide a degree of assurance to employers of the competency of the practitioner. The
more senior the practitioner, the higher the level of qualification that is expected. So, too,

48
should it be expected with project and program managers. The need for professional
certification has been recognised by industry associations and training institutions in
Australia and overseas.

This is not to suggest that pursuit of formal recognition of specialist skills should detract from
the value placed on experience. Rather, APS agencies need to identify and encourage
talented project managers and then support them to map out a career path to more senior
program management roles. Agencies need to be discerning consumers of the training
products on the market, and access the best ones that can be tailored to APS processes.
Program managers need to be prepared for an evolving public sector environment.

The APSC would be well-placed to work with industry associations to develop suitable
project management and program management standards relevant to the public sector
context. Setting minimum competencies, subject to the operational requirements of each
agency, would increase the professional standing of project and program management skills
within the public service. It would significantly strengthen APS delivery capability.

In addition to formal professional recognition, the availability of ongoing

Communities of practice
professional development helps practitioners to continually improve their
keep the profession
understanding of their field of expertise. Having opportunities to network
up-to-date
with professional colleagues is a useful way to build collective expertise.
Communities of practice should be supported. They enable members to
develop and share a suite of resources and can draw upon collective capability for virtual
support, hands-on assistance or the identification and recruitment of talent. Some also
provide a mechanism for continuing education through professional certification.

Many program management communities currently exist.174 They draw together practitioners
working across the APS, in state governments and the private and not-for-profit sectors.
They provide a breadth and depth of experience and insight. As a way to facilitate
participation in a professional community, agencies should support staff attending these
forums as a vehicle for career development. In return, those staff should be asked to drive
continuous improvement of program management in their home agencies.

There will always be occasions in the public sector when the right
A role for tiger teams
combination of expertise and subject matter experience does not exist
within an agency to effectively manage a major program. That helps to explain why the
development of policy supporting a program can be the responsibility of one agency, but
implementation is sometimes assigned to another agency with specialist delivery capability.
Not every agency has—or needs to have—equal capability ‘on tap’.

Such situations may call for highly trained and experienced program managers from across
the APS and private sector that can be used as a shared resource, able to be mobilised as
they are needed. Hanger suggested establishing a “central team of project implementation
specialists that could be deployed to an area that needed resources and expert advice”.175

49
There are a few different models for achieving this. One is centralised centres of excellence
where expertise is clustered in the one department. For example, AusIndustry provides a
single point of business between the Commonwealth Government and businesses, including
managing grants programs for other departments.176 It provides for career development,
creating expertise and assurance that risks are being well managed. Centres of excellence
work best for activities that are more transactional, where scale breeds efficiency and the
connection to policy objectives, stakeholders and the broader environment is less critical.177
For complex major projects like the HIP, a more bespoke, agile capability is required. The
notion of establishing a ‘tiger team’ is one that should be adopted. It would assist the APS to
meet future challenges of government program delivery, particularly with new, large and
complex initiatives.

Internationally, tiger teams have already been used to great effect for short-term, high-stakes
program implementation. In particular, the United Kingdom Civil Service has successfully
adopted this model to deploy scalable rapid response program management teams under
the direction of its Major Projects Authority.178 In the APS, mobile program management
units could be utilised in the early stages of major government initiatives. They could also be
brought in at critical junctures to address emerging risks that threaten the potential success
of a program.

With extensive experience working on complex public and private sector programs,
members of tiger teams would be able to share their collective knowledge of lessons
learned. They could identify critical governance, resourcing and planning requirements in
order to improve the likelihood of successful implementation. The teams would bring a
critical outside perspective, as well as strong capability in program management.

Creating a centrally-managed register of qualified and experienced
Creating a register of
practitioners from across the APS would facilitate the establishment of

professional expertise
such teams. The register should include the best program practitioners
within the APS, bolstered by experts from the business sector. The
existing register of Assurance Review teams administered by the Department of Finance
could be built on for this purpose, but should also incorporate a new induction program to
school practitioners in the tiger team methodology.179 The APS needs to get behind such a
whole-of-government approach in a concrete way. Departments need to be willing to release
their best program managers for deployment at short notice, knowing that at some time their
own agency may need similar assistance.

Deployment of a tiger team to a specific project would operate best at the authority and
expense of the relevant agency head, though from time to time it may be necessary to have
the Secretaries of PM&C and the Department of and Finance, together with the Australian
Public Service Commissioner, exert their influence on behalf of cross-agency collaboration.
The technical term is ‘knocking heads together’. Once deployed, the teams should not be
seen as a panacea. They may face significant cultural difficulties gaining traction in the

50
organisation they join. They will probably need to wrestle with agency-specific practices and
cultural norms. Success will depend on having a clear mandate and authority from within the
agency, strong leadership and the ability to deliver high-quality projects and programs under
intense financial, time and political pressures. It is a model which will only work when the
teams have unambiguous support to get the job done.

Here is a truth rarely admitted in the APS. Policy skills are generally

The APS needs to build
viewed as a ‘creative’ or ‘strategic’ while implementation skills are often
the breadth of
experience of the perceived as ‘corporate’ or ‘operational.’ This outdated assumption can
Senior Executive result in a bias towards promoting the former at the expense of the latter.
Service It is premised on a falsehood. Most leadership positions require a variety
of expertise and experience across policy advice, program design, service
delivery, regulatory impact, procurement practice or resource administration.180 This is not an
argument for more generalists. Senior leaders can be specialists in more than one area, and
their professional background often continues to influence their managerial capacity.
Regardless of background, the key to success is that leaders have the capability not only to
provide strategic advice but to oversee its execution. They must understand that these skills
are two sides of the same coin. They should have a depth of understanding in both.

Changing the recruitment criteria for senior executives would be a means of driving change
over the medium term. Building on the 2013 legislative changes that broadened the roles of
the SES,181 there would be benefit in reviewing the Integrated Leadership System that
frames SES recruitment. Aspiring SES candidates should be expected to demonstrate a
breadth of experience during the selection process, and be able to indicate the value that
their technical skills and professional expertise bring to senior management.

Let me return briefly to my 2006 address to Department of Environment and Heritage staff.
“Australian public servants tend to be very good at developing policies,” I argued. “It is
undoubtedly our strength. We need to complement that professional experience with an
ability to implement programs.” Nine years on I find myself delivering the same verdict.

51
CONCLUSIONS | Enhancing program management

D.13 The Australian Public Service Commission should work with industry

associations to develop standards of proficiency for public sector project and

program managers, with agencies committing to support these staff through

career development opportunities, continued education and participation in

professional communities of practice.

D.14 For all projects and programs, there needs to be a clear understanding

about who accepts end-to-end responsibility for managing implementation,
wields delegated authority and where accountability resides.

D.15 The APS should establish a ‘tiger team’ capacity by which service-wide

expertise can be harnessed to assist Senior Responsible Officers in the

management of high risk, large-scale projects.

D.16 Whilst acknowledging that different departments have different workforce

needs, Senior Executive Service selection criteria should place greater

emphasis on program leadership when considering a candidate’s demonstrated

breadth of experience.

52
E | Opening up the APS

PROBLEMS EXPOSED

The reviews conducted by Hanger, Hawke and Scales serve as a cautionary tale about what

happens when the APS fails to seek and heed external perspectives. Hanger found that

governments and public administrators are often not aware of the complex relationships

within a particular industry. Without proper consultation and analysis, they are likely to

misunderstand or underestimate the impact a policy will have on it.182 In the case of the HIP,
a lack of subject matter expertise within departments resulted in advice being predicated on

false assumptions. Indeed the perspective of industry was ignored. When “extensive advice

was given, it was put to one side”.183 In the case of the NBN, even when a decision was

made to undertake a major redesign, the government failed to engage with industry early in

the process.184

In both the HIP and NBN, the perspectives of external parties were buried in process and

bureaucratic structures. Experience often resided with those lacking positional authority or

who were too intimidated (or busy) to raise their concerns with decision makers. When

external experts were hired there was a tendency for them to be absorbed as ‘one of the

team,’ blurring their independence and diminishing the value of their contribution.185

Hanger and Hawke highlighted concerns with the governance and reporting frameworks

established to assist decision-making in the HIP. Hanger found that roles were vague, not

clearly articulated or misunderstood.186 Critical decisions were taken within a collective body

that enabled members to remain passive participants in the decision-making process.
Hanger noted that debate or dissent within this group appeared to have been rare: it was

easier to agree or remain silent than to contest issues.187 Many of those involved now regret

not being more forceful in their views at the time.

PROBLEMS ADDRESSED

Governments—Commonwealth, State and Territory and local—are increasingly

commissioning the delivery of their services by community organisations and businesses.
This brings with it the imperative for openness—to ideas, to people, to places and to different

ways of getting things done. If outside organisations are simply contracted to deliver services

as if they are public agencies, the benefits of outsourcing will be lost. Their views need to

influence decisions on the programs they implement. When people who see the world

differently work together constructively, their deliberations are more insightful. There is less

acquiescence and more interrogation. As the advice of public servants becomes more

contested, it has never been more critical that APS leaders (and the advisory bodies that

support them) welcome the perspectives of delivery partners, community advocates and

citizens—the latter both as ‘customers’ of government services and as contributors to

political debate.

53
The role of a public service ‘outsider’ is to be a circuit breaker. They need to act as a
provocateur, challenging accepted wisdom. To do so they require permission to put forward
alternative views and must be given the authority to challenge the dominant mindset. They,
in turn, will need to understand the emphasis on accountability in a public sector
environment. Managing such a diverse team will not always be easy. For diversity to work, it
requires people to act with humility, respecting and considering different perspectives. It
takes a skilled leader to balance the benefits of diversity with the camaraderie of teamwork.

Being a public servant is not necessarily the career for life it once was.
Mobility in and out of

the APS will broaden The median length of service in the APS is now less than 10 years.188
perspectives and Increasingly, people both within and outside of the APS do not want to be
increase capability tied to a single career, let alone a single organisation. This can deliver
benefits to the APS. Public service leaders are recognising that they need
to promote the movement of people in
and out of the APS.
Ian Watt AO
Employee mobility has the potential to
“We’ll also need to drive productivity by
diversify the knowledge, skills and investing in our people…ensuring that our
experience of employees. Agencies can workplaces are open to ideas and routinely
generate innovations both in policy work
benefit by recruiting staff who are
and in delivery systems—including our
interested in public administration but corporate systems, and building a culture
come to the sector with different skills that is up for transformational change—one
which readily accepts that what may have
and perspectives.190 Cross-sector seemed previously unthinkable is not only
exchange and mobility programs can thinkable but achievable.” (December
2013). 189
provide greater appreciation for each
other’s distinctive operating Ian Watt was the Secretary of the
environments. Outsiders can come to Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet from 2010 to 2014
understand the inner workings of
government and the far-reaching
consequences of public policy. Insiders can gain greater appreciation of the impact of public
sector interventions, not least the burden imposed by regulatory ‘red tape’ and the
consequences of learned dependency. It is for such reasons that greater mobility should be
encouraged by aligning incentives, promoting exchange schemes and launching a flagship
program that can provide an authoritative imprimatur for collaboration between the public,
private and community sectors. Mobility is not a ‘silver bullet’. It can only deliver real and
lasting benefits if it is supported by a culture that genuinely values external perspectives and
acknowledges that a range of views and approaches improves both policy design and
implementation.

54
Over the last few decades, there have been various attempts to

Mobility programs have encourage mobility between business, the community sector and the
struggled
public service. Mobility was identified in the 2010 Ahead of the Game
report as a key mechanism for APS employees to expand their career
191
experience. There are well-established exchange programs operating in a number of
departments, including in the Treasury and the Department of Industry and Science. The
APSC is working with the BCA and ANZSOG to trial secondments to BCA member
companies. Despite these stratagems, many other cross-sectoral mobility initiatives have
failed to prosper. In part, this is because insufficient corporate priority has been given to the
movement of skilled employees as a means of building an organisation’s range of
perspectives and experience. Far more can still be done across the APS. Such moves can
challenge existing ideas and perspectives about government processes and institutions.
Many assumptions are unconscious. Few senior APS leaders have substantial career
experience outside of the public sector.192 But if there is a firm underlying commitment to
improvement, the resulting exchange of ideas will be positive.

Opportunities for mobility need to be provided under formal arrangements.
Barriers to APS If not, the risk is that public servants who would benefit most from gaining
employees gaining greater breadth in their
external experience Glenys Beauchamp PSM
career will believe they have
must be reduced
no other option but to resign “I’d love us in the public service to get
from the APS, even if their original intention away from ‘this is my position number
and this is what it says I do.’ I’d love to
had been to return in a year or two. With get a much more team-based, agile
resignation comes a number of potentially environment where people are chosen
for skills and expertise. I think I’ve got
significant financial implications for the
my challenges cut out for me there.”
individual: lost superannuation contributions, (March 2015) 193
reduced sick leave entitlements, and a
Glenys Beauchamp is the Secretary of
resetting of the ‘clock’ on long service and the Department of Industry and
maternity leave. The APS should not be seen Science
as an allowance-driven workplace. However, it
needs to be recognised that public service employees do wear significant financial risk when
moving in and out of the APS. Often the framework of enterprise bargaining prevents them
from renegotiating conditions on their return in the way that individuals from the private
sector are able to do.

A simple solution is to utilise the existing leave-without-pay provisions more widely. By
allowing employees greater access to leave-without-pay for a couple of years, they can take
up opportunities for an approved purpose outside of the APS, yet remain connected to their
home agency and maintain their conditions. Why is such an approach not more widely used?
The problem is in part because of cultural expectations: someone wishing to have time out of
the APS may not seem to be a committed public servant. This resistance to letting public
servants leave temporarily is no doubt accentuated at present by the fear of losing talent at a
time when the APS is contracting.

55
Secretaries should remove any barriers to mobility that exist in their departments’ policies
and practices. They should manage leave liability within their departments through
centrally-funded corporate overheads for approved work experience purposes where they
are persuaded that outside experience will benefit the APS. Better still, Secretaries should
actively encourage staff to participate in external activities in other sectors that do not raise
conflicts of interest with the role they perform in the APS. This could take the form of
supporting staff to serve on external boards or participate in a research project.194 There are
still few departments that have negotiated secondment arrangements with partner
organisations in the sectors in which they operate. This is a missed opportunity to strengthen
relationships, as well as to build staff capability.

It can be even harder to persuade those employed outside the APS to
New initiatives need to take up an opportunity in Canberra. Senior executives of private sector

draw talent from outside
businesses are generally paid significantly more than their public sector
the APS
counterparts. For a not-for-profit sector organisation it can often be
challenging to lose a key staff member even for a few months. If the
rhetoric of cross-sectoral mobility is to be turned into reality, it may well require active
support and encouragement at the highest level. Staff who want to move between the public,
private and community sectors need to be assured that their ambitions are seen not only as
laudable but are regarded as a means by which to contribute to the creation of public value.
This tone needs to be set from the top. In some respects we need different narratives about
what constitutes a ‘successful’ public sector career. Perhaps we need to talk in terms of a
career in the ‘public purpose’ sector, only part of which might be spent in the formal
structures and institutions of the public sector itself.195

This helps to explain why leadership-endorsed mobility programs are becoming increasingly
significant around the world. The United States launched the Presidential Innovation
Fellowship in 2012. The program is already highly competitive. The nation’s best and
brightest technological innovators (developers, designers, entrepreneurs, product managers
and ‘data geeks’) are paired with public servants for 12 months to tackle some of America’s
biggest challenges. Although Fellows receive a full-time salary, it is prestige and public
purpose that are the major attractions. The President seeks to harness new ideas “to remake
our government”—to save lives, use taxpayer money wisely and build a culture of
administrative entrepreneurship. As one Fellow blogged: “You want a participatory
democracy? Here’s your chance. Becoming a Fellow is a commitment to work as hard as
you can on behalf of the American people”.196 The United Kingdom’s Civil Service has a
similar Whitehall Internship Programme.197 Supported by highly competitive and transparent
processes, the British and American initiatives attract high-quality candidates to spend time
in public administration. Australia could benefit from such initiatives, at an APS-wide level.

A prestigious Public Service Fellowship should be established. Ideally the Fellowship should
be directly associated with the status of the Prime Minister. Ten talented senior executives
from the business, community or academic sectors would be selected each year by a Public

56
Service Advisory Committee (discussed below). They would work on a range of significant
initiatives for the Australian Government. The Fellows would be embedded as members of
the team, work with senior public servants and experience public administration first-hand. It
is likely that larger Australian companies would recognise the value of the program and
would continue to be responsible for a Fellow’s salary and other entitlements, although a
bursary could be provided by the Government to offset temporary relocation costs. Where
salary requirements would be a barrier to participation, for example in the community or
small-to-medium enterprise sectors, further financial support could be made available
subject to a supporting business case. It can be expected that in the future a business or
community leader who receives the ‘Prime Minister’s Fellowship’ will look on the
achievement with pride—and, by participating, will help open up the APS to new and
challenging ideas.

A scholarship should also be established for ten exceptional leaders from the APS to enable
them to undertake an experience-based assignment in a non-government sector for up to
12 months. Similar to the Churchill Fellowship, candidates would be expected to seek out
their own opportunity in a business, community or research organisation and make the case
for why it would benefit the public sector. 198 Candidates should be selected by a cross-sector
advisory panel. Agencies would generally be expected to provide the continued salary and
entitlements for successful candidates, although additional financial support might be
provided to cover any necessary travel and temporary relocation costs. Experience in the
private sector has highlighted that the benefits of such transfers are more likely to be
harnessed when they are accompanied by efforts to ensure individuals maintain links to their
‘home’ organisation whilst away, and then are adequately re-oriented and supported upon
their return, including with career planning.199

The Australian Government has a value proposition that is compelling—
External expertise
the ability to contribute to society and to serve in the national interest. Of

should be brought in for
specific projects course, Australians generate public value through many avenues:
volunteering their time to not-for-profit activities, joining the Army Reserve
or undertaking pro-bono work for causes with which they identify. Social mission often has
great public benefit.

How might the APS harness and encourage this enthusiasm for contributing to the public
good? There needs to be a focus on creating alternative pathways where individuals in the
private and community sectors can quickly and easily contribute to the work of the public
service. Whether launching an innovative online service, creating new public markets or
initiating large-scale transformational change, the public service needs to attract outsides
with the knowledge, experience and enthusiasm to contribute to project teams.

57
Outsiders can supplement the talent and expertise within the APS. But
Taking a Hollywood
they should not necessarily be expected to commit themselves to long

approach to the APS
engagements. Rather in the manner that Hollywood studios undertake film
production, the APS could offer people with professional skills the chance
to come together briefly as a team, perhaps in a virtual environment, to work on a project
uniquely suited to their collective talents and which appeals to their creative impulse. This is
not pie-in-the-sky. It may well be that our whole economy is in the midst of a grand shift
towards the Hollywood model. Traditional careers are disappearing. More of us will see our
work lives structured around short-term, project-based teams rather than long-term,
open-ended jobs.200 The administrative and structural facilities required already exist. The
main change needed is cultural.

The nature of public service lends itself to such an adaptable approach. Imagine
Westminster shaped by Hollywood. It’s easy if
Michael Thawley AO
you try. A project is identified by government
(home insulation, perhaps); a group of experts “There are not enough people in
government who understand how
is assembled; they work together for just as
business works, what is required for
long as it is needed to complete its design or businesses to become successful, and
oversight its initial implementation; and then how rules and regulations get in the way
and can steer businesses into ways that
the group disbands. Pulling together these prevent productivity.” (April 2015) 201
‘virtuoso teams’ could prove the difference
between real success and mediocre Michael Thawley is the Secretary of
the Department of the Prime Minister
outcomes.202 and Cabinet

Some individuals may even wish to volunteer
their time, attracted by a sense of public purpose. For those who dismiss such notions as
high-minded nonsense, take a look at the National Library’s Trove site.203 There you will find
thousands of individuals who, for no more than online recognition, make millions of text
corrections to the Library’s collection of digitised newspapers. They see it as a public
service. There are many government social, cultural and environmental programs that could
harness equally successfully the enthusiasm of citizens.

The fact is that there are many ways that innovation can be brought into the APS. If an
entrepreneur develops a leading edge online tool, government should harness that expertise
within the public sector when it wants to build its next online help centre. If a State
government has significant success in rolling out a complex new program, star performers
from that project could be recruited temporarily to contribute to a similar Commonwealth
initiative. If individuals have created an exciting online app, they could be persuaded to direct
their technological prowess to a similar government project. Occasionally people will be keen
to participate on an exciting project for little more than a sense of public purpose. More often
people will want to be paid market price for the talent and skills they bring. The key is to be
flexible in attracting outside talent into the APS for a short period to work on the design or
management of a specific project—and to use the sense of national significance as the lure.

58
This is not to imply that purely because someone is from outside the public sector they are
better. In fact, ‘outsiders’ may flounder when put in the complex environment of public
accountability, competing objectives and ambiguous authority. Conversely, many public
servants could blossom as ‘intrapreneurs’ if given a chance to work with greater autonomy
on the design or execution of new policies. When a person’s expertise and experience is
valued and they are placed in a position where they are able to influence, they can contribute
to the creation of major public projects or programs, whether or not they are career public
servants.

Those who have senior decision-making responsibility for the design and

APS Program Advisory delivery of public programs have very demanding roles. They are typically

Committees should be
chosen on the basis of their knowledge of the program area and their
established
management skills. They cannot, however, be expected to be an expert
on everything. SROs will often need to draw upon a broad set of
competencies, skills and experience if they are to address successfully the complex issues
posed by large programs. Diversity of knowledge can contribute to more effective program
management, a better understanding of the risk environment and achieving a stronger
alignment of policy to outcomes.

One way to achieve that goal is to establish ‘advisory boards’, as proposed by Hanger.205
Such boards could provide an environment
that would allow preconceptions and John Lloyd PSM
assumptions to be challenged and assist the
“We’ve got to be looking not just at what
SRO to make better decisions. It would also public sectors are doing, but what we can
be beneficial if the Department’s CRO drag out of the private sector… In certain
areas I think the private sector’s leading
participated as a member of the advisory
companies are at the leading edge of
board when a major departmental initiative implementing change, of how they’re
was planned. This is not a call for a implementing IT, of their personnel
practices, and there’s so much we can
proliferation of new boards or committees: learn from that.” (March 2015) 204
rather, it is recommended that a diversity of
perspectives should be incorporated into the John Lloyd is the Australian Public
Service Commissioner
program governance structures that already
exist within the APS. The harnessing of private or community sector experience needs to
become common practice, particularly at the point where policy is translated into
implementation.

If we look to the example of the HIP, it is clear that there would have been enormous value in
having someone at the table with practical knowledge of the hazards of working in the
insulation industry—a person able to draw attention to issues not fully understood by policy
makers. The HIP PCG needed people who had a depth of experience in the industry. In their
absence, the PCG decided to relax safety training requirements.206

59
It is challenging to put together a committee that reflects a balanced
Membership needs to representation of the interests involved, but the objective needs to be

embrace a diversity of
pursued with greater rigour. When considering the membership of such
perspectives
bodies the governance roles must be clearly understood and articulated.
External appointees should have a solid foundation of practical experience that is more
comprehensive than that available within the APS. They must be encouraged to speak their
minds. Their views should be listened to and conveyed to the minister. For their part,
external committee members will need to understand the appropriate constraints of
confidentiality and accountability within which public policy is designed and implemented.

An advisory board would not take over the managerial responsibility of the decision-maker.
Rather, its role would be to proffer sagacity and common sense. Some critics point to
difficulties in involving outside parties who may have something to gain by being involved in
these fora: sometimes they can be portrayed as little more than rent-seekers pleading
special interests. Such concerns are misplaced. Probity issues can usually be addressed by
foresight and due diligence, and a skilled public servant is well equipped to appreciate the
difference between lobbying and advice. The APS must also be mindful not to fall back on
‘friendly faces’. Dissent should be respected, and valued as an input to policy design and
decision-making. When advice is needed on major projects, the APS should look beyond the
‘usual suspects’. Industry associations and unions may well provide good members of an
advisory group, but the greater percipience often comes from individual companies,
community organisations or people with first-hand experience. Members should be sought
for their particular experience rather than selected as organisational representatives.

Successive Australian Governments have underinvested in public service reform. Efficiency
dividends help to reduce costs, but on their own they do not enhance productivity. Public
servants themselves have often sought to stay ahead of the game, but their blueprints for
reform tend to look backwards and inwards in the pursuit of enhanced capability. When
major projects fail, they often do so not just because of poor processes but because of a lack
of imagination. We need not wait for the next crisis. Public sector reform should be
conceived as a continuous process, driven from within but supported by outside expertise.
As has been recognised in the UK, “small, mixed teams combining people with experience,
skills and connections outside Whitehall, as well as career public servants, can strengthen
the [Civil Service] reform design, while maintaining focus, energy and momentum”.207

A Prime Minister’s Public Service Advisory Committee could be charged

A whole-of-APS reform with driving this approach. It should itself embrace membership from the
agenda should drive a private and community sectors. There exists a profound appetite amongst
more open and
many public servants for change. They need to be encouraged to go
collaborative APS
further. Exciting things are already happening in the APS but their
transformative potential often goes unrecognised. Too often the most
interesting innovation remains at the margin of public administration. What is needed is
authoritative leadership. Australia can learn from other nations like Canada and New

60
Zealand, which have established advisory bodies to drive significant reforms over the past
five years, helping to ensure that their public services are ready for emerging challenges. I
have had the privilege in recent years to work on public sector reform agendas in New South
Wales and Queensland and have seen first-hand the positive changes that can be
implemented if there is the will. Equally important, I have witnessed how perspectives from
outside the public sector can add significant value to the processes of reform. The
Commonwealth should follow suit.

The Public Service Advisory Committee should report to the

A Prime Minister’s Advisory Prime Minister, through the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for
Committee could be
the Public Service. Its terms of reference should be to assist the

charged with driving reform
Australian Public Service Commissioner to drive a more open,
collaborative and outward-looking APS. Its members should help
identify innovative approaches and imagine new ways of developing or delivering policy—
measures that can enhance public sector productivity and raise public service standards.
The Committee would not require a large administrative secretariat. Its deliberations should
be integrated into the existing work program of the APSC. However, it should have the
capacity to generate its own agenda. Membership of the Public Service Advisory Committee
must be carefully chosen to bring together the right mix of pre-eminent leaders, who have
had diverse experience outside and inside government, but also share a real commitment to
enhancing Australian governance.

61
CONCLUSIONS | Opening up the APS

E.17 Secretaries should support their staff to undertake career development

opportunities outside the APS in order to gain beneficial experience.

E.18 Building on existing departmental initiatives, an Australian Public Service

Scholarship should be established that provides financial support for ten APS

leaders each year to undertake an important project in the business or

community sector for up to 12 months.

E.19 A highly prestigious Public Sector Fellowship should be established to

provide financial support each year for ten exceptional leaders from the

business, community and academic sectors to contribute to significant initiatives

in the APS for up to 12 months.

E.20 For high priority large-scale projects, departments should actively source

specific talent from outside the APS on a temporary basis to provide a wide

range of relevant skills, experience and entrepreneurial energy.

E.21 Program advisory groups should be established within departments that

include representation drawn from outside the APS in order to capture a

broader diversity of perspectives and knowledge.

E.22 A Prime Minister’s Public Service Advisory Committee should be

established that includes leaders from business and community organisations,
to support the Australian Public Service Commissioner build a more open,
collaborative and outward-looking public service.

62
F | Embracing Adaptive Government

PROBLEMS EXPOSED

The Royal Commission into the HIP found that “the tension between the stimulus objective of

the policy, with its concomitant need for expedition, and the energy efficiency objectives of

the policy … caused a number of decisions to be made … which unnecessarily exposed

workers, particularly inexperienced ones, to an unacceptably high risk of injury or death”.208

Given the political pressure for speed, which curtailed the time available for program design,
the APS should have been aware that it would have to learn lessons along the way. Hanger

drew attention to the fact that information from the roll-out of the HIP was not used to inform

ongoing management of emerging risks nor to act on them as they manifested.209 There was

no testing of whether the right people and skills were available to deliver the project.210 No

attempt was made to recruit experienced individuals to address the deficiencies.211

With respect to the NBN, Scales reflected that the Government leapt to creating a new
‘start-up’ Government Business Enterprise “that was completely untested and ill-prepared to

deliver one of the largest, most complex infrastructure projects in Australian history within a

very tight timeframe”.212 Government did not think that it might need to adapt as it moved into

a new and untested area. There was too little willingness to try things out at a small scale, to

experiment and evaluate and to respond flexibly and expeditiously to emerging problems.

In the HIP public servants did not act in a facilitative manner. They failed to harness outside

experience. Indeed, Hanger noted a tendency for public servants to isolate themselves from

external sources of advice. Express instructions were given not to consult industry.213 There

was also an unwillingness to engage with counterparts in other jurisdictions: “Curiously, and

inexplicably, none of the … officers working on the HIP appear to have liaised with their

New Zealand counterparts about their respective energy efficiency programs involving home

insulation to share information, experience or alert each other to potential problems”.214 This

closed approach also extended to the fundamental issue of properly investigating how States

and Territories understood their work health and safety responsibilities.215

In a similar vein, the review of the BER found that when school stakeholders were not

consulted or authorised to make decisions, schools were placed at greater risk of being left

with more expensive buildings that were not fit for purpose.216 The stark contrasts between

the results achieved in different school systems and states revealed how old-fashioned

command-and-control public administration (and both Commonwealth and some state

governments were guilty of this in their haste to get the program going) can ultimately

undermine the delivery of quality outcomes.

63
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
The traditional path to developing and delivering government policy is
A one-size-fits-all well-trod. It involves developing a Cabinet submission to address a

approach does not work
perceived problem, gaining Cabinet approval, having the APS design
for most complex
problems
the program, and using public servants or contractors to roll it out
across the nation. There is still a place for such tried and tested
methods. They can work effectively for policies that deploy at an
industrial scale, involve high numbers of transactions and require high levels of accuracy (for
example, collecting taxes or making benefits payments). In other areas of service delivery, a
one-size-fits-all approach to delivering a program across the whole of Australia will increase
the risks of implementation going wrong. In most instances this will reduce the value-for-
money that citizens derive from the public funds expended. Inflexibility reduces choice for
program clients and diminishes contestability amongst providers. It is often far better to allow
programs to be tailored to the needs of particular individuals or communities.

Public services are becoming increasingly contestable. But while it is now standard practice
for a range of providers to be contracted to deliver programs, governments still do not face
the discipline of full competition in the marketplace. This makes it critical that they find other
ways to learn from the experiences of businesses and community organisations. Too often,
governments focus their resources on defending a well-established but outdated approach.
Doing things differently is often not considered until things go badly wrong and large sums of
money have been wasted.

But, a quiet revolution is already underway. Pockets of the APS are
Pockets of the APS are
experimenting with new ways of delivering government business. A
already doing things
differently consistent theme in most of these projects is the desire to start small
and learn from both success and failure. They involve testing a range
of actions, evaluating the results, and then shifting attention and resources towards what
works best. Programs move to full scale only when the lessons of demonstration projects
have been incorporated. Public servants
may deliver the services directly or work
Paul Shetler
with
third-party delivery agents, who are “You can’t do it all at once otherwise it will be
a train wreck… We’re going to get there by
provided with greater autonomy in how
doing small things, deliver them very quickly
they pursue agreed performance-based and then iterating them, changing them,
outcomes. Success is achieved through improving them, making sure they actually do
meet user needs and that we continue to do so as
iteration. In short, these areas of the APS we move along” (July 2015).217
are adaptive: they learn and adapt
Paul Shetler is the CEO of the Digital
through the process of doing.
Transformation Office

Positive findings are emerging from using
trial sites to explore different ways of implementing the National Disability Insurance

64
Scheme; from place-based, community-driven initiatives in early childhood; from providing
longer-term more flexible contracts to indigenous organisations to deliver services in remote
areas; and from promoting consumer-directed services to older Australians who require
home care.218 Lessons also come from some state governments, where this gradual, patient,
exploratory approach has reaped benefits in helping families at risk of breakdown.219 There
is a palpable sense of change.

There are four elements to adaptive government: being flexible (paying

Be flexible, experiment, by outcomes and measuring performance), being experimental (starting
work with others, and
early and failing quickly), being facilitative (working with others rather
learn as you go
than in isolation), and being agile (learning as you go). Applied
concurrently, these elements have the capacity to improve and
strengthen the way government designs and delivers its policies, programs and services. I
have discussed these in turn below, contrasting traditional practice with adaptive practice,
and drawing on examples from Australia and overseas.

1. BE FLEXIBLE: PAY BY OUTCOMES, MEASURE PERFORMANCE
   Traditional government Adaptive government

    Use only public servants to design the  Employ collaborative processes to
   program and the administrative identify and negotiate desired
   guidelines government outcomes with stakeholders
    Allow the mechanics of program  Set the policy objective of the program
   delivery to take priority over at an early stage
   consideration of program outcomes  Be willing to experiment with delivery
    Measure success on the basis of models
   process compliance  Allow providers (public service or third-
    Roll out the program nationally (one- party) more flexibility in their approach
   size-fits-all) to delivery
    Calibrate payment on the basis of
   agreed outcomes
    Focus on performance

The starting point for any new project should be developing a deep understanding of the
objectives pursued by government. The opening question should be “what will success look
like?”. It is necessary to identify the results that are sought, and agree (in collaboration with
potential providers) the outcomes against which performance will be measured. The
Enhanced Commonwealth Performance Framework, introduced under the PGPA Act from
1 July 2015, emphasises the importance of Commonwealth entities reporting on outcomes
and impacts in their corporate plans and annual reports. The new corporate planning
requirements encourage agencies to identify what success looks like at the beginning of the

65
annual business cycle, and to explain how they will measure it over the short, medium and
long term.220

The APS is still a long way from being able to do this consistently. Too often public servants
are reduced to monitoring processes, ticking off programs against a series of outputs,
acquitting payments or meeting contractual conditions. Meanwhile the ambitious goals of
government and interests of the citizen become lost in the mechanics of grant applications,
contracts, guidelines and reporting rules. There remains too much focus on process (how
many clients have been seen) and outputs (how many services or payments have been
delivered) rather than on outcomes (how has welfare dependence been reduced,
employment increased or health and well-being improved). Unfortunately, the innovative
impulse of delivery partners is too often stymied because APS contract managers restrain
unnecessarily the approach they can take. Contracting is transactional, with management
focusing its attention on legal and procedural compliance. In contrast, commissioning of
service delivery undertaken in a flexible way can be transformational: management can
direct its attention to performance.

One way to promote more flexibility in program delivery is to shift to

Payment by results is one Payments by Results (PbR). It should not be underestimated just
way to be flexible while
how challenging this can be. PbR requires pre-agreed measures to
improving performance
be established. Payments are contingent on the verification of
results, some of which may become apparent only over the medium term. Counterfactual
approaches are required, allowing estimates to be made of what results would have
occurred over time in the absence of an intervention. The better the quality of the
performance metrics, the more discretion that can be allowed to front-line public servants or
contracted providers in how to deliver them.

Of course, outcomes need to be set to discourage gaming. Experience warns us that simple
targets often result in behaviour that weakens the underlying purpose of the program.
Incentivised performance measures, in themselves a useful feature, can sometimes distort
provider behaviours. Nor am I advocating a laissez-faire approach, allowing contractors to
claim that virtuous ends justify dubious means. Nevertheless, the benefits of applying a PbR
approach methodically more than outweigh the up-front costs invested in its development.
Payments can be made on the basis of the benefits that are being delivered. Through
upfront agreement on outcomes, and the removal of restrictive controls, public sector
entrepreneurship can be liberated.

The flexibility engendered by PbR approaches can go much further. An example that I have
been intimately involved with is the introduction in Australia of Social Benefit Bonds (in the
UK, Social Impact Bonds). They represent a financial instrument that pays returns to
investors based on achieving agreed public outcomes. This approach has been trialled in
NSW to deliver better results for families at risk of breakdown.221 The programs to reduce
levels of out-of-home care have not been designed by public servants but by innovative

66
community organisations (UnitingCare and The Benevolent Society). Performance-based

outcomes have been negotiated, and funding raised from the private sector. The providers

carry the risk but they are given the freedom to deliver the program as they wish. Such

public-community-private partnerships (impact investing) can have much wider application.
The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has recently

recommended assessment of Development Impact Bonds as a means to improve the

effectiveness with which overseas aid is delivered.222

2. BE EXPERIMENTAL: START EARLY, TEST WHAT WORKS, FAIL
   QUICKLY
   Traditional government Adaptive government
    Implement defensive risk management  Embrace a positive risk culture
    Blame and punish for small failures  Devolve decision-making to those
    Bet everything on one large-scale closest to the risks
   project  Ensure that front-line experience can
    Describe interventions as ‘trials’ when influence policy design
   there is no intent to move to full scale  Undertake controlled trials of

    Have little regard for front-line government policy (pilots or

   experience demonstrations)
    Change approach to adapt to
   circumstances
    Learn from mistakes
    License innovation within clear
   boundaries
    Move to scale progressively

The biggest impediment to greater use of experiments in the delivery of public services is

risk aversion. For this reason the adoption of a positive risk culture is a critical first step on

the path to more experimental approaches. A positive risk culture, as has already been

discussed, involves public servants accepting responsibility for risk at all levels of the

organisation, and allowing risk management and decision-making to be devolved to those

who are close to the action.

It is useful on occasion not to ‘think big’. For initiatives that are entering relatively new areas

of government policy, perhaps we should be willing to countenance giving public sector

managers the licence to ‘start fast, test first, fail small’. After all, why can’t governments on

occasion act more like businesses and be able to prototype and trial delivery models and

learn from these experiments before proceeding to scale?223 This is not about wasting public

money on administrative fads or bureaucratic fopperies. Rather, it is about testing the most

efficient and effective ways of delivering on the ambitions of government. Establishing clear

boundaries from the top down as to what risks can be taken, and in what circumstances, will

allow public servants to establish the best approach.

67
Trialling before moving to full scale does not mean delayed implementation. I have no desire
to sign up the APS to the ‘Slow Movement’, nor, conversely, to promulgate haste. The key to
good public administration is to do everything at the right speed. It is often faster to deploy a
single prototype from which to learn, than to design and deliver a full-scale program that is
likely to be beset with problems from day one. Better still, demonstrations allow public
servants to compare the efficacies of different approaches. On occasion trials may suggest a
need for quite different methods of pursuing government policy, but in most instances they
will allow public servants to identify a plethora of incremental improvements that,
cumulatively, can drive significant efficiency gains.

Trials should not be limited to new programs. Opportunities are also

Behavioural insights can
available to improve large, ongoing programs. For example, the
extend the experimental
approach to existing Behavioural Insights Team, formerly based within the UK Cabinet Office
programs and now a company operating at arm’s length from government, has
carried out extensive randomised ‘nudge’ trials to test end-users’
responses to a range of prompts. This testing was undertaken at low cost and quickly
showed which approaches worked best. Subsequently, the UK Government was able to
implement successful policies that achieved improved outcomes (such as increasing organ
donation by 100,000 people in a year, and lifting tax payment rates by 5 per cent) 224 A
similar White House Social and Behavioral Science Team has been established to help the
United States Government identify approaches that harness public behaviours to improve
effectiveness.225

Understanding the psychology of market interventions is just as important as understanding
the mechanics. The most elegant policy solutions will fail if they do not account for how
humans behave. As Allan Hawke noted in his review of the HIP, the program design
provided little incentive for householders to think about the quality or performance of
insulation installers.226 This goes to a more general point: there should be an expectation
that public servants, when designing policy and programs, have made themselves aware of
what has been done by others, what has worked well, and what has not. Public servants
should take the time to ‘stop and look around’, not just at the operation of markets, but at the
behaviour of people.

The good news is that this focus on the social, cognitive and emotional behaviour of
individuals and institutions, often explored through testing different approaches, is now being
taken up in Australia. For example, a Behavioural Insights Unit has been established in the
NSW Department of the Premier and Cabinet. It collects data from the front-line and then
undertakes randomised controlled trials, incorporating results into the design of government
interventions. A small but growing number of Australian Government agencies is also
beginning to apply or trial the use of behavioural insights techniques.227 Greater investment
in these approaches, both inside government and in think-tanks, can only help spur the
evolution of richer insights. There would be considerable value in the APS fully engaging
with the Behavioural Insights Community of Practice that has been established in Australia

68
and, better still, creating a similar group of its own. It would act as a catalyst for
experimentation.

The APS can learn much from Australia’s large publicly-listed companies
Learn from the private
about experimentation. By virtue of their size, these companies have

sector’s purpose-driven
many of the characteristics of bureaucracies. They are generally
experimentation
approach demarcated horizontally by function (into subsidiaries or business units)
and vertically by hierarchical reporting lines. Committee structures
dominate the processes of decision-making. From the outside—and as I now know, from the
inside—they look very similar to large departments of state.

The difference is market competition. Although they enjoy the considerable power of
incumbency, each company recognises that its continued success depends on addressing
the constant threat of disruptive innovation. Challengers, from large global multinationals to
small entrepreneurial start-ups, constantly improve the price, quality or consumer
attractiveness of the goods or services offered for sale and the manner in which they are
produced and distributed. Organisational sclerosis means certain decline. Sometimes
companies die slowly by a thousand competitive cuts; occasionally they collapse
precipitously in the face of dramatic shifts in consumer preferences. Loss of market share,
declining profit and susceptibility to takeover are ever-present dangers. Many of the great
companies of the past, household names for a generation or more, no longer exist.

Each company knows that it must find ways to maintain and grow its shareholder value.
Each, led by a CEO and executive management and governed by a chair and board of
non-executive directors, will develop its own strategies. There is a discernible pattern of
good practice, however, from which public service agencies can learn.

A forward-looking company will seek to do more than react speedily to emerging threats. It
will set its sights on identifying untapped opportunities that can provide it with a competitive
edge by which to deliver sustainable shareholder return (in contrast, the driving force for a
government agency will be to deliver public outcomes better). It will often trial different
approaches to demonstrate which is likely to be more effective. Some initiatives will then be
deployed at scale, others extended more broadly, and others shut down or sent back to the
drawing board for further work. The core systems of the company will be adapted to ensure
that they can support the new approaches or products. Often that involves motivating
intermediaries that stand between the company and its ultimate customer. Not all initiatives
will prove successful: behavioural psychology is complex, and consumers will often respond
in unexpectedly negative ways to change. Some interventions, by contrast, quickly deliver
tangible improvements. A well-managed company learns from both. It is a form of disciplined
entrepreneurship. It is experimentation, driven by purpose. The APS should embrace such
approaches.

69
3. BE FACILITATIVE: WORK WITH OTHERS

Traditional government Adaptive government
 Develop policy in relative isolation  Make it easier for outsiders to become
 Consult on an ad-hoc basis, often after part of project teams on a temporary
key decisions have already been made short-term basis
 Prescribe in contracts how outsourced  Seek alliances with organisations
providers are to undertake their work already in the field
 Expect that the final shape of policy will  Encourage front-line experience to
look like the original proposal with only influence project design
a few tweaks around the margins  Involve potential providers in the

 Use digital tools solely as a means of co-production of policy

communicating or transacting simple  Make full use of the internet to enhance

business digital democracy and citizen
engagement
 Encourage service recipients to learn
helplessness by treating them like
dependents

The APS will continue to sit at the centre of public administration. Its senior leaders have
extensive access to ministers’ offices. They participate in the confidential meetings that
discuss new policies. Relations between the government and most of the lobbyist or
advocacy bodies with which it meets, and the multifarious organisations which it regulates or
influences, are to a large extent conducted through government agencies. Public servants,
directly or by contract, deliver government services to the public. They are the means by
which the entitlements and obligations of citizens are communicated.

What needs to change is the ethos that is brought to that situation of positional authority.
Public servants cannot seek to be controllers. Indeed, the PGPA Act establishes a duty in
law for officials to co-operate with others to achieve common objectives.228 Adaptive
government depends upon them exercising their responsibility on the basis of collaboration
and partnership, working cooperatively across sectors to inform and deliver a government’s
agenda. They need to see themselves as the stewards of democratic processes and good
governance. The leadership they provide needs to be facilitative in nature. Their
performance should be assessed on their ability to effectively harness ideas and capabilities
from across and outside of government, not on their ability to control and orchestrate every
minor activity.

Let me provide two instances of changes already underway. Both call for

There are good examples
public servants to apply high-order facilitative skills. The first example
of being facilitative
in the APS
builds on almost two decades of experience in brokering the delivery of
Australian Government labour market programs on a competitive basis to

70
a range of public, private and community providers. As Secretary of the Education

Department, Science and Training in the second half of the 1990s, I remember well the

introduction of the Job Network (now jobactive) and the exciting prospects that it held. I

envisaged a public economy in which job seekers would be able to select the organisation

that they wished to deliver the training or labour market support that government funded.

That ambition has been only half-fulfilled. The goal seemed so straightforward—setting an

outcome (how many jobseekers were placed into work for 13 or 26 weeks) and allowing

contracted providers to decide on their own approach to achieving it. Unfortunately, the

process has become burdened by tomes of prescriptive guidelines. The organisations have

been treated as if they were mini-government agencies and expected to do things in very

similar ways.

It does not have to be like this. The Department of Employment is seeking to modify its

approach. By collaborating with potential providers on policy design and execution, and

paying on the basis of performance-based results, a greater spirit of partnership can be

created. Providers can be given more flexibility. Of course, it will still be important for public

servants to ensure that providers behave honestly and ethically. Between the co-production

of policy design and careful monitoring of outcomes, however, perhaps the best role of the

APS is to stand aside and let the organisations commissioned to deliver the services get on

with the job.

The second example of working with others in an

adaptive way is to go beyond ‘customer service’ Martin Parkinson PSM

and allow those who receive services to wield more
“There are expectations on us to

control. The emerging commitment to consumer-
engage differently with business

directed care allows those entitled to government and the broader community—to

services to manage a care budget and make their better understand and incorporate
their perspectives into our policy

own decisions. From July 2015 this year, for analysis and development.”
example, Home Care Packages for the elderly (March 2014) 229

provide individuals with the option of tailoring care
Martin Parkinson was the

to their particular needs, with the assistance of Secretary of the Treasury from

service providers.230 For public servants this will 2011 to 2014

involve a much greater need to work not only with a

range of contracted providers but with the individual citizens who will access their services.

Such initiatives offer great opportunity for government to actively encourage consumer or

community choice and then to learn from the preferences that are revealed. This information

can improve the design of public services—just as any company in a new market carefully

monitors and reacts to how its customers respond to its products. Actively supporting

community organisations or individuals to be engaged in service delivery also helps build

their skills, resources and social capital, allowing them to independently generate beneficial

public outcomes.

71
Business has been quick to harness the power of digital platforms to use their customers’
views to shape their product offerings. Governments in Australia still lag behind. Done well,
the techniques of digital democracy can help to drive citizen engagement in ways that can
help shape government policies. Of course, the technology is just a tool. Real power lies in
the willingness of public servants to employ a range of facilitated deliberative processes to
involve citizens in reframing questions and suggesting answers. Simply signing up to social
media will not change things unless the APS is ready to take on lessons from outside the
public sector.

4. BE AGILE: LEARN AS YOU GO
   Traditional government Adaptive government
    Retain information  Share information about good
    Dismiss opportunities to learn from the practice—and lessons learnt
   experience of others  Create stages/gates to allow programs
    Leave evaluation of ‘what works’ until to be modified on the basis of ongoing
   the end monitoring and evaluation
    Work within the silos of bureaucratic  Learn continuously from doing
   demarcation  Encourage people to share mistakes

    Base program design on what has been and ‘near misses’ that can inform

   done in the past program design
    Fully embrace whole-of-government
   cooperation
    Imagine new ways of doing things

   Three things can stymie effective sharing of lessons across government: the functional
   demarcations of bureaucratic structure; an unwillingness or inability to discuss failure; and
   the over-use of confidentiality and security provisions as an excuse not to consult broadly.
   The effect on APS capability is clear. Less obvious is the manner in which discussions with
   business and community organisations and the wider public are impoverished. It lessens the
   opportunity to hear from those impacted by government programs, and reduces the ability to
   evaluate the impact of government investment. This is not just an Australian Government
   problem. In spite of the occasional nod to the potential benefits of co-operative federalism,
   Australian jurisdictions have historically been poor at sharing information about different
   policy approaches between levels of government.231

   For agencies to become learning organisations they must transition

Agility requires a focus
from a ‘need-to-know’ approach to information to a ‘need-to-share’
on learning and sharing
information philosophy. Of course, standards around security, confidentiality and
privacy cannot be compromised. But the APS needs to find ways to
improve how it shares data and experience from early lessons, rather than relying on
post-implementation audits and risking large-scale failures. In 2008 the Venturous Australia

72
review, conducted by Terry Cutler, recommended that “to the maximum extent practicable,
information, research and content funded by Australian governments… should be made
freely available over the internet as part of the global public commons”.232 Since 2013, the
Australian Government has required the results of research funded through the Australian
Research Council to be openly available to the broadest possible audience.233 Perhaps this
requirement could be extended to all government funding, similar to many areas of public
funding in the US.234 Perhaps too, we might learn from the UK Government, which regularly
creates opportunities to assess and publish the results of different approaches to
government delivery.235 Staying agile, continuously learning and adapting requires a change
of mindset.

Contracting out service delivery has not delivered on the promise of flexibility and choice.
The failure speaks to a larger issue. The contestability agenda is too often conceived
narrowly as a drive to outsource service delivery to the private sector or communities at the
lowest cost (which is how value-for-money is all too often perceived). This misses the larger
purpose of identifying the most effective and efficient ways to achieve a government’s
desired outcomes. Contestability should introduce credible competition between
implementation options based on benchmarking and market testing. A diversity of
approaches should be actively encouraged so that delivery is undertaken by a variety of
providers in different ways. Improvement can be informed by monitoring the experiences and
evaluating the outcomes of those ‘doing the doing’.237 Just as businesses learn by
scrutinising what works for their competitors, so too can the APS learn from studying the
providers of public services. It can acquire knowledge of good practice and innovative
approaches by assessing their performance. The key is to focus on results, learn from
experience and to stay agile in the search for innovation.

The best way to discover the value of adaptive government is to do it.
Adaptive government
Pay on outcomes, embrace experimentation, start early and (if things
sometimes means
starting small go wrong) fail
quickly, Marie Johnson
collaborate widely, and learn as you go
“You can say government needs to be more
(including from the experience of cautious and that’s true, but it’s not an excuse
others). Adaptive government can take for failing to be more agile and operate in a
different way… You have to ask ‘what would
many shapes. There are innumerable government services look like if Apple or
ways in which the public service can Google delivered them?’ and you get a
become more agile. As with any new different answer to what we see in the public
service.” (2014) 236
approach, changes will be needed to
turn the adaptive ethos into action. Marie Johnson was the Chief Technology
Architect for the Department of Human
Some will require a shift in entrenched
Services from 2011 to 2014
practices, attitudes or behaviours.
Administrative structures and workplace systems often hinder the capability of APS agencies
but it is cultural inertia that acts as a barrier to creativity. Induction programs generally focus

73
on explaining to newcomers that “this is how we do things here” rather than “this is how we
are looking to improve things here”.

There are disincentives for ministers to propose adaptive approaches, even if they would like
to do so. The large number of competing priorities at Budget time creates an incentive for
ministers and their departments to downplay the costs and risks of new initiatives and talk up
the benefits in order to secure larger expenditure commitments to their portfolio. This in turn
creates an incentive to adopt and promote expansion of a well-tried implementation
approach, rather than admit the wisdom of trialling and demonstrating a range of approaches
(some old, some new) to achieve the outcomes sought. Would it not be advantageous if,
when bringing forward a new policy proposal, ministers should have to justify why they
should not have to start by piloting their idea on a small scale and then, on the basis of trial
and error, prove their implementation strategies on the ground before it is decided to spend
large sums of money? For adaptive government, at least initially, small is beautiful—it is a
clever way to do big things better in the future.

Adaptive government necessitates other changes. The assurance

Aligning incentives to be
reviews framework administered by the Department of Finance
adaptive
requires proposals that are high in risk, priority, value and complexity to
be assessed by independent experts. Whilst the framework has raised
delivery performance, there is potential to make far better use of its Gateway Reviews and
Implementation Readiness Assessments (IRAs). Feedback from those involved in the
reviews indicates that they are helpful in improving the management of a large program or
project. Experienced practitioners comment that it is usually obvious very early whether the
initiative is likely to succeed or fail.
Geoff Mulgan
There may be scope to put a broader range
of proposals through the initial stages of the “Governments often do slowly what
should be done fast, and fast what should
Gateway process, while allowing initiatives be done slowly.
that perform well in the early review stages to Ill-thought out reforms are rushed into
opt out of the later ones. Similarly, there is implementation at great cost. The
experimental method offers a reasonable
scope to be bolder with assurance reviews, compromise—fast action, but on a small
using them to assess whether to stop doing scale, leading to phased adoption at a
larger scale. That gives politicians plenty
something that is not going well, rather than
of examples to point at, but at less risk.”
just offering suggestions for improvement. (2015)238
Those involved in reviews are sometimes
Geoff Mulgan was Director of the
frustrated that the Gateway process misses Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and
the mark on outcomes. Too often the process Head of Policy in the Prime Minister’s
Office, United Kingdom, from 1997 to
is geared around checking that the
2004
proponents “are doing things right” rather
than that they “are doing the right thing”. There is little value in agencies demonstrating best
practice process when there exists a fundamental design flaw that means that
implementation can never properly meet the outcomes sought by government. Building

74
greater flexibility and adaptability into the assurance reviews process would remove
unnecessary red tape while making scrutiny more meaningful.

In some cases, staged financing creates perverse incentives to move too quickly to scale.
The typical approach is to set aside the full project budget in the contingency reserve, and to
release it once the business case has been established. This creates an incentive to talk up
the business case in order to secure release of the money. A preferred alternative might be
to provide sufficient ‘seed capital’ to allow projects to complete not only their business need
and business case stages but also to develop a proof-of-concept. This evidence could then
be submitted to make a case for funding a full-scale project, although it might sometimes
reveal that the project is not likely to work as conceived and that further funding should not
be provided, at least until other approaches have been considered. Linking this ‘gated’
funding process more strongly to the Gateway Review process would allow funding to be
withheld until independent assurance is received that the project is going well. It might
reduce the likelihood of throwing more money in the wrong direction.

The manner in which governments select modes of delivery also needs to change. New
Policy Proposals (NPPs) have a laudable focus on providing evidence that supports policy
intervention, but traditionally this has included little evidence about the mode of delivery. The
implementation of major new projects and programs should form an equally important part of
the evidence base for decisions by Cabinet or recommendations of the Expenditure Review
Committee. Assessment of whether the proposed delivery methodologies have been applied
or trialled successfully in the past will assist ministers to consider execution risk. Too often
there is no effective pathway to gather evidence from stakeholders—the organisations,
communities and individuals who can contribute practical suggestions on how to deliver new
proposals most effectively. They may know much better than APS senior management what
will work on the ground.

Government, through skilled public service facilitators, should actively
An innovation solicit concrete proposals from the private, community and academic
competition could
sectors on how their programs could be delivered better. Perhaps

engage the community
on how to improve outcomes can be better defined; or cost savings redirected to improve

delivery of government services; or the burden of public service regulation lessened; or citizens
programs given more opportunity to make choices on their own behalf. The
possibilities are limitless. Opportunities should be introduced that allow
government to proclaim its adaptability.

An annual, well-publicised competition might be held to gather good ideas from business and
the community on how to improve the delivery of the government’s major programs. For
example, a Chamber of Commerce might design a scheme to encourage businesses to hire
older workers and organise supportive companies to test different approaches. A group of
doctors might undertake a small trial of different ways to deliver preventative health
education and share the results. An emerging tech company might submit a ‘Trip Advisor’

75
type application to help people navigate the range of disability services available or to select
their own aged care provider. Here is an opportunity, on a grander scale, to build on the
successes of GovHack.239 A small amount of money could be awarded to set the winners on
their way, and public service mentors selected to assist them negotiate the labyrinthine
systems and processes of government. Where the proponents can test the concept
themselves, lend support. Where the idea would be best tested by the APS, the proponent
might receive a cash prize, and (probably more important) a commitment from government
to involve them fully as the test proceeds. For all ideas, the results should be published.
Additional funding should be considered as part of the Budget, if the results of the test turns
out to be encouraging and useful. The winners would gain not just a prize but public
recognition. Equally important, the government would show itself to be actively encouraging
and welcoming innovation.

Adaptive government can go further. The full benefits of contestability
Funding models should
will not be realised if contracting continues to be designed to
promote innovation and
pay on performance encourage all providers do their business in the same way. At
present, the APS tends to default to process-driven, output-based
and highly prescriptive contracts, elaborated in voluminous administrative requirements. This
does not allow sufficient latitude for third-party providers to explore and implement better
approaches. Opportunities exist for APS leadership to endorse a more fulsome exploration
of the different funding models available by which to contract performance-based outcomes.

There are already established models available, such as alliance contracting, performance
contracting and using schedules of rates and cost-plus models rather than lump sums.
These models balance the probity and accountability that citizens expect to be applied to
public money, with harnessing external expertise in the design and implementation of policy.
As well, they create more opportunities for ideas on program design to come from outside
the APS, and allow risks and benefits to flow freely between delivery partners. In essence,
this is the approach which underpins the introduction of Social Benefit Bonds in NSW. What
matters is that contracts provide both the flexibility and the incentive to develop and trial
ideas. Innovation can improve results. These different forms of contracting need not be more
risky. Rather, risks can be negotiated and managed by the party best placed to do so, with
provision made to share both the upsides and downsides of experimentation.
Commonwealth contracts can be written and managed to encourage public
entrepreneurship.

The Government’s strong commitment to reducing red tape and making it
Deregulation needs
easier for the public to deal with government must continue. This requires

active engagement with
the community and more than removing or simplifying regulation through the legislative
business process. It requires positive engagement with business, the community
and citizens to better understand how their lives can be made easier
when working with government. This will not occur, for example, if contracts continue to
include onerous reporting conditions or grants programs have overly prescriptive guidelines.

76
The APS needs to value the time of its delivery partners. The Government will benefit from
lower prices as partners reduce the premium they build into Australian Government contracts
in order to deal with the cost incurred by poor administration. During consultations for this
review, it was suggested that some outsourced providers may add up to 25 per cent to
prices to cover the cost of the transaction. Here, often hidden from view, is the true burden of
red tape.

Reducing the administrative and reporting guidelines imposed on third-part agents does not
mean licencing delivery partners to do ‘whatever it takes’, or turning a blind eye to risky or
inappropriate business practices. Rather, working in partnership to simplify dealing with
government should lead to better risk management, through better understanding of roles
and responsibilities, greater trust between partners, and greater accountability.

But wait, there’s more. Many of the excellent ideas of the
Digital and deliberative Government 2.0 Taskforce from 2009 have largely fallen by the

democratic methods can
wayside or have emerged as reporting obligations rather than
unlock better delivery
opportunities for change.240 Recent surveys indicate that Australia is yet
to fully translate its high-quality digital infrastructure and human capital
into high-quality online service delivery. The 2014 United Nations E-Government Survey
indicates that while Australia rates highly for service delivery (8th internationally), in the
provision of connected services (that is, citizen-centric online solutions that cut across
departments to allow data transfer), Australia rates 65 per cent where leading countries are
closer to 100 per cent.241 Compared to the UK and United States, Australia’s progress on
open data policy implementation has been fragmented and lacks sustained conviction.242 As
a consequence, government is less adaptive.

As part of this process, the APS should open up to new forms of citizen engagement both
through increased sharing of government data and information and by providing more online
opportunities to participate. Technology solutions, including digital democracy, can empower
citizens to exercise the greater discretion they are being given. There is an increasing
interest in many Westminster countries in ‘citizen-centred governance’. It involves finding
ways to devolve power and influence to citizens, communities and service-users. In the UK
the approach has become a key component of government policies to tackle social exclusion
and welfare dependency.243 Implemented well, citizen engagement can improve the design
and responsiveness of services, build social capital, encourage civic participation, and build
greater trust in democratic institutions. At the local level, where there is opportunity for place-
based solutions, citizens can attend in person with discussions facilitated by public
servants.244 At the regional or national level, in most instances, engagement will have to be
elicited online through webinars, chat rooms, deliberative polls, or structured (but
open-ended) questionnaires. Think of it as digital democracy with a purpose. As was
recognised in Western Australia, ‘e-engagement’ allows individuals to participate who would
usually not be interested in traditional methods of consultation.245

77
Such notions of active citizenship are not new in Australia. Nor do they have to be online. I

have witnessed first-hand a range of projects that have been designed to bring members of

the public together to discuss common concerns and to participate in the decision-making

that affects them. The citizens learn

negotiation skills, not helplessness. The Michael Pratt

public servants learn to listen. The design of “I obviously realised very quickly if I come

programs may be improved and, in most in as the subject matter expert telling
career and life-long bureaucrats about

instances, the manner in which they are how to do their job, I was probably going

delivered is enhanced. Of course there are to have a short lifespan. What I did have…
hurdles, from the identification of was a set of skills that they really needed…
[a] modern approach to customer

stakeholders to agreement on purpose. delivery… a lot of technology

Experience shows that problems can emerge background… a real commercial
approach… I then used these skills in a

during the process, ranging from
way that was clear to the Directors-
collaboration fatigue to aggressive behaviour. General and their teams that I was there to
help them. The first months for me were

Yet it is disappointing that such citizen- basically active listening.”
(August 2014) 246

centred approaches—which would have

been so useful to informing home insulation Michael Pratt is the Services NSW
Commissioner

or school hall construction—have so rarely

been built into major programs. One key

reason is that the expenditure of time and resources required continues to be seen as a cost

rather than an investment in improved public benefits. Such perceptions need to be turned

on their head. By involving the community early in planning, it is likely that programs can be

delivered at lower risk and provide greater value-for-money.

If the APS invests in modernising the online engagement skills of staff at all levels,
encouraging them to explore in the virtual world and discover innovative ways to engage with

the public, the emerging techniques of digital democracy are more likely to become powerful

tools for experimentation. Many options are available. ‘Ideas markets’ can allow government

to be informed by votes from the community.247 Text mining tools can make assessments of

a large volume of online submissions.248 Open publishing of government data, such as

data.gov.au can allow third parties to make new uses of government data sets.249 Citizen

juries or online town hall meetings can be effective tools to help build consensus around

difficult choices within constrained budgets.250 The internet can encourage the public to

report fraud, waste or emerging implementation problems early. New citizen spaces, such

as, ‘We Asked, You Said, We Did’ in the UK allows governments to be more sensitive to

market responses in the same way that successful companies are. 251 Such approaches,
already trialled by the South Australian252 and Western Australian253 public services, should

be embraced by the APS. Deliberative technology is becoming even more sophisticated,
enabling citizens to contribute to political decision-making in structured ways. The new

Digital Transformation Office promises to make digital delivery of government information

and services the new default.254 This is a vital and long overdue step in meeting the

expectations of citizens regarding how they engage with government.

78
The APS needs fully to comprehend the extent to which the public is attracted to the concept
of public service. GovHack has just celebrated its fifth year.255 It has grown from a small
mash-up event in 2009 to a huge competition that brings together large numbers of
enthusiastic volunteers in 30 locations to innovate, collaborate and apply their creative skills
to open government data. Some of this entrepreneurial innovation is applied directly to
improving the way in which government services are delivered. Much of the energy goes into
developing new apps for the community based on government data. All of this boundless
enthusiasm has the potential to contribute to the creation of beneficial public impact. The
event exemplifies the ethos of structured experimentation that should imbue a contemporary
public service and adaptive delivery. It requires openness to different ways of doing things
and active efforts to maintain goodwill with participants, by ensuring that the format remains
fit-for-purpose, and is engaging and rewarding for those who take part.

Adaptive government must make full use of the potential of digital democracy. It will make it
easier, cheaper, less risky and quicker to bring to
Martin Bowles PSM
government the experience and knowledge of
businesses, not-for-profit organisations and “Be stewards of the system you’re
universities. It will enable tech-savvy citizens to dealing with; don’t try to be the
owner.” (July 2015) 256
involve themselves in the full gamut of policy
development and delivery. Major programs and Martin Bowles is the Secretary of
projects should incorporate transparent and the Department of Health

responsive digital engagement with citizens from
the earliest design stages through to operation and completion. This should be done not just
because it is more democratic, but because engaging widely is often the way to generate
more insight, quicker. It can tap into and connect sources of expertise and experience that
are distributed across the public.

The term adaptive government may be new. Its underlying principles
Communicating an
are not. “The future is already here”, said the science fiction writer

adaptive way of working
William Gibson, “it’s just not evenly distributed”.257 That insight sums
up the state of Australian public administration. To build and sustain innovative approaches
the APS must become more open to outside ideas, learn from business, value community
experience, sponsor academic research and ’crowdsource’ citizen proposals.258 This
commitment to an outward-looking APS needs to be championed at the highest level of
government and public administration if it is to provide a strong foundation for tackling future
challenges.

The factors contributing to more open and flexible government have been the subject of
rigorous discussion for many years. There is evidence that they deliver results. Why, then,
do these approaches so often remain at the fringes of public administration? Part of the
problem, perhaps, is that those at the centre of government perceive that their position will
be undermined should they be open to new voices, to admitting and discussing failure or to
explicitly seeking advice. Such fears are misplaced. Nor are they universally held. From what

79
I have seen in the course of this review, many parts of the APS are well-positioned to get on

with the business of implementing adaptive approaches to government. They are prepared

to innovate, manage the risks, learn from experience and be held accountable for the results.
They are waiting for permission to start.

If adaptation and agility are to become widespread practice, the roles of the public servant

and the minister will need to change. Instead of controlling the whole process of

implementation, they will act as stewards, shepherding the limited resources of government

towards a successful result. Humility will be needed to accept that the shape of policy, or at

least the way it is implemented, may evolve in unexpected ways in response to evidence and

experimentation. This will be a challenging shift for those who feel more comfortable with a

command-and-control style of leadership. The public servant of the future will be the

facilitator of innovation.

It will not be sufficient for leaders to set managers ‘free’ to be adaptive. Capacity and

capability need to be enhanced. Often governments that have begun experimenting with

adaptive government have found their aim of ‘transforming markets’ has faltered because it

was not sufficiently complemented by investment in new human resource skills. Nor is being

adaptive just a top-down process. Some of the best ideas to improve delivery are

languishing at the front line, lacking a channel to those who have the authority to adopt them.
In some areas poor policy design has generated great innovation in delivery as frustrated

front-line staff come up with work-arounds and improvised solutions in order to get things

done.

Taking the first step requires trust. Departments must trust that their ministers will back them,
so that they can learn from mistakes. Ministers must trust that citizens have the common

sense to see that it is smarter to ‘fail fast, fail small’ rather than to pretend that failure is

impossible. Citizens must trust that government will learn and improve, and that an

unsuccessful trial is not a waste of public resources. Being agile needs to be authorised.
Leaders should take heed of the words of the former Premier of NSW, the

Hon Barry O’Farrell, who extolled the value of public servants thinking differently, even if on

occasion failure was the result.259 As he said in a 2013 address to public servants, “[I]f you

are being innovative, and from time to time there are failures, don’t expect the Premier …. to

give you a hard time … if your goal was the correct goal. Because stuff ups do occur,
mistakes do happen—that’s why we trial things, that’s why we undertake pilots. But unless
… we have the courage to innovate, unless we have the courage to think about how to do

things differently, we won’t deliver the excellence that I’m determined to—through you—
across this state.”260

80
There is deep cynicism in some quarters around trials and pilots.
Committing to trials Some of it is well-founded. It is unfortunate that trials have often
means committing to been used in the past to fob off interest groups or to avoid
transparency and committing the level of resources necessary to tackle a hard
managing the
problem. These are trials employed as cost-saving measures rather
expectations of those
vested in the outcomes
than as a demonstration of effectiveness. On the other side,
ministers can be too eager to move to full scale at the first sign of
success in a trial. It takes time to understand why a trial succeeded in one instance and
whether this result can be repeated. Often success is based on particular factors—often, I
discovered in Indigenous Affairs, the leadership of a particular individual in the community.
Moving too fast inevitably results in disappointment when benefits are not replicated. Once a
decision has been made to grow to scale, a measured process is required to get there. Trials
can also be seen as an impediment to “getting on with the job”. There will be times when
government needs to move very fast and won’t have time for formal trials. At these times the
adaptive approach comes into its own: intensively monitoring, adjusting and evolving policy
roll-out reduces the risk of a fast-moving policy coming off the rails. Here is a good
opportunity to test and refine the implementation process. Otherwise, as the old saying goes,
there will be more haste and less speed.

Government must be genuine, open and honest about its reasons for trialling and piloting
programs and the timeframes within which they will take place. Announcing a trial need not
communicate a lack of commitment to following through on a policy. On the contrary, it
should mean that government is so committed to achieving a successful outcome that it will
carefully investigate the best way of doing so. Announcements will be less definitive, more
open to possibilities and, at least initially, involve smaller expenditures. There will be more
opportunities to talk about progress along the way. Major programs will increasingly begin in
minor ways.

Not every area of government operations will benefit from such an adaptive approach. It is
not a panacea. Adaptiveness is better suited to areas in which problems are complex,
uncertainty prevails, risks of failure are high, and there are a range of possible options for
intervention. Governments may find it challenging to invest the ‘patient capital’ to build new
programs that move to scale slowly. Patience, however, can provide its own very substantial
rewards.

In a world with 24-hour media cycles driven by ‘gotcha’ moments and
Having the humility to demands for greater accountability, it is difficult for government to
admit failure is the
admit failure.261 But to presume that no public servant will ever make a
essential first step

towards genuine change mistake is hubris. I made many and I’ve reflected publicly on why I
did.262 Accountability means being honest about the limitations of what
one knows, and having the courage to admit to a mistake and learn from it. For government
to become more adaptive, it will be critical to proclaim this message over and over: that

81
ministers and senior leaders who are truly accountable are those who admit to making

mistakes, and can demonstrate that they have learned from the experience.

It is a great shame that public trust in government institutions is not greater. It helps to

explain the even more worrying fact that young Australians are losing their faith in the

benefits of democracy.263 Adaptive government can provide a practical mechanism to rebuild

this trust, manage risks and demonstrate that government is both learning from the past and

responsive to the national challenges of the future—in partnership with citizens. Perhaps the

best way for the APS to honour the lessons from the HIP, and the failure of many other

major projects over the years, is to demonstrate that change has manifested itself in a new

culture of public service. Out of tragedy let there be transformation.

CONCLUSIONS | Embracing Adaptive Government

F.23 The default position that new policies proceed straight to large-scale
roll-out should be reversed and instead new policy proposals should include a
trial or demonstration stage, allowing new approaches to be developed fast and
evaluated early.

F.24 Staged decision-making for large projects should incorporate the
allocation of seed funding to agencies to develop a business case and
proof-of-concept, which can be tested before the project moves to a further
stage.

F.25 The Australian Government should fund an innovation competition to
encourage experimental, innovative community and business proposals for
improving the delivery of programs and services.

F.26 In order to improve contestability and citizen choice, departments should
facilitate the ability of contracted providers to take their own approaches to the
delivery of agreed performance-based outcomes.

F.27 As part of continuing effort to reduce red tape, greater efforts need to be
made to engage with communities and businesses to understand how
contractual conditions and administrative guidelines can be less prescriptive,
making it easier to work with government.

F.28 The APS should promote new forms of civil participation, including digital
and deliberative democracy techniques, in order to enhance consumer-directed
care, improve customer service, encourage greater citizen engagement and
inform the public economy.

82
The Future: Learning from Mistakes

Peter Shergold AC

“Contemplating the past, I have discovered that I’m able
to learn more from the failures I suffered as a public
sector CEO that from the successes I enjoyed. Equally
important, I have found that the public servants to whom I
speak … prefer to hear about the failures … It helps
people feel authorised to be more honest about their
mistakes and —supported by colleagues—consider how
best to make use of their experiences in the future”
(2015)264

Peter Shergold was the Secretary of the Department of
the Prime Minister and Cabinet from 2002 to 2007.

83
Acronyms

AAT Administrative Appeals Tribunal

APS Australian Public Service

APSC Australian Public Service Commission

ANAO Australian National Audit Office

ANZSOG Australia New Zealand School of Government

BCA Business Council of Australia

BER Building the Education Revolution

BRW Business Review Weekly

CRO Chief Risk Officer

DEEWR Department of Education, Employment and Workplace
Relations

DEWHA Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts

FOI Freedom of Information (Freedom of Information Act 1982)

GFC Global Financial Crisis

HIP Home Insulation Program

ICT Information and Communications Technology

IRA Implementation Readiness Assessment

MoPS Act Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984

NBN National Broadband Network

NPP New Policy Proposal

OCG Office of the Coordinator–General

PbR Payment by Results

PCG Project Control Group

PGPA Act Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act
2013

PM&C Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

SES Senior Executive Service

SRO Senior Responsible Officer

84
APPENDIX | ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND

CONSULTATION

Many people were generous with their time and thoughts as I developed the ideas in the

report. Some spoke to me. Others spent time with the Secretariat. I would like to thank them

all.

SECRETARIES ADVISORY PEER REVIEWERS
GROUP Professor Gary Banks AO
Glenys Beauchamp PSM
Yvonne Butler
Dr Gordon de Brouwer PSM
David Fredericks
Hon. John Lloyd PSM
Dr Nicholas Gruen
Lisa Paul AO PSM
Ian Hanger AM QC
Michael Pezzullo
Dr Allan Hawke AC
Elizabeth Kelly for Michael Thawley AO
Dr Stein Helgeby

Andrew Metcalfe AO

Professor Richard Mulgan

Martin Stewart-Weeks

ORGANISATIONS
Australian Futures Project Digital Transformation Office

AMP Limited Executive Intelligence Group

Apis Group Ernst & Young Australia

Attorney-General’s Department Institute of Public Administration Australia

Australian Border Force Lateral Economics Pty Ltd

Australian Institute of Project Management Melbourne School of Government,
The University of Melbourne
Australian National Audit Office
MetLife Insurance Limited
Australia New Zealand School of

85
Government National Archives of Australia

Australian Public Service Commission National Disability Insurance Agency

Australian Renewable Energy Agency newDemocracy Foundation

Australian Taxation Office NSW Office of Environment and Heritage

Civil Aviation Safety Authority NSW Department of Family and Community
Services
Crawford School of Public Policy,
The Australian National University NSW Public Service Commission

Deloitte Australia Office of Best Practice Regulation

Department of Employment Public Purpose Pty Ltd

Department of the Environment Save the Children

Department of Finance Tanner James Management Consultants

Department of Human Services The Australian Centre for Social Innovation

Department of Health ThinkClear Group

Department of Immigration and Border Transfield Services Limited
Protection
Victorian Department of Treasury and
Department of Industry and Science Finance

Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet

Department of the Treasury

INDIVIDUALS

Suhit Anantula, Robert Antich, Peter Arnaudo, Ralph Ashton, Drew Baker,
Ross Barnes, Ruth Bayley, Barbara Belcher AM, Teena Blewitt, Martin Bowles PSM, Rina

Bruinsma, David Bryant, Donna Burton, Yvonne Butler, Craig Calder,
Lieutenant General Angus Campbell DSC AM, Professor Lyn Carson, Barbara Cass,
Joe Castellino, Drew Clarke, Thea Daniel, Jose Del Rio, John Dickinson,
Dr Michael Di Francesco, Jan Dorrington PSM, Andrew England, Karin Fisher,
Ian Fitzgerald, Stephanie Foster PSM, Jamie Fox, Matthew Fraser, Catherine Friday,
Ivor Frischknecht, Julie Fursman, Leah Gabolinscy, Rebecca Gordon, Vanessa Graham,
Emma Greenwood, Terry Hanisch, Georgina Harrisson, Nick Hartland, Graeme Head,

86
John Howath, The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Tom Ioannou, Wayne Jackson AM, Kathy Jones,
Jo Laduzko, Geoff Leeper, Renée Leon PSM, Owen Livermore, Liz Locksley,
Tracie-Anne Maher, Neil Mann, Brendan MacDowell, Blair McAuliffe, Jason McNamara,
Ian McPhee AO PSM, Kerry Moir, Joe Monforte, Chris Moraitis PSM, Nicola Morris,
Kate Munnings, Annette Murphy, David Parker AM, Anthony Parsons, Ed Purrer, Liz Quinn,
Joe Raiti, Alex Roberts, Mick Roche AM, Paul Ronalds, Eamonn Rooney, Peter Rush,
Tricia Searson, David Schmitdchen, Brant Smith, Pip Spence, Professor Gary Sturgess AM,
Lembit Suur, Bruce Taloni, Mike Thornton, Professor Anne Tiernan,
Professor Michael Vitale, Iain Walker, Sue Weston, Peter Wilkinson, Neil Williams,
Simon Writer, and many others who assisted the above.

SECRETARIAT
Kelly Fisher (Head) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Will Atkinson Department of the Environment

Jade Carson Department of Education and Training

Mark Eslake Australian Renewable Energy Agency

Anthony McGregor Department of the Environment

Cindy Reese Mitchell Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Adele Moncur Australian Public Service Commission

Michael Payne Department of Immigration and Border Protection

Alison Reeve Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Kate Sullivan Department of the Environment

Graphic Design by Australian Public Service Commission
Jayne Abel

87
REVIEWER

Professor Peter Shergold AC was a senior public servant in the APS for 20 years. He

established the Office of Multicultural Affairs in 1987 and headed the Aboriginal and Torres

Strait Island Commission (ATSIC) from 1991. He was appointed Public Service

Commissioner from 1995-98. He served as Secretary of the Department of Employment,
Workplace Relations and Small Business from 1998-2002 and then as the Secretary of the

Department of Employment, Workplace Relations. In February 2003 he became Secretary of

the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet for five years.

Today Peter has a portfolio career. He was installed as Chancellor of the University of

Western Sydney in January 2011. He chairs Opal Aged Care and QuintessenceLabs. He is

a non-executive director on the boards of AMP Ltd (where he chairs the Risk Committee),
AMP Life, Veda Group and Corrs Chambers Westgarth.

Peter remains active in the public sector. He is chair of the NSW Public Service Commission

Advisory Board and chaired the Partnership Forum in Western Australia. He headed the

Ministerial Expert Group on Gambling under Prime Minister Rudd and, in 2013, completed a

report on community service sector reform for the Victorian Government. He chairs the

National Centre for Vocational Education Research and the Commonwealth’s Higher

Education Standards Panel and is a member of the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory

Council. He chaired the Aged Care Sector Committee and continues to lead the NSW Social

Investment Expert Advisory Group.

Peter is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FASSA), the Australia and New

Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG), the Institute of Public Administration Australia
(IPAA), the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) and the Australian Institute of

Management (AIM). He is a Senior Research Fellow at Singapore Civil Service College.

88
Endnotes

1
Hanger, I 2014, Report of the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program, Commonwealth of
Australia, Canberra, pp. 299, 315.
2
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 307, 317.
3
Hanger, I 2014, p. 308.
4
Hanger, I 2014, p. 308.
5
Hanger, I 2014, p. 311.
6
Dhir, A 2015, Challenging boardroom homogeneity: corporate law, governance and diversity, Cambridge
University Press; Forbes Insights 2011, ‘Global diversity and inclusion: fostering innovation through a diverse
workforce’, ;
Russel Reynolds Associates 2014, ’Interviews and findings, different is better: why diversity matters in the
boardroom’,
7
In 2012, 39.37 per cent of the SES were women as compared to only 10.7 per cent of Top 200 ASX Executive
Managers. According to AICD data as at 31 March 2015, the percentage of women on ASX 200 boards was
just 20 per cent, whereas as at 30 June 2014 women held 39.7 per cent of Australian government board
positions. Australian Public Service Commission, 2013—14 State of the Service report, Chapter 5, Senior
Women in the APS,
Australian Institute of Company Directors (2014), Appointments to S&P/ASX 200 Boards, Statistics, Director
Resource Centre,
8
Employment of individuals from Indigenous and non-English speaking backgrounds remained steady between
2013 and 2014 (2.4 per cent and 15.5 percent of total employment, respectively). In 2014, 84 per cent of all
APS employees were covered by a workplace diversity programme and 89 per cent of APS employees were
covered by a formal strategy for the engagement and accommodation of individuals with disabilities. Australian
Public Service Commission, State of the Service Report 2013-14: Appendix 5, Diversity,

9
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2015, Achieving public sector agility at times of
fiscal consolidation, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, p. 16,

10
For the first time in 2014, the number of Australians who trust government has fallen below 50 per cent, as
have the number who trust business, Edelamn 2015, ‘Edelman TrustBarometer’,

11
Hanger, I 2014, p. 300.
12
The concept of adaptation has been used as the basis for a variety of approaches in different contexts. For
example, ‘adaptive management’ is used in environmental resource management, ‘adaptive development’ is
used in the aid literature, ‘complex adaptive systems’ is used by complexity science and ‘adaptive leadership’ is
used in human resources literature. Adaptive government draws on many of the same foundational concepts but
applies them specifically to the government context.
13
Shergold P 2015, ‘Mea culpa—failure as the foundation of leadership,’ in P Crisp (ed.), So you want to be a
leader: influential people reveal how to succeed in public life, Hybrid Publishers, Melbourne, p. 109.
14
King, A & Crew, I 2013, The Blunders of our governments, Oneworld Publications, London.
15
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 241-268.
16
Department of the Treasury 2009, ‘$42 Billion Nation Building and Jobs Plan’, N.009 Joint Media Release
with the Prime Minister, 3 February,

17
Department of the Treasury 2009, ‘Energy Efficient Homes—Ceiling Insulation in 2.7 Million Homes’, N.014
Joint Media Release with The Prime Minister & Minister for the Environment, 3 February,

18
Hanger, I 2014, p. 1.
19
Hanger, I 2014, p. 2.
20
Australian National Audit Office 2010 Home Insulation Program—Department of Environment, Water,
Heritage and the Arts, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Medicare Australia, Audit Report
No. 12 2010—11: Performance Audit, p. 26., Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

21
Hanger, I 2014, p. 83.
22
Hanger, I 2014, p. 306.
23
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 25-28.
24
Hanger, I 2014, p. 3.
25
Hanger, I 2014, p. 2.
26
Hanger, I 2014, p. 156.
27
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 26-27.

89
28
Hanger, I 2014, p. 5.
29
Hawke, A 2010, Review of the administration of the Home Insulation Program, Canberra; Senate Standing
Committee on Environment, Communications and the Arts 2010, ‘Committee report: Energy Efficient Homes
Package: ceiling insulation’, Canberra; and ANAO, Audit Report No. 12 2010–11.
30
Kelly, P 2014, Triumph or demise: the broken promise of a Labor generation, Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne, p. 227.
31
Hanger, I 2014, p. 96.
32
Hanger, I 2014, p. 5.
33
Hanger, I 2014, p. 27.
34
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 304-306.
35
Hanger, I 2014, p. 116.
36
Hanger, I 2014, p. 137.
37
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 114-119.
38
Hawke, I 2014, p. 43.
39
Hanger, I 2014, p. 3.
40
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 244, 260.
41
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 263-267.
42
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 285-293.
43
Australian Labor Party 2013, Statement on Government Action on Home Insulation Program, media release,
9 August
44
These were the Foil Insulation Safety Program (FISP) and the Home Insulation Safety Program (HISP).
45
These were the Insulation Workers Adjustment Package and the Insulation Industry Assistance Package.
46
McPhee, I (Auditor General) 2011, Opening Statement on Audit Report No.12-2010-11, Report of the Joint
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 23 March, Canberra.
47
The Hon Greg Hunt MP (Minister for the Environment) 2014, Government response to the Home Insulation
Program Royal Commission, media release, 23 December,
.
48
The Hon Tony Abbott MP (Prime Minister of Australia) 2014, ‘Statement to Parliament on the Royal
Commission report into the Home Insulation Program’, 30 September, Canberra
; Department of Industry and Science 2015, ‘Home Insulation Program Industry Payment
Scheme’,
49
Scales, B 2014, Independent audit: NBN public policy processes, April 2008-May 2010, Canberra, p. xiv.
50
Scales, B 2014, p. xxviii.
51
Scales, B 2014, p. xxx.
52
Scales, B 2014, pp. x.
53
Scales, B 2014, p. x.
54
Hanger, I 2014, p. 296; Scales, B 2014, p. 27.
55
Scales, B 2014, p. x.
56
Scales, B 2014, p. xxxiv.
57
Building the Education Revolution Implementation Taskforce 2011, Building the Education Revolution
Implementation Taskforce—final report, p. 9, Australian Government, Canberra.
58
Building the Education Revolution Implementation Taskforce 2011, pp. 10-12, 51.
59
Kelly, P 2014, p. 169.
60
Lewsi, C, Dollery, B, Kortt, M.A 2014, ‘Building the Education Revolution: another case of Australian
Government failure?’, International Journal of Public Administration, vol. 37, no. 5, p. 306.
61
Easton, S 2014, ‘Jane Halton on central reform in her new Finance fiefdom’, The Mandarin, 20 November,
online,
62
Australian National Audit Office 2007, Audit Report No. 24 2006-07: Customs’ Cargo Management Re-
engineering Project, Australian Customs Service, Canberra, pp. 16-17.
63
ANAO 2006-07, p. 28.
64
Baker, P 2008, ‘Terminal 5: could it happen to you?’, Logistics and Transport Focus, vol. 10, issue 6, pp. 37-
39.
65
Hemant, K 2013, ‘Why IT Projects Really Fail', CIO,

66
The Standish Group International, Inc. 2014, ‘Big Bang Boom’, 99.1-12,

67
RSM Bird Cameron 2015, ’Internal Audit Report: review of the Green Army Programme’, 16 June,
Department of the Environment, Canberra.
68
Scales, B 2014, p. 27; Hanger, I 2014, p. 83; Hawke, A 2010, p. 17.
69
Scales, B 2014, p. 101.
70
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 169, 302-303.
71
Hanger, I 2014, p. 317.

90
72
Hanger, I 2014, p. 307.
73
Pezzullo, M 2014, ‘Leading change in the Australian Public Service: The case of the Department of
Immigration and Border Protection’, speech to The National Public Sector Managers and Leaders Conference,
Melbourne, 17 April.
74
Burgess, V 2015, ‘Michael Thawley takes stock after first four months in top job’, Australian Financial
Review, 9 April.
75
Government 2.0 Taskforce 2009, Engage: Getting on with Government 2.0, Australian Government
Information Management Office, Canberra.
76
Bovens, M 2005, ‘Public Accountability’ in E Felie, L Lynn & C Pollitt (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public
Management, pp. 194-196, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
77
Greber, J 2015 ‘Treasury’s John Fraser blames media, FOI for bad policy’, Australian Financial Review, 19
May.
78
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2011, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act 1982,
Australian Government, Canberra.
79
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 1982, section 11(b), (Commonwealth of Australia).
80
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000 (United Kingdom), Section 36; Official Information Act 1982 (New
Zealand), s. 9(2)(g)(i).
81
Right to Information Act 2009 (Queensland), Schedule 4; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tasmania), Schedule
1.
82
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Victoria), Section 30; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (South Australia),
Schedule 1, Part 3, Section 9(1); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Western Australia), Schedule 1, Clause 6.
83
Easton, S 2015, ‘Government off the record: the limits of transparency’, The Mandarin, 16 March.
84
Evans, C 2013, ‘Better policy responses: How well does the public service support ministers?’, speech to the
Institute of Public Administration Australia National Conference, Canberra, 21 November.
85
Banks, G 2013, ‘Restoring trust in public policy: what role for the public service?’ Garran Oration 2013,
speech to the Australian Institute of Public Administration, Canberra, 21 November.
86
Hawke, A 2013, ‘Review of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and Australian Information Commissioner
Act 2010’, p. 48, Australian Government, Canberra.
87
Hawke, A 2013, p. 49.
88
Wright & Parnell and Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet [2015] AICmr 13 (3 February 2015). See
also Crowe and Department of the Treasury [2013] AICmr 69, Parnell & Dreyfus and Attorney-General’s
Department [2014] AICmr 71 and Crowe and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet [2014] AICmr 72.
89
Freedom of Information Act 1982, section 47(c), (Commonwealth of Australia).
90
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2014, Annual Report 2013-14, pp. 135-136, Australian
Government, Sydney,
91
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2010, Ahead of the Game: blueprint for the reform of Australian
Government administration, p. ix, Australian Government, Canberra.
92
Hanger 2014, p. 319.
93
The National Archives of Australia officially endorses the Australia Standard ISO 15489 for use by all
Australian Government agencies.
94
Management Advisory Committee 2007, Note for file—A report on record keeping in the APS, Australian
Public Service Commission, Canberra,
95
Australian National Audit Office 2012, ‘Records Management in the APS and the Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act)’, Audit No 53 (2011-12), Canberra. The PGPA Act
specifies records must be kept about performance (s. 37), and transactions and financial position (s. 41).
96
‘Keep the Knowledge—Make a Record’ is a training package development by the National Archives of
Australia to assist all public servants and APS contractors to understand their obligations regarding records
management. It explicitly includes all forms of digital messaging in the list of what constitutes a record and
provides guidance on how to determine whether those records need to be saved in to the department records
management system. Such training is valuable and should be more widely accessed. See National Archives of
Australia 2015, ‘Keep the Knowledge—Make a Record’,
97
Weller, P 2007, Cabinet Government in Australia, 1901-2006: practice, principles, performance, UNSW Press,
Sydney, pp. 278-280.
98
Hanger, I 2014, p. 306.
99
Scales, B 2014, pp. 83-84.
100
Scales, B 2014, p. xi.
101
Turnbull, M 2013, ‘Leadership in times of uncertainty’, Speech presented at the 2013 Sir John Monash
Oration at the Jewish Museum, Sydney, 5 July.
102
Kelly, P 2014, p. 206.

91
103
Chubb, P 2014, Power failure: The inside story of politics under Rudd and Gillard, Black Inc, Collingwood,
p. 15.
104
Kelly, P 2014, pp. 152-153.
105
Hanger, I 2014, p. 169.
106
Cornall, R 2012, ‘Impressions, observations and lesson from a Canberra outsider’ in Wanna J, Vincent S,
Podger A (eds.) 2012, With the benefit of hindsight—valedictory reflections from departmental secretaries,
2004-2011, ANU E-Press, Canberra,
107
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015, Cabinet Handbook, 8th Edition, p. 18, Australian
Government, Canberra,.
108
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015, p. 9.
109
Cornall, R 2012, p. 80.
110
Hanger, I 2014, p. 306.
111
See Shergold, P 2012, ‘Peter Shergold: political staffers aren’t killing the public service’, The Conversation,
October 26, online ; Shergold, P 2014, ‘Peter Shergold: modern mandarins: fearful and politicised’, The Mandarin,
27 October, online
112
Westacott, J 2012, ‘Restoring a high performing public service’, Speech presented at the Institute of Public
Administration Australia (IPAA) 2012 International Congress, Melbourne, 20 September.
113
D’Angelo, L F 2012, ‘Ministerial Staffers Behaving Badly’, BRW, 26 September, online

114
Ashpole, L 2012, ‘Are ministerial advisers really the villains here?’ The Drum Online. 24 September, online

115
Russell, D 2014, ‘Reflections on my time in Canberra’, Speech presented at the Australian National
University, Canberra, 31 March,
116
Hanger, I 2014, p. 169.
117
Podger, A 2014, ‘Public servants should not just say ‘Yes, Minister,’ Australian Financial Review,
10 September, online
118
Tiernan, A 2007, Power without responsibility, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney,
pp. 171-208; Senate Select Committee for an inquiry into a Certain Maritime Incident 2002,

119
Donaldson, D 2015, ‘We’re not there to be popular: Treasury boss John Fraser’, The Mandarin, 18 May,
online
120
Australian Government 2013, Statement of standards for ministerial staff,

121
United Kingdom Cabinet Office 2010, Code of conduct for special advisers, Clause 7,
; Privy Council Office Canada 2011, Accountable government: a guide for ministers and
ministers of state,
122
Moran, T 2012, ‘In Conversation with Professor John Alford’ speech at the Australia and New Zealand School
of Government and the Melbourne School of Business, 1 November, online
123
Mulgan, R 2012, ‘Advisers are already held to account’, The Ethics Centre, 1 February, online

124
Australian Public Service Commission 2011, State of the Service Report 2010-11, Canberra,

125
Hanger, I 2014, p. 22.
126
Hanger, I 2014, p. 303.
127
Hanger, I 2014, p. 307.
128
Hanger, I 2014, p. 308.
129
International Organization for Standardization, ISO31000—Risk management,

130
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 157, 179-180, 209, 309-310.
131
Hanger, I 2014, p. 310.
132
Hawke, A 2010, p. 43.
133
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 157, 238–239, 309.
134
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 2015, Comcover Risk Management Benchmarking Programme 2015: key findings
report, Department of Finance, Canberra.
135
Of the 156 entities surveyed by self-assessment, two thirds of respondents reported not measuring whether
their risk management procedures have supported the achievement of agency objectives, around half of

92
respondents do not define responsibility for managing risk with staff performance agreements, and over two
thirds of respondents do not provide risk management training to SES officers.
136
Department of Finance 2014, Commonwealth Risk Management Policy, p. 3, Australian Government,
Canberra,
137
Earned autonomy in the PGPA Act means taking a targeted and risk-based approach to financial framework
regulation. The nature and extent of oversight and regulatory intervention exercised will depend on an entity’s
risk profile and performance. See the Explanatory Memorandum at

138
Laker, J F 2013, ‘The importance of good governance’, Speech presented to the Australian British Chamber of
Commerce, Melbourne, 27 February,
139
The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (sections 15-19) outlines the duties and
responsibilities of the accountable authority under the Act, including the requirement to keep the responsible
Minister and Finance Minister informed of decisions relating to the entity. Supporting this, the Commonwealth
Risk Management Policy outlines nine elements underpinning the Commonwealth’s risk management policy,
including the requirement to develop a positive risk culture (Element Five), communicate and consult on risk in
a timely manner with internal and external stakeholders (Element Six).
140
Survey of attendees at the APSC’s SES Risk Management Program between November 2014 and February
2015. Attendees were asked prior to and after attendance at the course whether “I am confident I am able to
effectively advise senior APS decision-makers and relevant portfolio ministers on a coordinated response to
whole-of-government and shared risks”. Prior to the course, only 57 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with this
statement, this number rose to 91 per cent after attending the course.
141
McPhee, I 2014, ‘Public Sector Risk Management—not walking too early to the winner’s circle’, Speech
presented to the Risk Management Institutions of Australasia, 2 October,

142
The general duties of company directors are prescribed in the Corporations Act 2001, sections 180-190B. This
includes the requirement to make judgements in good faith for a proper purpose, informed about the subject
matter of the judgement to the extent that a reasonable person would believe to be appropriate.
143
Thomson, P 2015, ‘Public Service boss’ pep talk: Industry Department Secretary Glenys Beauchamp’, The
Canberra Times, 29 March.
144
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2015.
145
Dunn, J 2015, ‘Risk remains much the same in the public sector’, Australian Financial Review, 13 April,
online
146
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2015, Prudential Standard CPS 220, para. 39.
147
Kaplan R S, Mikes A, Simmons R, Tufano P & Hofman M 2009, ‘Managing risk in the new world’, Harvard
Business Review, October 2009,
148
Jackall, R 1983, ‘Moral mazes: bureaucracy and managerial work’, Harvard Business Review, September –
October 1983, p. 120.
149
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, section 16.
150
Australian National Audit Office 2015, Public Sector Audit Committees: independent assurance and advice
for Accountable Authorities, Australian Government, Canberra.
151
Since 1 July 2015, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014, section 17(4), has
required that for a non-corporate Commonwealth entity the majority of members on an audit committee must be
persons who are not officials of the entity; and that for a corporate Commonwealth entity the majority of
members must be persons who are not employees of the entity.
152
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012, ‘Forward thinking for the audit and risk committee’, Audit and Risk Committee
Matters, March, p. 3, PWC suggests that the decision to separate the risk committee from the audit committee
may be influenced by the complexity of the operating environment (especially if it has recently changed), the
segregation (or not) of risk and audit in the rest of the organisation, and whether dealing with risk matters
distracts the audit committee from dealing with audit matters.
153
Explanatory Memorandum, Public Governance and Performance Accountability Bill 2013, [54-60], Public
Governance and Performance Accountability Act 2013, section 101(2).
154
McPhee I, 2014.
155
Hanger, I 2014, p. 299.
156
Hanger, I 2014, p. 301.
157
Shergold, P, quoted in T Mendham 2005, ‘The State of Project Management’, CIO, 1 November, online,

158
The Capability Review reports can be found online at Australian Public Service Commission 2011-15,
‘Capability Reviews program’,
159
ANAO audit reports reviewed included: Department of Defence, Capability Development Reform (30 October
2013); Department of Defence, Recruitment and Retention of Specialist Skills for Navy (18 December 2014);
Department of Defence, Multi-Role Helicopter Program (25 June 2014); Department of Industry,

93
Commercialisation Australia Program (17 June 2014); Departments of the Prime Minister & Cabinet and
Human Services, The Improving School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (25 June
2014); Department of Agriculture and Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Screening of
International Mail (18 June 2014); Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations and
Department of Human Services, Cross-Agency Coordination of Employment Programs (17 June 2013);
AusAID, AusAID’s Management of Infrastructure Aid to Indonesia (28 May 2013); Department of
Employment, Administration of the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (23 April 2015); Department of Education and
Training, Administration of the Australian Apprenticeships Incentives Program (23 April 2015).
160
Hanger, I 2014, p. 302.
161
Hanger, I 2014, p. 305.
162
Moran, T 2014, ‘On Reflection’, Public Administration Today, Issue 40 (October 2014), pp. 4-5.
163
Shergold P 2006, ‘Project management in public administration’, Speech presented at ANZSOG Conference
on Project Management and Organisational Change, Canberra, 22 February.
164
North, J 2014, ‘Outcome-based contracting is on the up: Who's doing it, why, and what you need to know
about it’, Corrs Chambers Westgarth Lawyers, 13 May,
165
Project Management Institute 2005, The standard for program management, Second Edition, Pennsylvania,
USA.
166
Tanner James Management Consultants 2014, ‘P3M3 Assessment Report—Department of Human Services
2014,
167
Kerzner, H 2015, Project management 2.0—leveraging tools, distributed collaboration and metrics for project
success, International Institute for Learning Inc, New York, USA.
168
Hanger 2014, pp. 303-304.
169
Netherlands Ministry of Finance 2000, Government Governance— Corporate governance in the public sector;
why and how?, Government Audit Policy Directorate, The Hague, Netherlands.
170
Australian National Audit Office and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2015, Better Practice
Guide– Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives, p. 23, Australian Government, Canberra.
171
Evans B & Saphea H, 2015, ‘Are non-government policy actors being heard? Assessing New Public
Governance in three Canadian provinces’, paper presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Canadian
Association of Program in Public Policy and Administration, Glendon College, York University, May 25-26.
172
Considine M & Lewis J 2003 ’Bureaucracy, Network or Enterprise? Comparing Models of Governance in
Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.’ Public Administration Review, Vol. 65, no. 2,
pp. 131-140.
173
Perrin B 2015, ‘Bringing accountability up to date with the realities of public sector management in the 21st
century’, Canadian Public Administration, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 183-203.
174
For example, the Department of Finance facilitates a P3M3 community of practice; the Department of Social
Services facilitates a business analysis community of practice. Externally, organisations such as Corporate
Executive Board, the Canberra Evaluation Forum, the Australian Institute of Project Management and the
Project Management Institute facilitate online forums and communities of practice.
175
Hanger, I 2014, p. 302.
176
The Department of Industry and Science 2015, ‘Single Business Service’,
177
Bryan K, Herbert, I 2012 ‘Raising the standard—organisational design: the role and form of the Centre of
Excellence’, Management Services, Journal of the Institute of Management Services, Summer, vol. 56, no. 2,
pp. 30-35.
178
United Kingdom Cabinet Office 2011, ‘Major Projects Authority’,

179
Department of Finance 2014, ‘Assurance reviews and risk assessments’,

180
SES roles are set out in section 35(3) of the Public Service Act 1999.
181
Public Service Amendment Act 2013, part 3, section 5.
182
Hanger, I 2014, p. 311.
183
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 301.
184
Scales, B 2014, pp. xvii, xx, xxx.
185
Hanger, I 2014, p. 304.
186
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 303-304.
187
Hanger, I 2014, p. 304.
188
Australian Public Service Commission 2014, ‘Length of service’, 2013-14 Statistical Bulletin, Canberra.
189
Watt, I 2013, ‘Address to the APS: the path forward for the APS’, Speech presented to the APS at the Rydges
Lakeside Hotel, Canberra, 5 December.
190
Drew, G & Cooper, R 2011, Job mobility research report: encouraging employees to expand their career
experience in the Australian Public Service, a report prepared for the Australian Public Service Commission,

94
Queensland University of Technology, p. 4.

191
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2010, Ahead of the game: blueprint for the reform of

Australian Government administration, Canberra, p. ix.
192
Australian Public Service Commission 2012, APS Statistical Bulletin 2013-12 Section 4: Movements of
ongoing employees, Australian Government, Canberra,

193
Thomson, P 2015, ‘Public service boss’s pep talk: Industry Department Secretary Glenys Beauchamp’, The
Canberra Times, 29 March.
194
To address this issue within superannuation, the CSS and PSS superannuation schemes include a ‘leave in the
public interest’ provision, which enables an employer other than the Commonwealth to contribute to the
superannuation scheme while the employee is on leave from the APS. See Australian Government
Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation CSF07 10/08, Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme, ‘Leave
Without Pay (LWOP)’, ; Australian Government
Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation, Public Sector Superannuation Scheme, ‘Leave Without Pay
(LWOP)’,
195
Stewart-Weeks, M 2014, ‘Redesigning the public service: architecture and culture’, blog post, 26 July,
< http://publicpurpose.com.au/?p=174>
196
The White House website n.d, ‘Presidential Innovation Fellowship’,

197
The Social Mobility Foundation website 2015, ‘Whitehall residential program’,

198
Winston Churchill Memorial Trust 2015, ‘About the Churchill Trust’,
199
McNulty, Y 2009, Measuring expatriate return on investment in global firms—industry report for
participating firms and their expatriates, Technical Report, Monash University, Melbourne.
200
Davidson, A 2015, ‘What Hollywood can teach us about the future of work’, The New York Times, 5 May. See
also Henry, Z 2015, ‘3 reasons you should adopt the ‘Hollywood model’ of doing business’ May 15,

201
Burgess, V 2015, ‘Michael Thawley takes stock after first four months in top job’, Australian Financial
Review, 9 May.
202
Boynton, A & Fischer, B 2005, Virtuoso teams: the extraordinary stories of extraordinary teams, Pearson
Education Limited, United Kingdom.
203
National Library of Australia website n.d, ’About Trove’,
204
Easton, S 2015, ‘Lloyd’s law: commissioner’s tough talk on productivity’, The Mandarin, 11 March.
205
Hanger, I 2014, p. 305.
206
Hanger, I 2014, p. 311.
207
Panchamia, N and Thomas, P 2014, ‘Civil service reform in the real world: patterns of success in UK Civil
Service reform’, Institute for Government, United Kingdom,

208
Hanger, I 2014, p. 2.
209
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 209, 309.
210
Hanger, I 2014, p. 300.
211
Hanger, I 2014, pp. 299-300.
212
Scales, B 2014, p. 80.
213
Hanger, I 2014, p. 83.
214
Hanger, I 2014, p. 97.
215
Hanger, I 2014, p. 234.
216
Australian National Audit Office 2010, ‘Building the Education Revolution—Primary Schools for the 21st
Century’, Audit Report No. 33 2009-10: Performance Audit, Canberra ,

217
Pearce, R 2015 ‘DTO chief: Australia could be 'best in the world' for digital government’
Computerworld 31 July; Thompson, P (2015) ‘‘We are failing’: Digital Transformation Office CEO Paul
Shetler warns public service’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 July.
218
An independent review of the NDIS has been commissioned by the Department of Social Services,
. Information on the National Evaluation of the Communities for Children
Initiative is available at Muir, K et al 2010, ‘The national evaluation of the Communities for Children
initiative’, . Work undertaken for the Closing The Gap
clearing house (Curth-Bibb, J, Moran, M and Porter, D 2014, Funding Indigenous organisations: improving
governance performance through innovations in public finance management in remote Australia,
) found
that flexibility was a key component of success for contracts with Indigenous organisations. An evaluation of
the Home Care Packages Programme and Consumer Directed Care is currently being undertaken by KPMG,

95
with results to be published in 2015. Further information is available from Department of Social Services 2015,
‘Evaluation of the Home Care Packages Programme and Consumer Directed Care’,
. The Digital
Transformation Office outline undertaking an experimental approach as an important principle: Digital
Transformation Office 2015, ‘Principles of digital service’,
219
See for example the Australian Centre for Social Innovation’s Family by Family program in South Australia
and NSW, The Australian Centre for Social Innovation 2015, Family by Family program,
; and Uniting Care Burnside’s ‘Newpin bond’ in NSW: NSW
Department of Premier and Cabinet 2015, ‘Social benefit bonds’,

220
See Department of Finance 2015, ‘Managing performance’, < http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-
management/performance/>
221
NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet 2015, ‘Social benefit bonds’.
222
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2015, ‘Partnering for the greater good—the
role of the private sector in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty in the Indo-Pacific region,’
Inquiry of the Foreign Affairs and Aid Sub-Committee, Recommendation 22,

223
Sundheim, D 2013, ‘To increase innovation, take the sting out of failure’, Harvard Business Review, January 9
2013,
224
The Behavioural Insights Team 2014-2015, ‘What are behavioural insights?’,

225
The White House Social and Behavioral Science Team is part of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
See White House Social and Behavioral Science Team n.d, ‘Using behavioural science insights to make
Government more effective, simpler and more people-friendly’,

226
Hawke, A 2010, p. 29.
227
See the Australian Tax Office’s project to improve payment compliance, Australian Taxation Office 2014,
‘Better communication to improve payment compliance’, ; and the joint report between CSIRO
and the Department of Human Services 2014, Transforming human services for the digital era,

228
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, section 17.
229
Parkinson, M 2014, ‘A Treasury for the future: organisational change and Treasury’s capability’, Speech
presented at the Institute of Public Administration Australia, Canberra, 20 March,

230
Department of Social Services 2015, ‘Consumer directed care (CDC) in home care packages’,

231
Department of Finance 2009, National Government Information Sharing Strategy, pp. 12-13,
.The issue of information silos is discussed in the
following report: Office of the Information Commissioner 2013, Open Public Sector Information: From
Principles to Practice,
232
Cutler, T 2008, Venturous Australia – building strength in innovation, (Cutler Report), p. 21,

233
Australian Research Council 2015, ‘ARC Open Access Policy’,
234
National Institutes of Health 2004, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’,

235
Examples include The Institute for Government < http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/>; Nesta
< http://www.nesta.org.uk/>; and the Alliance for Useful Evidence .
236
Johnson, M 2014, ‘Before the Decade is OUT: What if the “Giants of the Web” Designed Government Service
Delivery’,
237
Sturgess, G 2015, Contestability in public services: an alternative to outsourcing, ANZSOG Research
Monograph, Melbourne.
238
Breckon, J 2015, Better public services through experimental government, Alliance for Useful Evidence,
United Kingdom, p. 5.

96
239
About GovHack, sourced from .
240
Government 2.0 Taskforce 2009, Engage—Getting on with Government 2.0, Department of Finance,
Canberra,

241
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2014, United Nations E-Government Survey 2014,
p. 217,
242
Lateral Economics Pty Ltd 2014, Open for business: how open data can help achieve the G20 Growth Target,
commissioned by Omidyar Network, pp. 34 – 35,

243
Barnes M, Skelcher C, Beiren H, Dalziel R, Jeffares S & Wilson L 2008, Designing citizen-centred
governance, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom,

244
UK Cabinet Office 2008, UK governance approach to public sector reform, United Kingdom; Martin, S 2006,
Promoting effective leadership: citizenship and community empowerment, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister,
United Kingdom; Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2009, Citizen involvement in local government,

245
WA Department of the Premier and Cabinet 2006, ‘Working together: involving community and stakeholders
in decision-making’, Office of Citizens and Civics, Perth, p. 33.
246
Whittaker, J 2014, ‘How a banker delivered happy customers to the NSW Government’, The Mandarin,
22 August, < http://www.themandarin.com.au/2078-customer-service-nsw-banker-comes-rescue/>
247
Australian Government Web Guide 2012, ‘Government 2.0 Tools’,
248
Australian Government Web Guide 2012, ‘Government 2.0 Tools’.
249
Department of Finance n.d, ‘About ‘data.gov.au’,
250
Smith, G & Wales, C 2002, ‘Citizen’s juries and deliberative democracy’, Political Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 1,
pp. 51-65.
251
United Kingdom Department for Business, Innovation and Skills n.d, ‘We Asked, You Said, We Did’,

252
See the South Australian Government’s use of a citizen’s jury to agree fair apportionment of infrastructure
funding for the South-East drainage network, NewDemocracy Foundation 2015, ‘Who pays? Agreeing fair
shares in infrastructure funding (South Eastern drainage)’,
253
See the Western Australia’s use of a citizen’s jury to develop and implement sustainability plans in the Greater
Geraldton City Region, NewDemocracy Foundation 2015, ‘Geraldton 2029 and beyond’,
<‘http://www.newdemocracy.com.au/library/case-studies/oceania/142-geraldton-2029-and-beyond>
254
Digital Transformation Office 2015, ‘About the Digital Transformation Office,
255
The first GovHack event was in 2009, funded by the Gov2.0 Taskforce, < https://www.govhack.org/>.
256
Easton, S 2015, ‘Martin Bowles: we’re changing the culture at Health’, The Mandarin, 8 July, online

257
William Gibson, quoted in The Economist 2003, ‘Books of the Year 2003’, 4 December.
258
NSW Public Service Commission Advisory Board 2014, Doing things differently: raising productivity,
improving service and enhancing collaboration across the NSW Public Sector, p. 5,

259
NSW Public Service Commission Advisory Board 2014, p. 4.
260
NSW Public Service Commission 2014, Doing Things Differently: Raising Productivity, Improving Service
and Enhancing Collaboration across the NSW Public Sector, p. 4.
261
Ergas, H 2009, ‘Is government the best risk manager?’, Policy, Vol. 25, No 3, Spring 2009; Gruen, N 2012,
‘”Soft” secrecy in the media age’, blog post, Lowy Interpreter, 12 March,

262
Shergold, P quoted in P Crisp (ed.), So you want to be a leader: influential people reveal how to succeed in
public life, Hybrid Publishers, Melbourne, p. 109; Karvelas, P 2013, ‘My 20 years of failure to close the gap’,
Weekend Australian, 1 June.
263
Oliver, Alex 2015, The Lowy Institute Poll 2015, p. 15,

264
Shergold, P quoted in P Crisp (ed.) 2015, p. 109.

97
Enhancing policy
implementation capabilities
in the Public Sector

A guide to programme and project management
training and workplace learning
Introduction
The purpose of this e-book is to provide information to public service departments and agencies facing
policy implementation challenges or considering programme or project management training.

It is designed to help decision-makers:

• Determine whether programme or project management is relevant to the challenges faced;
• Have an awareness of global best practice programme and project management frameworks; and
• Know what things they should consider, including the role of senior executives, available
qualifications and how learning is translated into workplace practices.

If after reading the e-book you would like more information, please contact us:
1300 774 623
info@tannerjames.com.au

We will be happy to meet with you to have an obligation-free conversation about your specific
circumstances.

About Tanner James
Founded in 1994, Tanner James has an unequalled track record in helping public service departments
and agencies build their capability to manage benefits-led change and deliver new policy initiatives
using best practice programme or project management frameworks. We have trained thousands of
people and have assisted hundreds of programmes and projects.

We hold international and national training and consulting accreditations and also conduct
examinations and competency assessments. Tanner James is committed to practical application of
learning in the workplace and flexible delivery of services to meet client needs.

This e-book contains quotations sourced from the Australian Public Service Commission publication Learning from Failure by Professor
Peter Shergold. This material is licensed for reuse under a Creative Commons BY attribution 3.0 Australian licence.
The Swirl logo™ and The AXELOS Consulting Partner Logo™ are trade marks of AXELOS LIMITED, used under permission of
AXELOS Limited. All rights reserved.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 2
Contents
2 Introduction

4 Policy implementation capabilities and why are they needed

5 How programme and project management can help

6 Global best practice for programme and project management

7 Programme and project management learning considerations

8 Senior executive involvement

9 Workplace implementation

10 Formal qualifications

11 FAQs

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
12 Programme and Project Management Learning Considerations Checklist

13 Value for money

14 Questions?

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 3
Policy implementation capabilities
and why are they needed
In 2014 Ian Hanger AM QC led the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program. He said in
the Report of the Royal Commission:

“ I do not think the deficiencies I have identified are ones that could only have occurred in the
specific circumstances of the Home Insulation Program. Several systemic or fundamental
shortcomings can be identified which not only are capable of repetition … but which might be
avoided through diligence and the taking of some additional measures. I would recommend
that the Australian Government use the experience of the Home Insulation Program as a means
by which to learn from the mistakes identified in the report, many of which can be traced to
overconfidence and unrealistic optimism.
”
In response the Australian Government asked Professor Peter Shergold AC to lead an independent
review of Government processes for the development and implementation of large public programmes
and projects. Professor Shergold delivered his report “Learning from Failure: Why large government
policy initiatives have gone so badly wrong in the past and how the chances of success in the future can
be improved” in 2015. The report is available on the APSC website here.

The report identified ten key lessons that emerged and can be learned, including:

1. Policy is only as good as the manner in which it is implemented.
2. As the public service fully commits itself to measuring results by outcomes, program
   management needs to be accorded far greater professional status.

   From the key lessons the review identified six reform directions, one of which was Enhancing Program
   Management, itself underpinned by four specific proposals for improvement:

   D.13 The Australian Public Service Commission should work with industry associations to develop
   standards of proficiency for public sector project and program managers, with agencies
   committing to support these staff through career development opportunities, continued
   education and participation in professional communities of practice.
   D.14 For all projects and programs, there needs to be a clear understanding about who accepts end-
   to-end responsibility for managing implementation, wields delegated authority and where
   accountability resides.
   D.15 The APS should establish a ‘tiger team’ capacity by which service wide expertise can be harnessed
   to assist Senior Responsible Officers in the management of high risk, large-scale projects.
   D.16 Whilst acknowledging that different departments have different workforce needs, Senior
   Executive Service selection criteria should place greater emphasis on program leadership when
   considering a candidate’s demonstrated breadth of experience.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 4
How Programme and Project
Management can help
Policy implementation usually involves the introduction of change to public service departments and
the outcomes to be delivered. Often this change is on a large scale. Introducing such change brings
with it a number of features and challenges:

• Working across organisational boundaries inside and outside the public service;
• Dealing with multiple stakeholders and conflicting interests;
• Knowing who has accountability and responsibility for what;
• Maintaining alignment between strategic objectives and day-to-day work;
• Creating clarity of purpose, such that all involved know what must be done by when;
• Working with new and unfamiliar concepts or technologies, often in demanding timescales.

Programmes and projects are the means by which we introduce change.

• A Programme is created to coordinate, direct and oversee the implementation of a set of related
projects and activities in order to deliver benefits related to an organization’s strategic objectives.
• A Project is created for the purpose of delivering one or more business products according to an
agreed Business Case.

Programmes and projects are both temporary, flexible organizations, and are run using the professional
disciplines of programme management and project management.

• Programme Management is the coordinated organization, direction and implementation of a dossier
of projects and transformation activities (i.e. the programme) to achieve outcomes and realize
benefits of strategic importance to the business.
• Project Management is the planning, delegating, monitoring and control of all aspects of the
project, and the motivation of those involved, to achieve the project objectives within the expected
performance targets for time, cost, quality, scope, benefits and risks.

Implementing change in the public service is much easier when programmes and projects are correctly
set-up as temporary organizations, and effectively governed and managed by public servants who have
the required competencies for their programme or project management roles.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 5
Global Best Practice for Programme
and Project Management
Programme management and project management are professional disciplines. Yet as the Shergold
Review observed:

“ The terms ‘project management’ and ‘programme management’ are often used interchangeably
in the APS without full understanding of their meaning.
”
Fortunately proven, global best practices are available for the implementation of large public programmes
and projects in Australia and internationally. Employing a best practice programme or project
management framework increases the odds of success by building the necessary skills to help organizations
manage and deliver change while obtaining real, measurable value. Embedding them in an organization
will support the delivery of strategic policy objectives in the most cost-effective way possible.

AXELOS’ best practice guidance and certifications, developed over 30 years in partnership with
government, industry and academia, help address the challenges for organizational change.
AXELOS Global Best Practice include:
PRINCE2® - the world’s most practiced project management method,
and the de facto standard for Australian public sector projects. It
TRAINING ORGANIZATION ACCREDITED BY provides guidance that gives individuals and organizations the essentials
ON BEHALF OF
of running a project, is easy to learn and a flexible method that can adapt
to all types of project.

PRINCE2 Agile® - combining the flexibility and responsiveness of
Agile with the clearly defined framework of PRINCE2. PRINCE2 Agile
integrates with portfolio, programme and project management, enabling
AGILE faster and better decision-making, accelerating the policy-planning cycle,
TRAINING ORGANIZATION ACCREDITED BY

ON BEHALF OF
enabling earlier delivery of benefits at programme level, providing a
controlled project environment and resulting in better implementation of
digital transformation projects.

MSP® (Managing Successful Programmes) – enables departments and
agencies to turn a major policy objective into a reality. To minimize risk,
TRAINING ORGANIZATION ACCREDITED BY manage dependencies and prioritize the benefits required from change,
ON BEHALF OF
it focuses on managing large scale change and stakeholders, delivering
strategic objectives rather than just co-ordinating a group of projects.

PRINCE2®, PRINCE2 Agile® and MSP® are registered trade marks of AXELOS Limited, used under permission of AXELOS
Limited. All rights reserved. The Swirl logo™ is a trade mark of AXELOS LIMITED, used under permission of AXELOS Limited.
PRINCE2®, PRINCE2 Agile® and MSP® Accredited Organization logos are trade marks of AXELOS Limited, used under permission
of AXELOS Limited. All rights reserved.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 6
Programme and Project Management
Learning Considerations
Adopting programme or project management frameworks is not simply a matter of sending individuals
on training courses to attain qualifications. Indeed, based on the 70:20:10 model advocated by the
APSC, only about 10% of learning occurs in formal classroom training:

• 70%—informal, on the job, experience based, stretch projects and practice
• 20%—coaching, mentoring, developing through others
• 10%—formal learning interventions and structured courses.

As the State of the Service Report 2014-15 stated:

“ The role of on-the-job learning has been a focus of public and private sector organisations for
some time. This has been driven by concerns about the adequacy of and the return on investment
provided by face-to-face training.
”
Tanner James recognises that classroom training is only one small part of learning, and that becoming
“qualified” through exams is the start of a journey, not the end of it. There are many more factors to be
considered when considering learning, including:

• the level of those seeking new skills (e.g. APS6, EL1, SES1)
• the role each person will be playing in relation to a programme or project
• how many programmes or projects are being run
• the range of programme or project management experience of the participants
• the desired learning outcomes for participants
• what time people have to commit to learning

A Learning Considerations Checklist is provided at the end of this guide to help decision-makers
provide direction on what they are seeking.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 7
Senior executive involvement
A common misconception is that programmes and projects can be delivered by appointing a programme
or project manager and letting them get on with it. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Programmes and projects are both organizations - temporary, flexible ones - and therefore require
leadership and direction in the same way as any organization does, big or small.

The Shergold Review reinforced this, stating that:

“ For all projects and programs, there needs to be a clear understanding about who accepts end-
to-end responsibility for managing implementation, wields delegated authority and where
accountability resides”. The review also said that “Senior Executive Service selection criteria should
place greater emphasis on program leadership when considering a candidate’s demonstrated breadth
of experience.
”
Senior executives who are appointed to any leadership roles such as SRO, Project Sponsor, Programme or
Project Board member must be equipped with the knowledge and skills to perform their role effectively.
This means having an understanding of programme and project management disciplines from an executive
perspective, and how they relate to the wider strategic context of public sector delivery and reform.

Senior executives do not want or need the detailed knowledge possessed by experienced and competent
programme or project managers; nor do they have time to attend training courses that run for days.
They do want to know how to direct and work with such individuals, and also how to avoid the pitfalls
commonly experienced when staff are inexperienced.

In terms of MSP or PRINCE2, senior executives want to understand the essence of things and know
how to ensure pragmatic application of these frameworks and to avoid common traps such as too much
documentation. For all senior executives time is precious, so they can only spare a few hours to attain
the level of understanding they need in order to be able to provide overall direction to projects or
programmes using MSP or PRINCE2.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 8
Workplace implementation
Programme management and project management disciplines can only be mastered through experience.
This often presents a dilemma for departments and agencies that need to manage the implementation
of major new policies or reforms: they find themselves having to choose between using employees
who lack the necessary skillsets, or external providers who have more skills but do not have the subject
matter insights and experience that public servants have.

Staff can be sent to attend formal training, however all courses must be focused on pragmatic application
within your workplace and run by appropriately qualified programme and project management
professionals, who have deep experience of public sector programmes and projects. Case studies must be
based on the actual projects and programmes on which participants are working.

Learning only begins in the classroom, it does not finish there. Programme and project managers
require access to on-the-job face-to-face coaching and support that complements initial classroom
learning. Such assistance must be timed for delivery as and when programmes and projects need it, and
made available to all roles, including senior executives, team members and business managers, not just
programme managers and project managers.

Training and workplace coaching must equip staff members with skills and competencies that align
to departmental learning and development pathways, APS development priorities and the Australian
Qualifications Framework (AQF) - the AQF is the national policy for regulated qualifications in
Australian education and training.

Workplace coaching and support in the application of frameworks such as PRINCE2 and MSP is
best delivered by suppliers who are AXELOS Accredited Training Organisations (ATOs), AXELOS
Consulting Partners (ACPs), and Registered Training Organisations under the AQF.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 9
Formal Qualifications
The Shergold Review made the following observations in respect of formal qualifications:

“ The importance of formal qualifications should not be underestimated. One of the best levers
to mitigate risks associated with programme delivery is to have properly trained and certified

”
practitioners.

Project and programme managers require minimum standards of competency and ongoing professional
development

There are a range of qualifications associated with AXELOS frameworks – Foundation and Practitioner
being the most commonly sought.

In most cases the Foundation qualification is a multiple choice exam that lasts an hour; the Practitioner
qualification is a more complex exam that lasts over two hours.

Training course participants often feel the pressure of having to take an exam at the end of a course.
They don’t want to leave with just a qualification; they want to be able to apply their learning in their
workplace; however it can be hard to concentrate on real learning when they feel they must focus their
time on making sure they will pass the exam.

For training to be effective there must be a way to alleviate this pressure. If participants decide at any
time (before or during their course) that they don’t feel ready to take any exam, they should be able
to postpone the exam to another time and be able to sit it after the course when they have had an
opportunity to study and feel ready to do so.

Some people don’t want exams. They would rather undertake competency-based assessment, and gain a
nationally recognised qualification in project management, and be assessed based on actual application of
their skills on the project on which they have been working.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 10
FAQ’s

“ Can MSP and PRINCE2 work for Digital Transformation and Agile?
”
Yes. Both frameworks are specifically designed for managing transformational change and/or in an Agile
way. MSP is designed to accommodate high levels of complexity, ambiguity and risk, and PRINCE2
has been fully matched with Agile, with detailed guidance available.

“ Are these programme and project management approaches just for IT-related change?
”
No. The Shergold Review was not IT-related. It set out to make practical recommendations to enhance
the capacity of the Australian Government to implement large public programmes and projects. Its
lessons, reform directions and proposals for improvement are designed to develop robust and effective
governance and accountability arrangements for such programmes and projects. It took account of best
practices on the nature and effectiveness of public policy processes and the implementation of large
public programmes and projects in Australia and internationally.

“ I recognise there is a lot to this - where do I start?
”
The answer will depend on your specific requirements, however in broad terms there are three steps to
improving programme and project management capabilities in the public sector:

1. People gain an initial understanding of the approaches available;
2. Programmes and projects apply the approaches in a way that is appropriate for them;
3. Organisations tailor approaches based on experience to establish effective frameworks

“ How can I obtain more information specific to my situation?

Please telephone us on 1300 774 623 or email info@tannerjames.com.au
”

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 11
Additional Information
Programme and Project Management Learning Considerations Checklist

Number of people to be trained

Level of attendees

Number of programmes/projects being run by organisation

Prior experience

MSP/PRINCE2 usage

PMO status

PMO contact

PMO role in this training

Programme/project position in lifecycle

Desired learning outcomes

Participant availability

Timeframe

Procurement mechanism (if applicable panel details)

Formal qualification(s) sought

Delegate / decision maker

Comments

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 12
Value for Money
Tanner James offers the best value for money. There may be other companies offering what appears
to be cheaper training; however we offer a unique approach to delivering high quality learning that is
successful and allows participants to complete the work and apply their skills on the job. This translates
to long term benefits for you.

Tanner James achieves better value for money by differentiating the fees for our training service (per day)
from the participant (per head) fees. This is because the participant price we charge our clients is driven
by the fixed input costs of training materials and as appropriate publications and examinations, to which
we add only a small margin to cover administration costs.

In addition, we wish to highlight that you will receive additional tangible financial value from Tanner
James, arising from the unique additional elements included with every three or four day MSP or
PRINCE2 course:

Workplace Implementation Pack FREE SES Executive Briefing
Designed to give participants understanding The highly engaging Executive
and knowledge about practical application in Briefing equips SES officers with the
the workplace, the Workplace Implementation understanding they seek in order to
Pack is focused on helping participants be able to provide overall direction to
programmes and projects. This briefing
implement the training when they get back to
is valued at over $2,200 inc GST.
the workplace. The Workplace Implementation
Pack consists of: Case Study Sessions
A free half-day Implementation Workshop We use case studies based on your
to help answer participants specific organisation’s actual current projects and
questions about implementation in the programmes. This gives participants a
workplace. practical way to look at learnings.

Free telephone support from the trainer the Flexible Exams and Course Attendance
month following the course. To ensure attendees are focused on
A free implementation checklist so that learning about practical application in
the workplace rather than passing an
participants are well placed to hit the
exam, we work with you to find an exam
ground running when they get back to delivery plan to suit your needs - at no
work. extra charge.
This pack is valued at over $2,300 inc GST. We can schedule training to suit staff
availability or the current focus of their
project. For example splitting the course
over two or more weeks. We will discuss
this approach with you and together work
out a delivery plan to suit your needs.

Tanner James | Enhancing policy implementation capabilities in the Public Sector 13
Questions?

If having read this e-book you would like more
information, please contact us.

1300 774 623

info@tannerjames.com.au

We will be happy to meet with you to have an obligation-free
conversation about your specific circumstances.

14